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INTRODUCTION 
This is an essay about entrepreneurial behavior 
in the woolen and worsted industry. The industry is 
presently in an important period of transition. For a 
period of many years prior to World War II the woolen 
and worsted industry lay dormant, generating no major 
rundamental technological or other changes. An impor-
tant.'.: post-war cluster of innovations materialized, 
however, which has fomented a revolution, a novel state 
of affairs for the traditionally conservative industry. 
Descriptive material has been written, principally 
·in technical publications, concerning mechanical, chem-
ical, corporate, and locational changes. In areas of 
this study which are concerned with such description, 
the au thor has drawn heavily .from these 49ouroes, pro-
viding appropriate documentation. These written sources 
haVe been SUpplemented by the Wi ter IS personal obser-
Vations of the subject matte!". 
The most signi.fieant portion of the work concerns 
behavior of entrepreneurs. Although some case studies 
have been made in other industries, it is the belief of 
i 
ii 
the author that this type o~ research is unique in the 
woolen and worsted industry. Because o~ the lack o~ 
documentary material concerning en~repreneurial behavior, 
most o~ the in~ormation has been d~rived ~rom personal 
interviews. In every case the principals and their close 
I 
associates were interviewed. All ~indings were cross-
checked in discussion with other personnel o~ the con-
cern, few o~ whom have been given pr9per documentary 
credit. It is believed that the case histories Which 
were so compiled present a ~air and accurate picture. 
The woolen and worsted indu$try has been tra-
ditionally an industry o~ locked d0ors. Perhaps the 
most remarkable feature o~ this study is that it could 
have been made at all. The author is pleased to state 
that although there were initial d~~iculties in some 
companies, each important ~irm that he wished to visit 
extended an invitation to visit th~ plant facilities. 
. I The managements of these companies: were most generous 
and helpful. The author sincerely appreciates the 
e.f~orts o~ these men in his behalf. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER I 
INNOVATION AND INNOVATORS 
' 
This thesis on entreprene~ial behavior in the 
woolen and worsted industry will 
1 
be limited to an 
1· '!,. 
analysis of the industry, an exa~ination of major 
I 
innovations, and an analysis of the imethods used by the 
persons who were responsible for thqse innovations. 
The history of the industry ~s a story of early 
development and rapid technological 'improvement. Long 
before other industries were mechanized, the textile in-
dusti?;es, including the woolen and \forsted industry, had 
reached a high degree of technological development. For 
many years prior to World War II, hqwever, the woolen §.tld 
! 
worsted industry had become a lagga~d. Woolen and worsted 
production techniques ' had become :a matter of lore and 
1 
1 i W. Rupert Maclaurin, rtThe P:ro cess of Technological 
Innovation, The Launching of a . New '<Scientific Industry," 
The-"'kmerican Economic Review, Vol. X~, No.1, ·March, 1950, 
p. 90. ·Maclaurin's approach has beeh used throughout this 
thesis as an analytical guide, since! innovations in the 
woolen and worsted industry have bee~ almost exclusively 
technological. 1 
2 
tradition, to be aceomplished after the fashion of pre-
ceding generations. But World War II and the post-war 
period witnessed the introduction of numerous changes of 
varying degrees of importance. These changes were pri-
marily of a technological nature and resulted in reducing 
the real costs of production in the industry. 
Innovation 
The terms innovation~ innovator, and-entrepreneur 
may convey various meanings to different persons. The 
words will be employed here as they were defined by Pro-
fessor Joseph A. Schumpeter in his books: The Theory o:f 
Economic Development and his two-volume work, Business 
Cycles. The following remarks concerning .the terms to be 
defined are quoted directly from these volumes or para-
phrased. 
In his monumental work, Business Cycles, Schumpeter 
defines innovation as "the setting up of a new production 
function.nl He explains that the term innovation includes 
the introduction of a new commodity, a new form of busi-
ness organization, the opening up of new markets, Taylor-
ization of work, or technological change; that is, any 
doing things differently. 
. lJoseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles (New York: 
McGraw-Rill Book Co., Inc., 1939), Vol. 1, 87. 
Even more specific is his definition found in 
The Theory of Economic Dev~lopment. 
IDhis concept covers the following five 
eases:: 
1. The· intr.oduction of a new good --
that is one with which consumers are not 
yet .familiar -- or of. a:new quality o:f a 
good. . . 
2. The intNJduction of a new method of· 
production, that is one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture 
concerned, which need by no means be founded 
upon a discovery scientifically new, anQ. can 
also. exist in a new way of handling a com-
modity commercially. 
J. The opening of a new market, that is 
a market into which the particular branch of 
manufacture of the country in question has 
not previously entered, whether or not this 
market has existed before. 4· The conquest of a new source of supply 
of raw materials or half-manufactured· goods, 
again irrespective of whether this source al-
r.eady exists or whether it has first to be 
created. 
5. Tke carrying out of the new organi-
zation of any industry, like the creation of 
a monopoly position (for example through 
trustification) or the breaking up of a 
monopoly position.l. 
Several assumptions are made concerning inno-
vations, Which may be·summarized as follows: 
1. Major ·innovations and also many minor ones 
entail construction of.new plants and equipment, or the 
1 ' 
3 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic 
Development (Cambridge: Harvard-university Press,l951), 66. 
rebuilding or old plants, requiring non-negligible time 
1 and outlay. This study will reveal important changes in 
etluipmeiltv!ntrodueed into old plants. In some eases old 
plants underwent important physical changes to become 
adapted to modern production methods. The movement of 
woolen and worsted mills to the South is, in small 
measure, due to technological change. The connection 
between technological and locational changein the indus-
try Will be discussed. 
2. Every innovation is embod;ied in a ~ rirm 
2 founded for the purpose. The life cycle of this new 
firm is intimately connected with innovation, the firm 
becoming less profitable when it becomes obsolete or has 
simply ceased to be new. Eventually the firm dies a 
nnaturalu death, becoming unable to pay interest or re-
cover depreciation. Innovations are always associated 
with the rise to leadership of new ~.3 A well-known 
important exception is the case of Trustified Capitalism 
as distinct from competitive capitalism. In large con-
cerns, particularly, an ever-changing personnel may bring 
lJoseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, op.cit., 
p. 93· 
4-
innovation into the firm, thus constantly renewing the 
life of the firm. Our study will reveal E£ ~ firms 
whatever engaged in innovational activity. All success-
ful innovations occurred within a limited number of 
multi-plant firms under tthe guidance of new me:n• We 
shall see that although all innovational activity occurred 
within larg~ firms, very few large firms in the industry 
could be classified as innovators. 
Innovations which become objectively possible are' 
not aarried into effect with equal promptitude by all 
firms technically capable of utilizing them. Case 
studies will reveal that some firms carry out innovations 
and act along new cost curves, while others do not.and 
have to adapt themselves in many cases by dying.l 
The Entrepreneur ~ Innovator 
The terms entrepreneur and innovator are reserved 
for individuals who carry out innovations. This excludes 
the majority of heads of firms who may engage in manage-
ment without the setting up of a new production function~ 
In his Theory of Economic Development and Business Cycles, 
Professor Schumpeter has endowed the entrepreneur with the 
following characteristics~ 
lJoseph A. Schum.peter, ibid., pp. 93-9~· 
.5 
1. He is a new man in a new ~ir.m. 
2. He is a man possessed o~ unusual but not nec-
essarily exceedingly rare talents. He is a leader. 
This ability to decide in ~avor of un-
tried possibilities or to choose not only 
between tried but also between the tried 
and untried ones, may, moreover, be dis-
tributed in the population according t'o 
the Gaussian -- though more probably a 
skew -- law, and Should not be thought of 
as confined to a ~ew exceptional cases.l 
To do something new is very much more di~ficult 
than to do something that belongs to the realm o~ the 
routine. The two tasks differ ~uantitatively, .and not 
only in degree. 
There are resistances to something new. The en-
vironment sometimes lacks,·sometimes refuses, the pre-
requisites in the case o~ something new. For example, 
lenders may lend willingly ~or routine purposes, but may 
re~use to lend for something new and un~own. Most 
people ~eel an inhibition when treading a new path be-
cause o~ lack o~ knowledge of how to handle an entirely 
new situation. It is much easier for people to ~allow 
and even to improve upon innovations after somebody else 
has pioneered and solved the major problems. 
1Joseph A. Schumpeter, ~., p.99. 
6 
7 
3. Entrepreneurs may simultaneously carry on other 
(non-entrepreneurial) business functions. His essential 
function may be routine managerial activity. 
It is not always easy to tell who the entrepreneur 
is in a given ease. Under competitive capitalism the 
entrepreneur will generally be found among the heads of 
firms, mostly among the owners. Generally he will be the 
founder of the firm and.of an industrial family.as well. 
In a giant firm the location of the entrepreneur is more 
difficult to determine. The organizational leader may or 
may not hold the position of entrepreneurial leaderShip. 
The entrepreneur may be any salaried employee, the pro-
moter, an executive or a stockholder. In the oases under 
study the innovators were the heads of their firms. These 
men were professional managers who had assumed executive 
leadership in old, well-established firms. 
4· The entrepreneur need not be the inventor of 
the good or process he introduces, nor need he be the 
person who furnished the capital. It is entrepreneurial 
leadership, rather than ownership, which matters. In 
cases under study the stock of the firm was widely and 
pub~iely held. This is underscored by the fact that con-
trol of the Pacific Mills, a leading innovating firm, was 
later acquired by other interests. The acquiring firm 
openly purchased Pacific Mills securities on the stock ex-
change. An attractive price was also offered to existing 
stockholders, and a sufficiently large number of shares 
was acquired for complete control. 
Profits are a.functional return. Whether or not 
profits accrue to the entrepreneur is a matter of the par-
ticular institutional pattern. For example, in the cor• 
porate industry under study, profits accrue to the firm as 
such. The share of profits allocated to the entrepreneur 
is indeterminate. 
Entrepreneurship is not a profession and, as a rule, 
not a lasting condition. Inheritance of assets and of 
personal qualities may facilitate succeeding generations 
in becoming entrepreneurs. But the function of the entre-
1 preneur itself cannot be inherited. An important case 
will reveal, however, that qualities of entrepreneurship· 
can successfully be transferred from one industry to 
another. 
The structure of the woolen and worsted industry 
has affected entrepreneurial activity. During 1947, an 
early post-war year, there was in excess of eight hundred 
1summarized from Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business 
Cycles, pp. 99-103j and from the Theory of Economic 
Development, pp. 74 and following. --
8 
woolen and worsted establishments, employing approximately 
180,000 workers. Income tax data disclosed that total re-
ceipts of woolen and worsted firms for that year were 
$1.7 billion, with profits of $153 million. The typical 
woolen and worsted firm was small, but there were a few 
large concerns (over one hundred employees). Many firms 
were very specialized, performing merely a single step in 
the production process. Other firms were partially or 
fully vertical-ly integrated. As previously mentioned, 
most large firms did not engage in innovation, but all of 
the important innovations were brought into being within 
the framework of these large, highly integrated, well-
established companies. It will be argued that large firms 
have found it easier to support and use the.results of re-
search. Small firms, on the other hand, have found it dlf.;. ... 
ficult to keep their· productive equipment reasonably 
modern. 
Types of Innovation Studied 
And Analysis Employed 
As was indicated earlier in this chapter, Schumpe-
ter points out that innovation can take many forms. A 
study of the woolen and vvorsted industry reveals that 
many important changes have oocurred,which are noted in 
this chapter. But mere change is not necessarily 
9 
Schumpeterian innovationQ 
While recognizing that many types of innovation 
are possible, it was clearly observed in this study that 
technological innovation was by far of primary impor~ 
tance. (As we shall see, other types of innovation were 
conspicuously absent.) Invention and development were·. 
encouraged through research. Important new machinery 
resulted. These machines reduced costs and encouraged 
the blending of wool fibers with man-made fibers. 
Because of our emphasis on technological inno-
vation and the relative absence of other types, we have 
adopted the analytical techniques of W.R~ Maclaurin, a 
leading student of technological innovation. · Maclaurinls 
method is especially valuable since it invites.realistic 
appraisal. The investigator is encouraged to gather and 
utilize empirical data from which it is possible to draw 
his ·own conclusions.. The analyst is not limited in his 
method by the rigid framework of a theoretical model 
which shapes his work in a pre .... dete.rmined design. MJ:tc-
laurin asks these five questions: 
10 
1 Maclaurin 1 s Five Questions 
Maclaurin recommends that when analysing techno-
logical innovation in an industry, the following ques-
tions be asked: 
a. Are major advances occurring in the 
sciences underlying the industry? 
b. Ia engineering art in close touch 
with and contributing to these advances? 
e. Is the economic organization of the 
industry conducive to innovation? 
d. Is capital freely available for rad-
ical new developments? 
e. Do the entrepreneurs possess the 
requisite skills for successful innovation?:· 
The above questions are an important part of our 
analysis and will be discussed at length in another 
portion of this work. 
Brown's Theory Examined and Rejected 
Another theory of technological innovation con-
sidered as a possible basis for analysis was that of 
William Henry Brown, .Jr.1 His theory will be examined 
in this chapter, but will not be utilized further in 
the study. 
1w.R.Maclaurin, QE.cit., p. 91. 
11 
2William.Henry Brown, .Jr., Innovation in the 
Machine Tool Industry, unpublished dissertation-(New 
Raven: Yale University, 1952). Summarized in an article 
of the same name published in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. LXXI, No.3, August, 1957~ --
12 
Brown criticizes the conclusions or Schumpeter and 
1 
the method or Maclaurin, recommending his own unique 
precise mathematical theory or-innovation for the machine-
tool industry. To summarize crudely, Brown•s theory is 
primarily c.ounter-cycJ,ical in character. He points ou:b 
that only a small amount of technological change occurs 
during periods- of peak demand and that the amount of 
technological change increases as machine-tool sales 
decline. Brown stajies.: 11A major hypothesis of this paper 
is that innovation occurs when the demand for machine 
tools falls.tt 2 
If Brownts thesis is correct, it is an i~ortant 
contribution to knowledge of timing of innovation under 
ttTrustified Capitalism" in the machine-tool industry. 
As statistical support for Brown's assumptions· 
concerning the timing of innovation, he states: 
.Records were compiled of all new machine 
tools announced in the new shop equipment 
column of Machinery, the monthly trade maga-
~ine, rrom 1905 through 1950.3 
These records, compiled from a trade magazine, are 
the oniy statistical jnstirication presented in support 
1Ibid., Chapter I. 
2" ~., P• 4.12.' 
3Ibid., P• 195. 
of Brown's calculus of innovation. Admittedly Brown's 
task was difficult. More suitable data were not r.eadily 
available. When verifying Brown1 s data, funthermore, 
this writer was required to separate highly complex 
machine tools from new twists in the simple (not machine) 
hand tools. Brown's compilati~ns appear accurate. 1 
Brown separates the innovations of the forty major 
mac.hine-tool companies from those of other industries or 
firms. 
The purpose of separating out the forty 
largest companies is to be able. to isolate 
the new, improved machine tools from the 
machines introduced by the manufacturers.of 
second or third-line equipment, who ~nter 
the marketat periods of peak demand. 
1 Brown s self-imposed restrictions seriously limit the 
scope and utility of any conclusionf! derived .from his 
.study, which is thereby restricted to the concept o.f 
"Trustified Capitalism.u It automatically ignores the 
entry of· new firms into the industry, considered a 
matter of importance by Schumpeter. 
lExcept for three insignificant errors in 
addi~n, years 1905 and 1915, p. l98,ibid. 
2Ibid.:. P• 196. 
13 
The foregoing data were then plotted against tbe 
value of machine-tool shipments for the entire period of 
the study, with the following results: 
I:t' innovation .in the machine tool indus-
try results :t'rom a decline in demand, it would 
be expected that the value o:t' machine tool 
shipments would. move in the opposite direction 
from the number of new designs introduced. The 
accompanying char~ shows the direction o:t' 
change in the value o:t' shipments, as opposed 
to the direction of change in the number o:t' 
new designs introduced by the forty major 
machine tool companies. In a total of forty-
six years, there are only nine years in which 
these two figures move in the same direction. 
In other words, when industry shipments are 
increasing, the number of new designs intro-
duced by the forty major firms is :t'alling.l 
Using the :t'igures tabulated by Brown for all com-
pa'nies, and not merely the top forty companies, it can 
readily be determined that the results are not as satis-
~actory as in the above quotation. Following Brown's 
method;;;, exactly, it was determined that in twenty of the 
years compared the data moved in the ~ direction. · The 
remaining items moved in the op,osite direction. Thus it 
cannot be reliably stated that the quantity of innovations 
reported tend to move· in the opposite direction from: ...... 
machin.e-tool shipments. 
1 Ibid. 1 P• 202. 
Further indication of the importance of the 
statistical data compiled from Machinery is evidenced 
in his published article. Brown's timing of innovation 
1 
must stand or fall on t~e adequacy of the data used. 
A peculiarity in the data provided by Brown is 
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revealed in an analysis of the number of new machines 
introduced by each of' the forty firms, on a year-to-year 
basis from 1905 to 1950. It may be observed that some 
major companies are reported to have had few or E£ new 
machines introduced during the lengthy period of the 
study 1 Other companies reported as many as eighty-three 
. 2 
new machines. 
Study of Brown's original source material reveals 
that MachinerY is ~;t long-established, highly regarded 
publication in the fields of engineering and production 
in the manufacture o.f metal products. The "Shop Equip-
ment News Department" from which all of th·e data was 
extracted, is compiled and edited by Freeman Duston, 
Associate Editor. He is the author of these articles, 
Which constitute a small portion of each monthly maga-
zine. Each new invention listed and described by Duston 
is accompanied by a photograph of' the tjpe commonly 
lw~H:~:2:Pown, .QR.cit., pp. 413, 414, 4-15. 
zw· 
.H.Brown, dissertation, p. 198. 
associated with advertising literature, the name and 
address of the manufacturer, and a technical description 
of the product. 
Duston stated in an interview1 that he was born 
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in 1892, was well acquainted with the machi~e-tool indus-
tries during most of his adult life, and had been on the 
staff of the publication continuously since 1918. 
Duston was carefully appraised of the purpose of \ 
the interview. He was thoroughly cooperative and was 
quite agreeable to being quoted. When asked where he 
obtained the material for his articles, DuBton explained 
that almost all of the material was mailed to him by 
manufacturers of'· the ~quipment in the hope that it would 
be published. On being questioned further he explained 
that·not all firms sent such announcements to him and 
that his column was never intended to be a complete list-
ing of all new machines or inventions in the field. In 
further evidence of this fact he pointed out that he 
typically had at least one-third more material sent to 
him than he could possibly print, due to space limitati9n& 
The increas~ng proportion of published reports on 
lFebruary 25, 1961. 
Editor o:f.Industrial Press, 
Duston.is also Associate 
publishers of' Machinery. 
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machines introduced by larger compa~ies during recession 
periods reflected requests by these imp.ortant advertisers 
1 that their material be used. "Nat"\].rally our advertisers 
expect us to use their material if they are paying us 
good money.u 
When asked for his opinion on whether the number 
of new machines actuallr increase during recession and 
depression, Duston was not prepared to be quoted •. But ·he 
aid offer: nWhen depression or recession comes, the num-
ber of news releases by the companies increase. No sense 
QUestioned further on the alleged rash of inno-
vations reported when recession occurs, Duston statedt 
Faced with increasing competition, 
manufacturers make whatever improvements 
they can do easily. These machines Should 
be_~ (to get into my column), but things 
can be changed over enough to rate another· 
_article, without really being different 
'machines. 
On the other hand, during the peak years of 
. 
World War I and World War II many important new machines 
were not mentioned at all, or.their descriptions were 
vague. Descriptions of new machine to~ls tt ••• had to be 
. . 
1Compare with Brown's interpretation, Quarterly 
Journal Qf Economics article, p. 414. 
cleared through Washington. Sometimes we couldn•t use 
them at all, or we were preven~ed from disclosing size 
and capacity. n 
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. The publishers of Machinery have a right to print 
whatever descriptions of mach~nery they choose to select, 
particularly since they. do not pretend that these are a 
.. 
complete listing of new items. On the other hand, in-
formation so assembled cannot be added up and used by 
economists as representing useful ~antitative data con-
cerning innovations in the tndustry. The quantity of 
innovations thus reported and their distribution among 
large and small ;firms depe:h.d less upon economic con-
ditions and more upon such factors as the number of 
column inches allowed .for. use,. the size of the photo-
graph used, pr.essures brought to bear by large advertis-
ers, verbosity of writers, and perhaps other· non-relevant 
consi¢l.erations. 
It should be obvious that poorly gathered data are 
not improved by refined mathe~atical techniques. Thus the 
use of such techniques by Brown does not change the fun-
damental fact that his source material is unsuitable for 
the purpose intended. 
This criticism can neither confirm. nor deny that 
Brown• s intuition and the opinions of other persons whom 
he cites conaerning the timing of innovation is correct •. 
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It asserts, however, that Brown has provided no acceptabl~ 
quantitative evidence to support his position. 
Areas of the Study Not Classified 
As Innovation -- Marketing and Merchandis~ng 
Charm asks the question: 
Of all the industries catering directly 
to the ultimate consumer, which besides the 
woolens and worsteds manufacture makes so 
little effort, tnd that offhand, to keep in 
touch with him? 
One may ask the question, how mueh should be ex-
pected of the mills in terms of advertising and other 
forms of demand creation? Should not this activity be 
left to clothing manufacturers who,.in the final analy-
sis, work the fabric up into the form in which it is 
taken by the consumer? Charm agrees that "advertising 
to the general pub+ic may well be the least effective and 
least important part of any marketing and merchandising 
2 
effort.n But he says this is true only if the mills al_'e 
able to plan their production lines on the basis of full 
knowledge about consumer demand. In this connection how 
do the mills function? 
1
sumner D. Charm, Textile Twilight, ~ England. 
This paper was ~itten by Charm while he was Associate 
Professor of Industrial Administration at Carnegie Insti-
tute of Technology and was widely circulated in mimeo-
graphed form in 1952. 
2Ibid. 
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There is advertising of woolen and worsted prod-
ucts, as any reader of Esguire, Ladies Home Journal, or 
similar publications is well aware. The number of tex-
tile fir,ms which engage in such advertising, however, is 
limited. The number of clothing manufacturers who at-
tempt to create a demand for their products is also 
limited to the larger, well-established houses. For the 
combined clothing and woolen and worsted trades as a 
whole the following procedure is more common. 
The typical clothing retailer knows what lines 
are moving and which are not. This information is nat-
urally transmitted back to the wholesaler and manufac-
turer. The salesmen for a woolen or worsted mill then 
informs the mill's. stylist what the current season's· 
demand is~ The stylist then goes back over the mill's 
stock of samples until he finds something similar to 
this. F'or example, in one year gabardines of a par-
ticular weight and shade may be popular. The chances 
are that sometime in the past ;;the mill has made suab. a 
fabric, or something very close to it. If this kind of 
cloth is moving on the market again, the stylist in-
forms the mill's designer. The latter sets up the spec-
ifications for the cloth, informs the buyers of the kind 
of wool needed to make it, has samples made up for the 
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salesmen Who then go out to get orders. 
Year after year woolen and worsted 
fabrics seem the same and look the same 
beQause they are the same. The illusion 
of change i~ provided by the cyclical 
sequence in which the same old colors, 
patterns,. textures,.· and designs follow 
one another.l . . 
There are exceptions to these generalizations, of 
course, and some of' these will be discussed presently • 
. The industry as a whole, however, has not taken steps to 
improve marketing or demand creation. As Charm has put 
it: 
The entire procedure_is strictly em-
p::i::Pical and almost completely stereo-
typed. The mills get some second or third 
hand information about how t:O.e market is, 
but have no way of knowing why it is that 
way or what it will be. The ·stylist often 
is a cloth technician who knows nothing more 
about style than what he personally likes. 
The designer often is a cloth mechanic who 
knows nothing about design except how to 
plot one somebody else has invented. Creative-
. ness and objective information on which ~o 
build prudent f'orecasts are both absent. 
Up to the present, at least, the industry has not 
even taken advantage of' the most elementary methods of 
market analysis based upon small-sample statistical 
theory of the Gallup-poll variety. It produces on the 
basis o:f past demands rather than going out to find out 
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what the public would like to wear in the way of woolen 
and worsted fabrics. Onee a trend sets in, the. indust·ry 
eagerly follows this trend With apparently little thought 
given to the fact that the market for a particular fabric 
will be saturated within a relatively short time. 
The classic example is provided by the case of 
blue serge -- a fabric rarely seen today. In the early 
1920's,however, the industry was "caught flat-footed by 
the public's saturation with serge.ttl This cloth had 
been popular for years, if not for generations. The 
leaders of the industry reasoned that there would alw~ys 
be a demand for serge, and that the decline in demand for 
this fabric that took place in the early 1920's ~as a 
temporary phenomenon. Mills continued to produce the 
fabric which piled up in warehouses, and, according to 
Charm, it was not until about 1929 that the realization 
finally dawned that blue serge was a fabric of the past. 
Only then.did the industry permit the decumulation of 
inventories and turn to the production of new fabrics 
which the public wanted. 
After World War II the industry was once again 
surprised. Acting on the assumption that servicemen 
clothed in olive-d~ab o~ navy-blue £o~ several yea~s 
would want to wear clothing as dissimilar as possible 
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to thei~ uni£orms, the industry p~epa~ed £o~ the post-
war ma~ket by p~oducing £ancy £ab~ics such as checks, 
her~ingbone weaves, plaids, etc. No one knows £or ce~­
tain how the indust~y a~~ived at this conclusion. Pos-
sibly membe~s o£ the industry serving in the armed 
£orces heard casual comments by soldie~s and sailors to 
the e££eot that once they were able to shed their uni-
ro~ms they were going to wear the "loudest" designs they 
could £ind. There was no attempt to make a scientific 
su~vey, however, and the industry acted upon the basis 
of' an untested assumption. 
The surp~ise came when discharged se~vioemen ,: 
demanded gabardines, sharkskins, and other non-fancy 
fabrics which the indust~y was not able to immediately 
provide in sufficient quantities. Clothing manufacturers 
and retailers .for a brief period after the war had con-
tinued to accept whateve~ textiles the mills could pro-
vide. MeanWhile,,in spite of the sellers' market then 
existing for textiles·and clothing, retaile~s were 
caught with racks of' unsold suits made of the .fancy 
.fab~ies. These were eventually disposed of, but to 
a large extent by means of the expedient of the 
mark-down and bargain sale. Now this may be one way of 
uereating a demandn f'or a product, but it is not what the 
economist or market analyst has in mind when he talks 
about demand creation. 
The study made by the author of marketing and 
merchandising in the woolen and worsted industry f'ailed 
to reveal any activities in this area which might be 
classified as innovations. 
Rise of Synthetic Fioers 
The rapid expansion in the use of synthetic 
fibers during recent years is well known. Chart 1 re-
veals the pheonomenal rise in the use of rayon acetate 
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and other synthetic fibers. This can be compared to the 
gradual and erratic rise in the use of wool. By 1955 rayon 
acet~te was more than three times as important as wool, 
while other man-made fibers rivalled wool in pounds con-
sumed b,y U.s. mills. Synthetic fibers 1are a creation of 
the chemical industry and not of' the woolen and worsted 
industry. The use of' synthetic fibers in blending was riot 
unique with the woolen and worsted industry, but was even 
more.prevalent in the cotton industry. 
The synthetic f'iber industry and the rise of syn-
thetic fibers is nottreated here. But the use of' impor-
tlUl:t~ new machinery which enabled the woolen and worsted 
industry to blend synthetics with wool, and the rise in 
the use of blended fibers are considered as important 
innovations in this study. The new machinery pe:rmi tted 
large-scale use of the new fibers on woolen and worsted 
machinery 1 and these new materials were used to create 
fabrics with price and quality characteristics Which 
were markedly different from all-wool. 
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TAB_l,E I 
u.s. MILL CONSUMPTION OF CERTAIN MILL FIBERS 1920-1955 (in millions of pounds) · . . 
Wool Cotton· Silk Rayon Other Acetate Man-made Fibers 
1920 3;t4. 2 2,828.1 29.2 8.7 
1921 ~%~:~ 2,595·3 42•3 19.8 1922 2,909.8 48.1 25.0 
192~ 422. . 3,120.5 47·1 ~2.8 192 )4~.2 2:;636.6 ~7.8 5~:tt 1925 349·9 3,074·7 6.0 1926 342.7 . ·3,214.8 65.6 60.9 
1927 354.1 3,587 ~7 71.6 100.1 
1928 333.2 3,184.2 74·~ 100".~ 1929 368.1 3.~22.7 80. 133· 
1930 263.2 2, 10.6 75.6 119-~ 1931 311.0 2, 656~ . 76.8 159 .. 
1932 230.1 . 2,463.3 "70.5 155.4. 
193~ 317.1 3,052 .• ~ 5~-5 217 ·3 193 229.7 2,65~· . 5 .2 196.9 
1935 417.5 2,15 ·1 62.3 259.2 
1936 4o6.1 3,~70.2 57.8 . 322.% 
1937 380.8 3, 57.1 53.6 304-. 
1938 28t.5 2,.918. 7 ~1.7 ,·a~~·% 19l9 r .5 3, 629.7 7·3 :. . . 19 0 07.9 3,953.6 35.8 '482.1 4--~ 1941 48.0 5,186.3 23.4 591.~ 11. 1942 616.2 5,63 • 7 5.0 620 •. 23.1 
19tli. 636.2 ~,269.0 1.~ 656.1 45·3 19 622.8 , 792·4 o. 704.8 5.8 
t~frg 645.1 Ji-,511.3 0.5 769.9 49.8 737·5 4,803.3 6.5 875·7 ·53.2 . 
1947 708.3 4,668.1 2.0 987.6 61.4 1948 704.5 4,%61.2 7 ·4 1,149· 71-7 
1949 511.0 4, 38.2 %·4 993·5 92.8 1950 647·0 4, 680.1 
·t 1,351.6 ll:J-0.5 1951 495.0 4,846.8 5. 1,276.6 195.5 
1952 477.5 4,437.1 6.9 1,215.5 248-9 195~ 503.8 4,S?I:o g:fr 1,223.0 2~~:l 195 ~93-3 4,12~.2 1,154.8 1955 . 22.9 4,38 .2 7.2 1,419.2 l32.2 
1956 44~· 7 . 4,332.3 7·7 1,201.1 484.2 
1957 37 .1 4,0~9·9 5·9 1,177.1 567.5 1958 itlt7·1 a,9 ~·9 5.2 1,114.4 575.2 1959 5.0 ,35 .. o ~-4 1,253·7 743.0 
Source:: nstatistics", Textile Organan, .Jan. 1952 •. 
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The Relocation of Woolen and 
- - -
Worsted Mills to the South 
A number of studies have been made in recent 
years touching on the relocation of woolen and worsted 
mills from the North -- especially New England -- to 
the South.1 A variety of factors have contributed to 
the movement of woolen and worsted mills to the South. 
Without minimizing the i~ortanee of other factors, the 
principal reasons for the movement appear to have been 
low wage rates, cooperative attitudes of labor, 2 and 
low building costs. 
A large part of the cost of a finished woolen or 
worsted fabric consists of .ffi.c.tory labor posts. Since 
Southern workers could be hired for lower hourly wage 
rates than Northern workers, this was a magnet to cost-
conscious manufacturers. Perhaps of equal or greater 
importance is that Southern workers, ignoring the tra-
ditions of Northern workers, were willing to accept in-
creased workloads, were generally more docile and non-
unionized. An. important point explained later in this 
lAmong those not mentioned thus far in this thesis 
are: John A •. Hogan, Employment ~ Collective Bargaining 
Problems in ~ American Woolen and Worsted Industry, 
unpublished doctoral dissertatioilTCambridge: Harvard 
Univ., 1952); .J.A. Morris, Woolen and Worsted Manufactu:r-
in~ in the Southern Piedmont (Coluibia,s.c.: Univ. of 
s .. -press, 1952); John o. Tomb, "Should Industry Move 
South," Harvard Business Review, September-October 1953~ 
· 
2According to principals who have moved mills 
from North to South. Bee later case studies. 
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thesis (less well known, but emphasized by men responsible 
I 
for mechanical innovations) is that Northern workers re-
sented new inventions which yielded greater output per 
man;-hour. 1 So~thern workers, according to top-management, 
were more willing to apply their best.efforts to makin,g 
a new invention successful. The latter factor alon~ was 
responsible for signifi.cant differences in productivity 
since it encouraged mills to use mechanical inventions in 
the South before introducing them in .the North. 
The movement of mills from the North to the South 
was, needless to sa:y, a matter of great economic conse-
quence.· to the areas involved. But since it appears that 
the movement was primarily merely a shift from a high 
labor-cost to a low labor-cost area, we have not classi-
fied such movements as innovations. 
1see later case studies for elaboration on this 
point. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WOOLEN AND WORSTED 
INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
Introduction 
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In the years preceding World War II critics or the 
woolen and worsted industry deplored its relative lack of 
technological progress as compared wlth other indu~tries. 
As we shall see, this resulted from a variety of factors, 
not the least of which were the early historical develop-
ment of the industry and the small unit size of the plant. 
The most casual study of the EngLish and United 
States industriaL history will reveal the early importance 
of the woolen and worsted industries and an accompanying 
hign degree of mechanization. The intense application of 
inventive genius and the utilization of ~ese ideas placed 
the industry on a high plateau of technology. Gibb states 
that "The textile machinery industry cannot well escape 
condemnation for the unparalleled technological stagnation 
1 
of the 1890-1920 period." The terminal date reflects 
lG. S. Gibb, The Saco-Lowell Shops; (Cambridge: 
Harvard University ¥ress, 1950J, 599· · 
Jl 
advances made in cotton machinery, the "stagnation" not 
ending in the woolen and worsted industry for ~lmost an-
other quarter-century. 
Size of the Mill (J:llant) and Firm 
The average size of the woolen and worsted mill 
(plant), with but few exceptions, has been small. ~here 
have been very large woolen and worsted firms, of course, 
but they have usuaLly consisted of a large number of small 
mills, rather than one or two huge factories. The typical 
·firm, in spite of several outstanding· exceptions,. has 
tended to be small also • 
. The reason that the small firm has been the general 
rule is that large production does not mean large macnin-
ery, but merely repetition of machine units.·A single em-
ployee can tend a certain number of a given type of ma-
chine. Low operating costs are consequently reached with 
but a small number of each of several types of machines. 
Increased size does not materially reduce costs further. 
Another factor ten~ing to reduce the size of the 
mill is that in spite of the number of mills that are ver-
tically integrated, receiving raw wool and shipping ·fin-
ished fabrics, many mills perform only one step in the 
production process, selling their product to other mills 
for further processing. The independent topmaker, for 
example, sells top to the worsted mill. Competition 
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keeps his profit low. The worsted mill may conse~uently 
avoid investing capital in preparatory machinery and 
plant, avoid long-term investment and consequent specu-
lation in wool, ana. avoid the necessity of finding a buyer 
for the valuab~e by-product, noils. 
A final reason for the small size of the woolen and 
worsted mill is that .the bulk of woolen and worsted sales, 
especially woolens, are small orders requiring individual 
attention and styling. This is an entirely different sit-
uation from tl:+e cotton mill which can produce tens of 
thousands of yards of the same product in the grey, and 
later have this bleached, dyed, or printed. In woolens 
and worsteds each individual order for fabric is styled 
in the loom for color and for weave. 0 , requiring more 
skilled, more highly paid labor and reducing the possibi~y 
of producing in anticipation of orders. This type of mill 
is not likely to engage in mass production techniques. 
Most of the large mills ~ich were built have failed~ 
These mills were designed to mass-produce blue serge fabric, 
a standardized perennial favorite. But when styles Changed, 
and a large variety of colors and weaves were demanded, the 
mass-producing factory proved uneconomic. 
The typical woolen and worsted firm has remained 
small in spite of a large number of mergers in the industry. 
The nature of and reasons for the merger movement are 
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discussed at a later point in this chapter. 
The importance of the small size of the firm to this 
study is that no evidence of significant innovational ac-
tivity has been found in this area. All. successfUl inno-
vational activity has been carried out by a very few of the 
larger firms. A contributing reason is that smaller firms 
~annot afford th~ expensive type of modern research which 
might result in useful improvements. Indeed, smaller 
firms have been adversely affected by innovations of the 
larger firms,finding it difficult financially to keep their 
machinery· and equipme.nt up to date. Successful techno-
logical innovation destroys existing values by making exist-
ing machinery obsolete. 
Perhaps this is the reason why the woolen and wor-
sted industry which has effective trade organization, and 
which has banded together successfully to obtain legis-
lative benefits, has never organized,on an industry-wide 
basis to support research. 
The Woolen and Worsted Industries Defined 
Before raw wool is ready to be made into yarn it is 
put through several preparatory stages. The first consists 
of scouring and combing the wool. The scouring process 
removes pnactically all the dirt, burrs, and similar foreign 
matter as well as the ugreasen which comes from the body of 
the sheep. The latter is recovered by the wool-scouring 
mill since it has commercial value (lanolin), and is 
widely used in a variety of medications and cosmetics. 
After scouring the wool is carded on machines known 
as ncardsu. · These machines consist of large metal cylin-
ders covered with card clothing, which consists of.heavy 
cloth studded with protruding short.wires. The purpose of 
this step is to lay the wool flat and remove any foreign 
matter which is not washed out in the scouring process. As 
the wool comes from the card it is in the form of a wide 
strip which is known as "laptt. In the manufacture of wool, 
the raw material is run through several sets of cards, each 
one of which delivers a narrower lap. After the material 
has been thoroughly carded, it is ready to be spun into 
yarn, if woolen yarn is desireda 
To manufacture worsted yarn, another step must be 
included.· This is the all-important step of eombing.There 
are two principal methods of combing wool which is to be 
made into worsted yarn. These are the Bradford and the 
French methods. BothFreneh and Bradford combs produce a 
~ap of wool known as wool top. In the process of combing, 
the longer fibers are separated from the short ones. The 
long ones are retained in the wool top, but the short fibers 
which ar·e cailed noils or nebs are combed out. The shorter 
fibers are not discarded but ~sed in tne manufacture of wool 
yarn or wool felting. 
The distinguishing feature of worsted yarn is that it 
is made exclusively of long fibers combed from virgin (unused) 
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wool. The fibers are laid parallel by the combing process 
and when they are spun into yarn a very hard twist is im-
parted to them. This results in a dense, smooth surfaced 
yarn. 
Wool rarn, on the other hand, is produced from the 
above mentioned nails, from short staple wools, and also 
from re-used wools such as discarded clothing. These fi-
bers are not combed parallel but are rather matted togeth-
er, are not tWisted as hard as worsted yarn, and have a 
fuzzy appearance. 
From this stage on there is relatively little dif-
ference between the two systems of cloth making, whether 
it be wool or worsted. Both must be spun on spinning 
frames or mules. Following this the yarn is woven into 
cloth on looms or on weaving machines. ~e latter is 
something new in the industry as the weaving machine is one 
of the most.important innovations introduced in recent 
years. It Will be discussed in detail in .a later chapter. 
In general, woolen mills are smaller than worsted 
mills, and are more likely to be completely integrated 
from the spinning through the finishing stages. Most of 
the preliminary process of wool combing is done in inde-
pendent mills which specialize entirely in wool scouring 
(washing of raw wool) and combing. 
9;'he Early History of the Woolen and 
Worsted Industry in the United States 
Colonial Period to 1812 
Early American immigrants brought with them the 
knowledge and art of making fabrics.of wool. Perhaps the 
earliest evidence of this knowledge and the value of the 
IDabrics may be found in the inventory of Peeter Branch1 
who died en route to New England in the year 1640. This 
inventory contains, among other things, the following: 
one owld Stuff petti9oate 
(one old woqlen petticoat) 
one owld ~.fanneil weastcoat 
(one old rla~el.vest) 
£ 
00 08 
02 
4. yard ·of wnome mad.,.Cloth · · · 05 
(four yards ·of homemade cloth, 
probably wool, .possibly linen) 
2 linsye woolsye·. bagges 
(two linsey-woolsey bags) 
2 Ids and ~ of bro~dcloth 
(22 yards of broadcloth) 
03 
01 
·00 
b 
6 
.,15 
The attention of the reader is invited. to the fact 
that in the· now obsolete terminology the term Stu:f.f ne:Cerred:' 
. lcommonwealth of Massachusetts, Su.ffolk, ss., 
Registry of Probate, filed 'in said court in 1640, and 
recorded in·Volume 2, page 2. uThe Inventory of the Geodes 
and Chattles of Pester Branch who dyed (sic) aboard the 
Shipp called. the Castle in his voyage to N.E." 
to woolen and occasionally worsted material. Ffannel is 
flannel) a nappy woolen mat(3r.ial. Linsey-woolsey was a 
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· popular material of linen warp (for strength) and woolen 
filling. Broadcloth is broadcloth) a fine) plainly woven 
woolen material. 
Durfng the Colonial period wool manufacture was a 
household industry. Most of the raw material wool was 
grown in the Colonies, .although there were some imports. 
Few Colonial woolens entered into .commerce, the major 
portion beirig consumed in the home where produced. Euro-
pean-made woolens) however, were sold in the cities and 
towns to fashion-conscious persons who did not choose to 
wear the crude homespun fabric. 
Early American Colonial nand tools were similar to 
those used by the British. After the wool was wasned it 
was carded with hand cards. The card was a rectangular 
board, covered with leather which bristled with wires. 
Tnese wires Q.id ·not stand straight, as in a brush) but 
were tilted and s1ign-cly bent. A worker used two cards 
· simultaneously, straightening and blending wool . .fibers. 
Carding was usually performed by women and children. 
When worsted yarns were desired, combing was ac-
complished by a pair of hand combs) sturdier than wool 
cards, utilizing fewer but heavier wires. The combs would 
straighten and separa.te the long wool fibers, discarding 
the short fibers. The long fibers (tops) were spun into 
worsted yarns. The short fibers (nails) were carded and 
spun into woolens. Combing required greater muscular 
exertion than carding, and was usually reserved for men. 
Spinning of the carding or top was usually accom-
plished on the hand spinning wheel. This work was gener-
ally reserved for girls and women. 
Weaving required strength, skill, and a loom. Many 
households performed their own weaving on th~ir· own equip-
ment. But the local weaver and the itinerant weaver were 
also commonly employed to convert the customer's yarn into 
woven fabric. American looms remained unimproved until 
after the Revolutionary War in spite or the earLier British 
adoption of Kay 1 s Fly shuttle. Woven cloth was of two 
principal types: homespun and linsey-woolsey. 
Fulling is a process which improves the texture and 
appearance of cloth. The usual manner of finishing was to 
wet the fabric tho~oughly with soapy water, lay it on ~ 
wooden floor, and beat it with sticks. The fUlling mill 
with simple water-driven machinery became an early, popu-
lar institution, the first being established in Rowley, 
Massachusetts, in 1643. 
Napping was accompLished by repeatedly rubbing a 
hand c·ard over the surface of the woven material, scratch-
ing up ends from the woven surface •• 
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Shearing cut back the napped fibers to the desired 
height. Cloth would be p~aced·on a table and the nap care-
fully sheared with hand scissors. A high degree of skill 
was required to avoid damaging the finish of the material. 
This operation was rarely performed by household labor, 
but was reserved for hired specialists. 
Colonial production of wool textiles was oha.Dacter-
ized by the above described modified household system. The 
... 
putting out system was rarely employed and factories (ex-
cluding the water-power driven fulling mill) were unknown: 
The Woolens Act of 12.22, was intended to restrict 
commerce in woolen cloth. Its purpose was to favor British 
manufacturers at the expense of colonial (not necessarily 
American) industry. Ireland suffered severely under this 
Act. The underdeveloped American Colonies were scarcely 
affected, however, and this household industry continued to 
grow as required by an expanding population. The Act p.er-
mitted locally manufactured woolen cloth to move in com-
merce within the boundaries of each of the thirteen Colo-
nies, but intercolonial and foreign commerce was forbidden •. 
The r"irst American woolen factory was·. founded in 
1769 by William Molineaux, in the Manufactory House lo-
cated on what is now Tremont Street, Bo~n, Massachusetts. 
lArthur H. Cole, American Wool Manufacture 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), 20. 
On the death. of Molineaux the equipn1:ent was sold at 
auction (1774) 1 Simple hand equipment, similar to house-
hold equipment, was used in early factories. 
A woolen factory, the United Company of Phila-
delphia, was founded by Samuel Wetherill during the Revo-
lutionary War. In addition to woolens the company also 
manufactured cottons and linens. In addition to his 
.interest in the United Company, Wetherill also independent-
ly established and owned a factory located at Market and 
Arch Streets in.that city which manufactured woolen cloth 
2 for the Revolutionary Army. 
The United C.ompany utilized the spinning jenny,. a 
British invention which improved the method of spinning •. 
The Revolutionary period encouraged _the develop-
ment of plantation workshops in the South, which·pro-
cessed wool· as well as other fibers. In some cases these 
workshops developed into Jenny mills. Clark speculates 
· that 11 one or two may have been operated by water power. tt) 
The first United States woolen mill in which· we 
are'~c.ertain water. power was employed for processes other 
. ~Victor s. Clark, History of Manufacture in the 
United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.:--
1929}, Vol. I, 189. 
2 . 
Ibid.t ,190. 
3Ibid,, 191. 
than fulling was founded at Hartford, Connecticut, in 
1788. This mill was privately sponsored, but received 
special:exemptions from taxation as well as a bounty on 
spun yarn (the first yarn spun by power in the United 
States). The factory was held in such h~gh esteem that 
it was inspected by'George Washington who ordered cloth. 
It also received favorable attention from Alexander Hamil-
ton. In spite of special privileges and attention, the 
factory failed in 1795. 
Power wool carding w~s introduced into the United 
States in 1791 and was used in the above-mentioned Hart-
ford factory, in addition to its use in Charlestown and 
Byefield. Power wool carding soon became popular in this 
country, but the machines were to provide carded wool for 
households rather than for woolen factories. 1 
The woolen factory disappeared from the American 
scene. No woolen factories are known to have remained in 
existence in the year 1801.2 The reasons for the failure 
of the factory system were many. England forbade the ex-
portation of machinery and shrouded the details of textile 
machinery with secrecy. Suitable ·buildings, skilled labor 
and skilled supervision were difficult to obtain. Domestic 
.Libfd, 423. 
2Ibid, 56. 
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sheep provided wools of poor quality which made up into 
inferior cloth. Foreign raw wools commanded a premium 
price in the United States, making for an expensive fabric. 
Factories could not hope to obtain a mass market which was 
aocomodated by the production of inexpensive, home pro-
duced, coarse fabrics. Earlier factories concentrated on 
the production of fine fabrics, but such American-produced 
goods could not compete on a quality level With imported 
cloth. 
When the Embargo Act was passed in 1807, fcilowed 
by the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, imp~rts·of textiles 
from England were shut off. The United States' demand for 
cotton textiles was met by increasing the number of cotton 
factories. (Cotton cloth was never produced in large quan-
tities in the American home.) The .demand for wool fabrics 
was met primariiy by ·the expansion of the household indus-
tryproducing homespuns. But several woolen mills were 
established, primarily to accomod·ate the deniand for fine 
fabrics. Gallatin.r s Report .QB. American Manufactures lists 
fourteen woolen mills using improved (non-household) ma-
chinery. ·The same ~eport lists eighty-seven such_cotton 
mills. While these statistics are unsatisfactory, they 
point out, in some measure, the relative importance of these 
early industries. 
1 Albert Gallatin, Report on American Manufactures, 
Ex. Doc., "llt¥ Congress, 2nd Session, April 19, HHO. 
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History - 1812 to Civil War 
During the War of 1812 the American textile indus-
tries again expanded. Both homespuns and factory pro-
duced woolens shared in the gvowth. Woolen factories were 
now producing finer quality fabrics than heretofore. A 
factory at Northampton, Massachusetts; made a specialty 
of producing "superfinen broadcloth. ··(Broadcloth is a 
fine, plain woven, smooth woolen cloth used primarily in 
tailored garments.) The mill had a capital of' $50,900, 
employed f'~f'ty hands, and produced twenty-two yards of 
ttsuperf'ine" broa~th per·day. The material sold at the 
very high price of ten to twelve dollars per yard. 
Several mills were engaged in the manufacture of' 
coarser woolens such as blankets and army-cloths :for the 
government. The demand for these products was so great 
during the War that it could not be filled by household;~ 
industry alone. 
Other simultaneous events caused the increased use 
of' wooien textiles. Woolen trousers replaced knee-
breeches as a general apparel for f'ashionable.men. The 
trousers used more material. More important,_laboring 
men also adopted woolen trousers for general wear. The 
trousers.which laborers had worn previously had been made 
of coarse non-woolen materials. Wool provided the durabil~ 
ity required by laborers combined with the tine appearance 
required in a fashionable fabric. With the general use of 
woolen trousers, woolen textiles became increasingly im-
portant. 
Another important innovation appeared in the form of 
a new ~abric called satinet. Satinet :favored mill rather 
than household manufacturing processes. Satinet was a 
very satisfactory and popular blend of cotton and wool. 
The warps (lengthwise yarns) were of cotton while the fil-
ling (yarns ac.ross ·the width of the f'abric) wa_s of wool. 
Some American mills specializedcompletely in the manu-
f'acture of this product. This material was never pro-
duced to any considerable degree in households. 
Spinning jennies with multiple spindles becam·e op-
erated by water power in this country after the year 1812. 
Americans developed important modifications ofthe jenny 
known as ttjacksu and ttbrewstersn. The period including the 
- - .... -. 
years 1810 to 1840 were· productive years for American in-
ventors in the woolen ·industry. Inventions were adopted 
which caused improvements·in dyeing, shearing, napping, 
brushing, and pressing. 
Af'ter 1815 woolen mills suffered and many were 
ab~ndoned. The depression was especially severe for manu-
facturers of fine products- which faced rigorous EUropean 
competition. According to the Census of 1820, somewhat 
over one hundred firms were spinning wool with 25,000 
spindles, one-third of which were idle. About one hundred 
looms were reported, one-third of which were idle. 
An important wave of growth occurred during 
1820-1826. Power. spinning had been used in England prior 
to this time, and in at least three United States mills, 
but had not been in general use in this country. Francis 
Lowell developed a power loom for plain(not fancy)woolens 
which was widely adopted here. Another very important 
mechanical innovation was the Goulding condenser. The 
Goulding condenser, an American invention, was a device 
whereby filaments were transferred automatically from one 
carding machine to the next. At the close of the carding 
operation the device transformed the wool into a roving 
which was fed to the spinning machine. The machine saved 
all the labor previously 'required in handling the product 
being transferred from one machine to the next, permitted 
the size of machines to be increased, and also permitted 
the speeds at which machines could be operated to be 
increased!. 
The more general adoption of power in the spinning 
and weaving departments combined with the use of the 
Goulding condense~ enabled United States mills to compete 
more effectively with foreign mills and with homespun 
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woolens. 
Water power sites were now developed. Relatively 
large corporations were formed during this period, notably 
the Salmon Falls Company producing 40,000 yards of broad-
cloth annually; the Great Falls Company producing 130,000 
yards of broadcloth annually; and the Boston and Canton , 
Manufacturing Company producing 600,000 yards of negro 
cloth (coarse material intended primarily for slaves) 
annually. 
In spite of the above-mentioned large firms, the 
woolen industry consisted principally of numerous small 
firms located in small communities which competed with the 
homespun product. 
The following depression caused the disappearance of 
many firms from the woolen business, including all of the 
above mentioned larger corporations. 
Business had begun to revive in 1830 When the 
Middlesex Company at Lowell was formed witu a large capital 
of one-half million dollars. This company had an annual 
output of 150,000 yards of cassimeres (a thin twilled wool-
en cloth). The production of cassimeres became profitable 
in the United States because of lpom improvements developed 
in New England, and because of the adoption of certain econ-
omies learned from the more highly developed cotton _indus:il'y_ •. 
The woolen industry was now firmly established, and its 
position was further secured by the substantial tariff 
protection secu~ed in 1828. 
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The year 1830 also witnessed the first blending of 
wool and cotton into the same yarn, by the Hazards of Peace-
dale. There followed a period when wool was blended with 
many other textile fibers, principally for the purpose of 
reducing the price of the finished product. 
Concerning the development of the above mentioned 
inventions, Clark states, 
In early days the experimental cost of 
such improvements fell upon the factory-
owners, but about the time Lowell was founded 
the manufacture of textile machinery began to 
dif.ferentiate .from the manu.facture of textiles 
themselves ••••• our greatest inventions were 
made at machine making towns in New England. 
Engineering became a profession, invention a 
science, and the risk and cost of experiments 
were thrown upon an industry organized espec-
ially to conduct them."l 
For all practical purposes the woolen and worsted 
industry relinquished control over the design and manufac-
ture o.f its equipment until the post-World War II period. 
The. industry remained prosperous and grew rapidly 
over the next seven years.- Power machinery became more 
widely adopted. Satinets remained the most popular fabric, 
followed by broadcloths, linseys (linen warps, woolen fil-
ling), cassimeres, and flannels (loose-textured, soft, 
nappy woolens). 
Individual woolen firms remained small. Clark states 
that the typical woolen mill did not have more than two sets 
of cards. The typical cotton mill remained much larger in 
size than the wo~len mill. 
During this period Samuel Batchelder developed and 
put into operation at New Ipswich, Massachusetts, a power 
loom which could weave fancy patterns. This overcame the 
principal disadvantage of the Lowell loom which could weave 
only plain fabrics. This was followed, in 1837, by the 
highly successful power loom of William Crompton.The Cromp-
ton loom was used in the manufacture of fancy fabrics. The 
Crompton machine was o~ such excellence that it introduced 
a new era in the manufacture of American woolens. Over-
night our woolens became as fine in quality as the best pro-
duced elsewhere in the world. 
! careful test at the Middlesex Mills 
demonstrated that American power loom woolehs 
could not be distinguished from the best hand 
loom products ·of Europe.l. 
Factories 'were widely dispersed over the United 
States, Massachusetts being the leading state. Mills in the 
South and West were small, tending to replace ~e declining 
homespun industry. Mills in the East became increasingly 
large. 
1 Ibi.d, 429 •. 
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The depression following 1837 witnessed a retarda-
tion of growth, but no absolute decline of the firmly es-
tablished woolen industry. Revival began in 1840 and was 
assisted by the tariff of 1842. Fb.nther growth along estab-
lished lines continued. 
Although worsted fabrics had been manufactured in 
Europe for many years, all early American attempts had met 
with failure. The American failune resulted from inade-
~uate supplies of fine, long staple V\Ool; and the per-
sistence of hand methods of' combing "top". The hand meth-
od of combing top favored the relatively low paid, highly 
skilled European worker~ to .the disadvantAge of the Ameri-
can. With the introduction of top combing machinery at 
this time, in both the United States and Europe, large 
scale production of top and worsted yarns ensued in the 
United States. Worsted.yarns were used in the manufacture 
of cloth and carpets. Clark states that in 1845, sixteen 
mills in Massachusetts and Connecticut employed worsted 
yarns in the manufacture of 2,300,000 yards of cloth. These 
mills produced an additional 754,000 pounds of yarn for 
1 
sale. 
The year 1850 wit~essed a decline in the use of 
broadcloth, a spec·ial ty of many mills. Broadcloth manu-
facturers were -adversely affected by a change in fashion 
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iri £aver of worsteds and fancy cassimeres. Crompton's 
loom had done its work, reducing the price of £ancy cassi-
meres to the equal o£ plain broadcloth. Broadcloth manu-
facturers (as well as manufacturers of other fine woolens) 
were adversely affected by the tariff of 1846. This law 
discriminated against manufacturers in the United States. 
The law provided that a pound oT imported raw wool should 
bear the same tariff as a pound o£ finished goods. Since 
more than a pound of raw wool is required to make a pound 
of finished goods, American manufacturers were injured. 
In addition to the above mentioned materials, some 
alpacas and cashmeres were woven in New England mills. 
Weaving of shawls and felt manufacture became important. 
Of special importance, however, was a fabric-originated in 
Europe, mousse.Line-de-laine; constructed of cotton warps 
and woolen filling. This material was r ead+ly accepted 
for use in women's dresses, and became a favorite of large 
New England manufacturers. 
During the following decade large Eastern manufac-
turers prospered while smaller operator~ in the West 
declined. In Ohio, an importa~t Western wool manufactur-
ing state, production declined by almost fifty per-cent 
between 1850-1860. New England, however, produced more 
goods in 1860 than did the entire nation in 1850. Another 
labor saving invention, the card cleaner, was introduced 
L 
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in 1853. Previously di~t and waste had to be removed .from 
the cards at .frequent intervals by hand. Now this oper-
ation was eliminated. 
As a consequence of the many above-listed inven-
tions, crude homespun .tab:Oics disappeared f:rom the Ameri-
can scene·and were replaced by less expensive, more at-
. . 
tractive materials. uclothing had changed .from an ances-
tral possession to the passing .fancy o.f a single season.ttl 
Thus woolen and worsted .factories were firmly established 
by the time o.f the Civil War (1561-1865). 
Wopl manufacturing prospered during the Civi~ War, 
. ·-
stimulated by military requirement.s .for b;Lankets and uni-
.forms. The then small worsted· industry increased greatly 
in the North, worsted fabrics replacing c~ttons for many 
purposes. Cotton had decreased in supply and increased 
in price. A reciprocal treaty with Canada, however, 
'enabled Northern worsted manufacturers to acq~ire excel-
lent combing wools .free of duty. Many small woolen and 
worsted mills were established throughout the United 
States, concentrating mainly in existing woolen manufac-
turing areas. High profits attracted some large corpor-
ations to the industry. 
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History - Civil War Through World War I 
After the Civil.War worsteds increased ln.-popular-
ity. Lister Combs and Noble Combs were imported from 
Europe, which made it possible to use the shorter clip 
of' American sheep as well as Canadian and other sheep in 
worsted manufacture. Clark states that American mills 
were not as well equipped for manufacturing worsteds as 
. 1 
were foreign mills. 
Spinning systems also underwent drastic changes at 
this time. The spinning jenny and similar devices known 
as jacks and brewsters were replaced by the mule. The mule 
was an efficient English machine for spinning high quality 
yarns. The change-over to mule spinning was completed in 
the United State·s after 1873. Spinning of worsteds was 
accomplished by a different technique on imported English 
machines lmown as spinning frames. The mule (very much 
diminished in importance) and the spinning frame, now in a 
greatly improved form, remain the two basic methods of 
spinning in use to this day. 
Worsteds were prepared by two somewhat different ma-
chine processes. The Bradford sy~tem, often known as the 
English system, was the dominant American mebhdd of manu-
facturing worsteds. Over time, however, there was a grad-
ual movement to the French method. The French method 
l . 
. V~S.~·Clark, .QE• .£ll., Vol. II, P• 111. 
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provided material with a softer handle (the feel of the 
material in the hand) and it could use the shorter fibers 
of American raised sheep. The Bradford and French systems 
remain the principal methods of manufacuring worsted today. 
The worsted industry became important in the United ~tates 
after 1870 following the introduction of the above ment~ 
automatic machinery. 
Woolen companies increased in size. Although the 
small firm remained characteristic of the industry, the 
giant firm arose. The largest and most important company 
was the American Woolen Company, incorporated in New Jer-
sey in 1899. This company_had an authorized capital of 
$b5 ,·,ri:J.illian, and acquired at its inception twenty-six 
mills. Clark states that this represented the ~argest 
capital and plant ever brought together under one manage-
1 
ment for the manufacture of any textile fiber. Wool fab-
ric output in the United States remained steady. The num-
ber of individual woolen firms decreased, some consolida~­
tbqg,some closing down. This was the result of pressures 
exerted by the rising worsted industry. 
Following the lead of woolens, by 1910 several 
large worsted mills had arisen. The Arlington Mills, the 
Washington Mills, and the Wood Worsted Mill, all of Law-
renee, were the giants of' the industry. 
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World War I, li~e the Civil War, greatly stimulated 
the woolen industry. The worsted industry, relying heavily 
on imported wools, suffered a shortage of raw materials. 
The war left harmful effects on both the woolen and 
worsted indu..Stries. When the German armies captured the 
fine wool manufacturing districts of Northern France, Paris 
faShion designers turned from woolens to silks. In later 
years silks were replaced by rayons and other synthetic 
fibers. Woolens have never regained their pre-World War I 
popularity in women•s clothing. 
Nor did worsteds recover their market entirely fol-
lowing World War I. During the war people were urged to 
shift from worsteds to more readily available fabrics •. ·Matty 
of these people did not shift back to worsteds when they. 
became available, but tended to be satisfied with· substi-
tute products. 
An important change, the reduction in the weight of 
woolen and worsted fabrics, occurred.. Since the value of 
the finished product is in part dependent upon its ~eight, 
this injured the producers. Women desired lighter woolens 
for dresses which, like silk,· would drape gracefu·lly. In 
men's suitings, woolens and worsted materials also declined 
in weight. Some of the reasons commonly attributed as 
causes for the reduction in weight of these materials were 
improved heating of homes and other buildings, improved 
heating of public conveyances~ and the use of the closed, 
. . 
heated automobile. 
History and Economic Status of 
The Industr~ After World War I 
Between 1920 and 1940 the woolen and worsted in-
dustries witnessed gradual g~owth. Growth was retarded 
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by the emergence of rayon which, to an extent~ is an in-
expensive substitute for wool.. For example, rayon becam~ 
commonly used in men's suitings, women's dresses, blankets, 
and many other items. About 1940 (see Chart 1) the use of 
rayon fibers eaught up with, then surpassed~ the use of 
woolen fibers in the United States. It should not be as-
sumed that rayon competed only with wool, as it also com-
peted with silk and cotton fibers. The raw data are also 
somewhat misleading since large quantities of rayon were 
used for blending with wool (and other fibers). These 
wool-rayon blends were processed on woolen and worsted ma-
chinery, keeping these mills profitably employed wit,b. this 
new raw material. 
This period of gradual growth was accompanied by 
rising wages. In the depths of the depression~ 19~2, 
wages fell to 32¢ per hour; pre-war 1941 saw the average 
wage climb to 57!¢ per hour; by post-war 1947 wages had 
risen to $1.16; by 1955 wages ~ad continued their climb 
to $1.53. 
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Increasing wages and increasing fringe benefits were 
an important.element of costs during this period. Although 
wages were low compared to those paid by other industries, 
they were high compared to those paid by foreign competi-
tors. This encouraged the search ~or low wage areas in the 
United States (an important factor in the movement of the 
industry to the South) and also stimulated the search for 
labor-saving technological improvements. 
Employment figures during the same period show a 
marked increase followed by a phenomenal post-war slide. 
The typical pre-war year of 1939 saw employment at the 
150,000 level. Peak World War II employment of 192,000 
occurred in 1941. Post-war years showed variations in em-
ployment followed by a precipitate plunge to about 80,000 
workers. EXcepting the period of the Korean conflict, the 
decline in textiles has continued almost to this date. The 
recession has been blamed on many factors including massive 
imports of woolen and worsted textiles, technological unem-
ployment caused .by new machinery, decreasing domestic use o~ 
woolen and worsted fabrics, and virtually complete loss o~ 
our export markets. The following data for the years 1947 
through 1957 reflect the serious nature of the recession. 
TABLE II 
UNITED STATES OOOLEN AND WORSTED 
INDUSTRY DATA, YEARS 1947-1958 
57 
Year Produetion in Liquidation of Woofen 
and Worsted Mills 
1939 
- --
1947 
:1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
195~ 195 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Millions of Yards 
(broadwoven) 
3'-60 
-- - ·- - - -
,16 98 
414 
4-71 
375 
351 
338 
281 
311 
327 
293 
No. of 
Mills2 
No. of Employees 
Affected 
- - - - - - - - -
...... - -
11 2,000 
22 3,000 
51 3~400 
17 3~~00 . 
17 2, 00 
33 17,500 
29 10,700 
41 20,400 
37 8,050 
2l.J_ 8,250 
14 5,400 
The great decline indicated by the above data is sub-
sta:p.tiated by the National Association of Wool Manufacturers' 
statement3 that between 1947 and 1954 the number of produc-
tion workers in the industry declined by 51%. Between 194~ . 
and 1955 the number of broad !~oms declined by 45% and the 
lTWUA, AFL-CIO, published in Problems of the Domes-
tic Textile lndustry, Hearings before a Subcommittee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, u.s. Senate, 85th Congress, 
1958, Vol. II, 939· 
2tr • .s. Bureau·o.f the Census. 
3WhyPresidential Action Q!1 Wool Textile Imports Is 
Es·sential in the l~a:tional Interest, report released by the 
National AssoCiation of Wool· Manufacturers (Boston), not 
dated, but prepared in 1956. 
number of spindles in place by 50%. (See also data on 
page 106 of this thesis. 
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Mere numerical comparisons, as ·in the above para-
graph, are not entirely satisfactory. New mechanical in-
ventions which were highly efficient partia~ly rep~aced 
older machines. A new. type spindle or loom provides sub-
stantia~ly more production than the prer;war variety. But 
the National Association of Wool Manufacturers warns that 
in spite of the increased efficiency. of tP.e new machines 
which have been steadily replacing the old, the decline of 
the woolen and worsted industry has been so great that it 
must be n assumed our over.-all capacity has been reduced. nl 
TempDDary World War II and post-war increases in 
output were made possible by around-the-clock operation. of 
woolen and worsted mills. Prior to World War II machines 
in the woolen and worsted industry typically operated one 
1National Association ofWool Manufacturers, 
March 14, 1956, A Petition to ArthurS. Fleming, Director, 
Office of Defense Mobilization, Wherein the Director. is 
requested to investigate or re-appraise what the petition-
ers consider to be the tnreat to National Security presen-
ted by wool textile impor-ts, within the meaning of ~action 
7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, page 9· 
Capacity, as it is used here,.refers to the ability 
o'f the industry to produce woolen and worsted textiles in 
the event of national emergency. The introductory remarks 
of this petition state: nThe wool textile industry has con-
tracted severely since Wor~d War II to a point where there 
is grave doubt that it could meet.mobilization require-
ments in a national emergency. u 
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shift of about forty hours per week. Shortly thereafter, 
preparatory operations such as scouring, spinning, and 
combing were in continuous operation at times. Following 
operations in the manu1'acturing process such as weaving, 
dyeing, and finishing operated two shifts or less. The 
uneven demand upon the various parts of the woolen and 
worsted industry resulted from a demand for heavy-weight 
fabrics for military use. 1 It is characteristic that 
heavy fabrics require relativeLy more preliminary, and 
fewer final operations per pound of wool. The situation 
is revers.ed, of course, when lighter weight fabrics are 
required. The additional manpower required for multiple 
shift operation in ·the plants .. was arranged both by in-
creasing the number of workers and increasing the length 
of the work week. · 
Profit-restricting price controls on civilian 
fabrics proved to be extremely difficult ~o enforce be-
cause of the great variety of widths, weights, patterns, 
textures and other characteristics of the finished and 
semi-finished materials. The levels of output, prices, 
and profits rose during the war period and were much 
higher in 1946 (when controls were terminated) than 
in 1939. 
1 ... 
Wool During World War II, War Records Monograph-7, 
United States Department of Agr~culture, Bureau of Agri-
cultural Economics, May 19~8, P• 47• 
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Our case studies indicate that this period of 
growth, high profits, and optimism, tempered with the 
knowleuge that it cou~d not ~ast indefinitely, set the 
stage for technological innovations. Witnin the Uxbridge 
Worsted Company, for example, there was created a Post 
War Planning Committee. Under the guidance of the Pres-
ident of the Cor~oration the Committee actiyely sought 
methods of reducing costs in preparat io,n for anticipated 
post-war competition. Technologica~ innovation was one 
of several approaches employed whic.n:also included re-
building and modernizing plant facilities, replacement 
of old machinery and equipment, movement of certain 
plants to the South, and mergers with other firms. 
The high war-induced profits disappeared shortly 
thereafter. With the exception of the brief period of 
the Korean conflict, tne general prosperity of United 
States industries,as a whole has not been snared by the 
woolen and worsted industries. 
The recent technological revolution had its be-
ginnings in the 1930's wnen some firms began to replace 
their mules with spinning frames. Long-draft spinning and 
roving was introduced before World War II but did not 
become important until after the war. The other important 
innovations to be studied were much affected by the above-
mentioned prosperous period. 
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Mergers have a~fected large numbers of woolen and 
worsted firms from World War I to tne present. There have 
been vertical integrations combining two or more firms in 
different phases of the production process; horizontal in-
tegrations combining two or more firms in the same phase 
of the production process; and combinations of woolen and 
worsted companies with firms which wisheq to diversif~ 
their production. 
The textile industries have traditionally been com-
posed of relatively small, individually owned plants •1 In 
earlier years there were fe~ outstandingly large ·firms •. 
But for three decades prior to 1950., and particularly 
during and since World War II, the integration Qf the tex-
tile industry has proceeded at an especially rapid pace. 
In his article concerning the southern textile industry 
Solomon Barkin has charged, "The textile industry is no 
longer properly classified as a classic example of com-
' . . 
petitive industry.tt2 Jesse W. Markham criticizes Barkin's 
conclusion that the textile industry is ttmonopolistic" in · 
character, stating, 
1 .. 
Solomon Barkin, 11 The Regional Significance of the 
Integration Movement in the Southern Textile Industry,n 
The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XV, No. 4, April 1949, 
P• 9~· . 
2Ibid. 
It is difficult ••••• to see the possi-
bility of the emergence of an oligopolistic 
rationalization of market behavior in an 
industry in which it is necessary to include 
as many as 42 interest groups in order to 
account for 50% of the productive capacity 
in a specific region ••••• There seems to be 
little if any evidence that .~ ••• competitive 
forces are not co~tinuing to play their 
traditional role. 
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For the years 1930 to 1948 Markham cites statistics 
involving 978 cases of mill acquisitions leading to inte-
grations, but states that, . in view of his foregoing 
remarks, this is not "an alarming rate of absorption. "2 
It is most interesting to note the change in the 
character·of the acquisitions recorded by Markham. From 
1931 through 1936 the number of horizontal integrations 
were far in excess of the number of vertical·integrations~ 
The number of vertical integrations increased greatly in 
1937, and from that year through 1948 the number of verti-
cal integrations were in excess of horizontal integrations. 
1Jesse W. Markham, nintegration in the Textile· 
Industry," Harvard Business.Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, 
January 1950, p. 88. 
2 Ibid, p. 79· 
3The National Association of Wool Manufacturers 
in their statistical reports classify firms as being in 
the follow~ng categories! Scouring .and Combing; Spinning, 
Twisting, Weaving; Weaving; Dyeing and Finishing; Firms 
Which carry on no production operations whatever and sell 
products fabricated on contract or commission. Horizontal 
integration means comb!ning two or more firms in the same 
category. Vertical integration refers to· combining two 
or more firms in different phases of the production 
process. 
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The number of interfiber integrations was the least impor-
tant type from the point of view of the number of firms 
involved, and showed no pronounced trend over the period. 
The total number of all types of integrations per year 
increased rapidly from about 1936 to 1948, the last year 
for which data are collected. In more recent years there 
have also been interesting examples of' merger·s of non-
textile firms •. 
The policies of the Office of' Price Administration 
during World War II are said to have been an important 
factor in promoting vertical integrations. The OPA price 
schedules applied much more rigorously to the more stand-
ardized semi-finished product used in manufacturing the 
f'inished textile f'abric. The OPA f'ound it much more dif'-
f'icult to administer ef'fective p~ice control on the less 
standardized f'inished textile •. This led -to both f'orward 
and backward vertical integration. The producers in the 
lower stages of production engaged in f'orward i~tegration 
in order to share ·in the greater prof'its enjoyed by the 
manuf'acturer of the f'inisned textile. 1 On the other hand, 
f'inished textile manufacturers engaged in backward inte-
gration in order to assure a supply of raw materials, 
of'ten purchasing mills advantageously from financially 
1 . . . Markham, op. cit., p. 79· 
hard-pressed producers who were SCJ,.Ueezed between rising 
costs and OPA price ceilings. 
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The woolen and worsted industry has not been immune 
to the wave of integra.tion .established by the textile in-
dustries. Although extensive quantitative data are dif-
ficult to obtain, Markham notes that in 1930 no large 
woolen corporation (of which there:.were nine in numbel:') 
was fully vertically integrated. By 1947, however, forty 
percent o~ the large woolen corporations (of whic~ there 
1 
were then ten) were fully integrated. It is interesting 
to note that almost all the woolen and worste·d companies 
mentioned by name in this thesis have already been subject 
to important integrations within the period under study. 
The merger movement began to diminish in ~mportance 
by 1948.2 With one great exception, to be studied later, 
the merger movement has been on a diminishing scale, gener-
ally involving smaller mills than before. 
Although the merger movement has resulted in changes 
in the·industry, we cannot classify these mergers as inno-
vations. Mer·gers for the above-mentioned and other 
1Ibid, p. 82. 
2seymo~r E. Harris, Report 2!! the New England 
Textile Industry, by Committee appointed by Confel:'ence 
of New England Governors, 1952, release date, April 1953. 
purposes have long been known in the woolen and worsted 
industry. World War II merely accentuated and stimulated 
the movement. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARE MAJOR ADVANCES OCCURRING IN THE 
SCIENCES UNDERLYING THE INDUSTRY? 
As indicated in Chapter I, this thesis employs 
proposals made by W. R. Maclaurin for the analysis of 
technological innovation. His approach is appropriate 
since recent innovations in the woolen and worsted in-
dustries have been essentia.Lly technological. Maclaurin 
directs that the analyst seek the answe~s to five ques-
1 
tions. The title of this chapter indicates the first of 
the questions which are studied. The remaining questions 
are employed, in turn, as titles for the following four 
chapters. 
The woolen and worsted industries, as we know them 
today, are tne culmination of thousands of years of ex-
perience and knowledge, and have been revolutionized many 
times over by new learning in many branches o·f human 
knowledge. 
A number of independent origins of the industry 
seem to be indicated since fragments of woolen fabrics 
lsee page 11 of this thesis. 
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have been found in such widely scattered areas as the 
tombs of ancient Egypt, tne barrows of early Britons, and 
the olden Peruvian ruins. The evolution of pne woolen and 
worsted industry included changes from the most primitive 
types of manuaLly operated wooaen appliances to the most 
highly developed modern mac.hine:ry. These modern machines 
• 
are triumphs of metallurgy as well as mechanics. Sources 
of power have included the physical energy of men, women, 
children, and animals; the direct and early use of water 
power; the early use of the steam engine; and finally the 
use of electrical power. 
Dyestuffs have progressed from colors provided by 
natu:re.to those synthesized by chemicaL means. Initially 
applied crudely by dipping the yarns or fabrics into open 
vats, dyest.uf.fs are now carefully applied to materials 
under exact cnemicaL and mechanical controls, with precise 
conditions of temperature and pressure. 
Selective breeding and cross-breeding of animals, 
as well as great improvements in transportation, permits 
modern fabricators to employ varieties and blends of wool 
unknown to the ancients. A host of man-made fibers devel-
oped in :recent years by the chemical ±ndustry has provided 
new raw materials for blending with wool fibers. These 
blends may reduce the cost of the 1'ab:ric as well as 
improving certain specific qualities of the fabric. 
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The varying techniques of production in the woolen 
and worsted industries have in some measure reflected the 
scientific progress of mankind throughout the ages. Allow-
ing for leads and lags at various times, a remarkable num-
ber of achievements in many apparently unrelated fields of 
endeavor have been incorporated into the industry's 
methods. 
It does not appear appropriate to review the ad-
vances of modern science in this paper, as even the most 
casual reader is aware of the enormous strides in many 
fields of scientific endeavor in recent years. It is im-
portant to observe; however, that the woolen and worsted 
industry,in the years immediately preceding World War II, 
did not share in the practical benefits of these scientific 
advances. The industry had matured to the point where 
changes were difficult to effect. 
Perhaps the most critical evaluation of the woolen 
and worsted industry during the interwar period has been 
l 
made by Sumner D. Charm. Commenting on the state of the 
industry, Charm had the fol~owing to say: 
Physically the New England woolen and 
worsted plant is as obsolete as the water-
clock. As a typical example in Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, the city recognized as the 
largest worsted center in the country and 
1 . . 
s. D. Charm, Textile Twilight, New England,(mimeo). 
(Pittsburgh: Carnegie Institute of Technology, 19S2J. 
with one out of every seven woolen and 
worsted looms in New England, no mill is 
housed in a structure built later than 
1915. While thirty-five years of age or 
so may not look like a great age for an 
industrial building, 1 t is the technolog-
ical, not the chronological age that counts.l 
Charm dates the introduction of scientific adjust• 
ments to process-flow, handling and storage .proble~s, 
lighting and heating efficiencies, and other improvements 
leading to efficient manufacturing buildings from about 
the year 1927. He also discusses many other technical 
developments such as small materials-handling machines, 
individual drive units for production machinery, and 
na whole category of pre-servomechanism devicesn which 
were not available for installation or incorporation in 
factories until after 1927, and since the Lawrence mills 
pre-date this year, they "are chiefly ·virgin of these 
concepts and devices.n2 
The mills of Lawrence are for the most part multi-
storied. They have wooden floors, high ceilings, many and 
leaky windows; their workrooms are broKen up by supporting 
posts and columns; they are built to drive machinery from 
master driveshafts. In summary: 
lcharm, ££• cit., P• 4· 
2Ibid. 
They are full of hazards. They make a 
nightmare of the industry's inherent prob-
lems of atmosphere control. Probably ninety-
five per cent of all New Englaud's woolen and 
worsted textile £Perations take place in sim-
ilar condi tiona. · . 
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Failure to rebuild or modernize plant buildings is 
only one, and perhaps the mildest, of Cnarm's indictments 
2 
of Northern woolen and worsted management. Some manage-
ments have attempted to modernize their mills; Cnarm cites 
one company which spent five million dollars for building 
repairs and machinery over a two-year period, and another 
which plowed back $1.7 million for equipment in a single 
3 year. · But even these .efforts were not as successful as 
their managements had hoped they would be. Actual work-
loads in these two cases fell far below the the theoreti-
cal potential for the new equipment installed. In the 
first case Charm attributes this to mismanagement, and in 
the second he atbributes it to the antiquated buildings and 
outmoded layout into which the new machinery was intro-
duced. 
The reasons for the failure of tnese attempts to 
improve the position of the two firms as much as they 
2Charm speaks about the industry after several years 
of experience in the industry, including, at one time, an 
association With American Woolen Co. 
3rbid, p. 7. 
hoped are given by Charm as follows: 
So long as it had to be set in the 
present obsolete plants, new machinery 
can never completely lick the ineffi-
ciencies with which the New England woolen 
and worsted industry finds itself beset. 
Its obsolescence is of a particularly ob-
durate kind. It is not very amenable to 
the effects of new methods and machinery 
customarily relied upon by other indust~iest 
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In spite of the indictment by Charm, however, the 
woolen and worsted industry which was until recently a 
laggard made use of developments in various fields 0f 
scientific endeavor to invent new machinery, new methods, 
new fabrics, and put them into actual operating use. 
Evidences of Advances in Becent Years 
A virtual technological revolution has occurred in 
the industry. Important improvements have been made to 
existing machinery, and new machinery has been created 
which eliminates steps in production previously considered 
necessary. In a widely circulated study Andrews compares 
pre-war with modern machinery, noting that the differences 
are so great that nit is impractical in some ways to en-
2 deaver to make a detailed machine comparison. u Nevertbe-
less, Andrews provides the following data: Pin-drafter, 
manpower and payrolls reduced 66 2/3%; spinning-frames 
1Ibid. 
2M.B. Andrews, Profit Life of Textile Machinery. 
(Vienna, Va.:: ~meriean Textile. Machinery Assoelationj 1958), 
p. 11. 
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(American System), man-hours and payroll reduced bb%, rloor 
requirements reduced 50%; weaving·'machine, improves work 
quality, will pay for itself in three years. Over-all, 
Andrews reports ttapproximately a 5o% increase' in produc-
tivity may be obtained in 1957 compared to productivity 
rates in 194-7. n 
Reasons for Lack of Tecnnological 
Change During Interwar Period 
During the interwar period it was characteristic 
that neither woolen and worsted manufacturing firms nor the 
machinery manufacturing companies aggressively promoted 
technological change. Indeed, it is evident that woolen 
and worsted man~acturers did not even fully employ the 
new devices and techniques developed by machinery manu-
facturers in preceding decades. During a vistt to the 
American Woolen Company's giant Wood Mill, shortly after 
World War II,. and to several other firms, large and small, 
the author personally observed large-scale use of techno-
logically obsolete equipment. Otten this was used along-
side new, highly efficient equipment. 
The principal reason t.hat competitive firms could 
exist in spite of marked variations in manufacturing effi~­
cienct·was the fact that wool was a high-priced commodity, 
and its price was subject to extreme fluctuations. The 
history of all companies publishing financial reports 
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during tnis period is underscored by huge inventory profits 
or losses. The reputation of management depended largely 
upon their capacity to make profits through such specu-
lation. In the circumstances, management did not concen-
trate its activities on technological operating efficien-
cies, where gains seemed small by comparison. Many large 
firms, the American Woolen Company being an extreme case in 
point, became increasingly obsolete. Even when money be-
came available during prosperous periods, management, which 
was not production oriented, refused to modernize or engage 
in research. 
It was axiomatic in the textile industry that the 
more unstable the price of tne fiber employed, ·the less 
modern and efficient the ~quipment employed. Thus the 
woolen and worsted industry employed .the least up-to-date 
equipment. The cotton industry was much more concerned 
with the quality of its_equipment. But the rayon industry, 
using man-made fibers with comparatively stable prices,has 
always been extremely efficient in its manufacturing oper-
ations. 
Relative disinterest by the woolen and worsted in-
dustry in technological change persisted for many years. 
During World War II a few men saw opportunity for their 
firms in the prolonged technological lag of the industry. 
; 
The war provided profits and a tax environment favorable 
for modernization and research. Thus, during the period 
of this study, when certain firms modernized completely 
and went a step further, introducing innovations of their 
own, the competitive differences between firms became very 
large. With numerous bidders on an Army order for e~teen­
ounce wool-nylon serge shi~tiqg, on January 31, 1952, it 
was announced that Bachmann-Uxbridge Company (a leading 
innovator) was lowest, with an offer to produce one-hal£ 
million yards at $3.68 per yard. The American Woolen 
Company, to compare, made various offers ranging from 
$3.97 to $3.984 per yard. Thirty cents per yard is a 
large difference in an industry where orders are some-
times won by a price advantage o£ one cent or less per 
yard. 
Conclusion 
The woolen and worsted industry is an ancient 
industry which has.benefited from scientific advances over 
the centuries. Improvements in mechanical arts, biology, 
chemistry, metallurgy,and electronics have all had their 
effect on the industry. While many of.these improvements 
arose arose from foreign efforts, the United States has 
also made valuable contributions. For many years prior 
to World War II the industry had been experiencing prac-
tically no technological change. As is well known, this 
was an era of scientific advance, and a· period during 
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Which many industries benefited from this advance. 
The relative backwardness of the industry 6n enter-
ing World War II, coupled with the high profits of the war 
and post-war years, set the stage for a handful of invent-
ors and innovators to introduce a number of important, new 
technological innovations. 
The remarkable scientific progress in the·many 
sciences before, during,and since World War II found many 
practical applications in the woolen and worsted industry. 
It seems likely that tne results of the scientific advances 
have not yet been eXhausted and that further innovation in 
the industry may be expected in the future. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IS ENGINEERING ART IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH 
. . 
AND CONTRIBUTING TO.THESE ADVANqES? 
Most innovations described in this thesis are rad-
ically different types of machinery which perform old 
tasks by completely different and more effective methods 
and machines which perform new operations never before 
attempted in woolen and worsted .factories. These inven-
tiona have added much to mechanics as applied to the 
woolen and worsted industry, and are having .far-reaching 
e.ffects in other textile industries. 
The inventors of many of the new types of textile 
machinery discussed in this paper were not professional 
engineers,but rather, educated men who were involved in 
the day-to-day operations of woolen and worsted mills in 
various capacities. In many, but not all cases, much 
pro~essional engineering development work was require~ 
before the inventions were suitable for ordinary factory 
use. 
Prior to World War II developments of inventions 
were carried out by the textile-machiner~ manufacturing 
companies. These conservative companies had made improve-
ments to existing machinery, but there had been no major 
changes in their products !'or decades. 
The limited market for woolen and worsted machiner~ 
coupled with dominance of foreign-made machinery in the 
United States, doubtless discouraged expensive research 
and changes. 
The Saco-Lowell.Bhops, then an important pn.aduc:er» 
completely stopped production of woolen and worsted machin-
ery for a large portion of the interwar period, concentra-
ting on the manufacture of cotton machinery. (They have 
in more rec-ent years returned to manufacturing woolen and 
worsted machinery.) In explaining the Saco-Lowell position 
Gibb states, 
The ••• worsted ••• machinery market in 
America was limited (2,800,000 worsted 
spindles in 1926 as compared with 3,8oo,ooo 
cotton spindles), and more than three-
quarters of the worsted machinery in place· 
in American mills was foreign built.l 
Elsewhere Gibb points out that p~ofits in woolen and wor-
sted machinery were small. 
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During and after World War II several important new 
inventions were developed by a major machinery manufacturer 
1c. S.· Gibb, The Saco-Lowell Shops (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press,~O), 793· 
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with requisite engineering skills who was in search of 
saleable products, but who had no preyious experience in 
1 producing or marketing textile machinery. Existing tex-
tile machinery manufacturers countered by imitation, by 
increasing the scope of their research, and by adding to 
.. 2 
the flow of inventions. 
Several mechanical inventions will be discussed :ln 
this chapter. The purpose of these discussions is to ex-
-. 
plore th·e need for and character of the engineering devel-
opment required to convert the fundamental new ideas of 
the inventor into practical factory machinery~ 
Pin-Drafter 
The pin-drafter is a machine w~oh has changed 
tr§ditional methods of manufacturing and markedly reduced 
the cost of processing worsted fibers during the prepara-
tGry stages when the fiber is being prepared for the 
roving and spinning operations. It is also important in 
blending other fibers into wool. 
Prior to World War II the Uxbridge Worsted Company 
1warn~r and Swasey Company. 
2During 1944 total research and development ex-
penditures for the machine~ industry were less than one 
million dollars. As of 1960 such expenditures were at 
the rate of seven million dollars annually, according to 
M.B. Andrews, Profit Life of Textile Machinerx (Vienna, 
Va.: American Textile-wachinery Association, 1958). 
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was experimenting with long-draft spinning of' woolens. The 
objective of' these experiments was to use modified cotton 
mill equipment to spin shorter, less expensive wool fibers, 
obtaining a lower-cost fabric than those who were require~ 
to use the longer, more expensive wools on their machinery. 
Other advantages such as a saving in labor cost were also 
hoped for. The firm actually had a production process in 
operation at the Macon, Georgia, plant. But it was not 
working very well. A major difficulty lay with the prep-
aration of' the wool for the new spinning machinery. The 
usual gilling machinery was not entirely satisfactory. 
(See appendix for pictures and explanation of mechanical 
devices.) 
In casting about for another method of preparing 
the wool for the new machinery, President H. Walter of 
the Uxbridge Worsted Company proposed experimenting With 
pin-drafting. This idea had never been pursued in the 
manufacture of woolens or worsteds although it was not 
entirely new in the textile industry. The pin-drafting 
technique (much different than what was rinally developed 
for woolens and worsteds) had been used in the silk in-
dustry. Experiments with silk equipment in the research 
department of' the Uxbridge Worsted Company indicated that 
pin-drafting might be effective, but that many changes 
·would be necessary if the technique were to become 
economical and efficient for the woolen and worsted 
industry. 
The company's research department proposed two 
different methods for the pin arrangement. One method 
employed a cylindrical head studded with pins. The other 
utilized a flat head, similarly pin-studded. In either 
case it was recognized that the problem of developing a 
useful machine was b~yond the engineering capabilities of 
the firm. A machinery manufacturer was sought to develop 
the idea. 
But help was not forthcoming from the existing 
textile-machinery manufacturers, many of whom were 
approached with the idea. In speaking of a leading 
textile-machinery manufacturer, for example, Walter 
stated (in an interview granted the author): 
When I would talk to Swift (Chairman of 
the Board) at Whitin he would say that if we 
manufacturers had any new ideas he would turn 
them into machinery. Yet when we showed him 
the silk machine and asked him to develop it 
into what is now the pin-drafter, he refused, 
on the grounds that h~s company was too busy.l 
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1The criticism made by Walter__ and a similar 
criticism later reported by Bliss of Pacific Mills should 
not imply that no changes were being made by the machinery 
industry, although it is probably correct to say that the · 
machine industry was laggard in research and in the use of 
known technologyo -
't 
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Doubtless, Whitin, the leading ~irm in woolen and. 
worsted manufacture, was in fact too busy at the time to 
undertake new responsibilities. But the ~irm 1 s early neg-
ative attitude toward research in new ideas is revealed 
by Gibb 1 s comment made several years later (1950) that 
nThe momentum of Saco-Lowell 1 s research program is such 
that Whitin may not soon be able to make up the ground 
already lost." 
And in the following paragr~ph: 
The greatest obstacle to the textile 
machinery industry has been the attitude 
that the ~ndamental processes were not 
only efficient but even perfect, or at 
least adequate and unsur.passable. This 
attitude now lingers on today in places, 
at least subcons~iously ••• l 
It should be pointed out here that the Uxbridge 
Worsted Company. was a large company and that it did have 
a small research department in existence at that time. 
Their need. was not for financial assistance, but for 
specialists who could develop the idea. 
Walter and his company wisely recognized that 
the development of the idea required skilled machinery 
engineers. Walter. was well aware of the personnel 
limitations of his own organization. 
After rebuffs from various textile-machinery 
la. s. Gibb, 2£· £!i., p. 598. 
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manufacturers, Walter asked A.W. Zelamek, of A.W.Zelamek 
Associates, Economic Service, Empire State Building, New 
York, how the pin-d!after idea might be developed. Zauunek. 
suggested that the Warner and Swasey Company· had an ex-
cellent reputation for developing new machinery, and were 
manufacturers of elaborate precision machinery. 
But the Warner and Swasey Company had never manu-
factured textile machinery. Textile-machinery manufac-
ture had previously been left to a very few highly special-
ized firms. Nevertheless, the Warner and Swasey Company 
sent an engineer to Uxbridge, Massachusetts, to see what· 
the worsted company had done. The engineer was impressed 
and the two companies decided to cooperate. 
Because the Warner and Swasey Company had no ex-
perience in the problems of textile manufacturing, it was 
decided that the development work should take place on the 
premises of the·Rivulet Mill. This mill building was near 
the main plant at Uxbridge •. The development was to be a 
.cooperative effort between ·the textile specialists and the 
machinery specialists. 
The first year of experiments ended substantially in 
failure. As previously indicated, two types of pin-studded 
heads were considered for possible use: the cylindrical 
head and the flat head. The cylindrical head was initially 
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preferred because it was felt that the process could be 
made very rapid by merely speeding up the cylinder. Un-
fortunately, however, regardless of the angle at Which the 
pins were attached to the metal cylinder, the device did· 
not work well. The movement of the rotating cylinder would 
cause the pins to enter the raw material at one angle and 
emerge at another angle, producing an undesirable effect. 
After the initial failures with the cylindrical ~ead,other 
experiments with f.Lat heads were conducted, yielding satis-
factory rates of production. 
It is interesting to note that if the idea had 
failed, then bo:th the worsted company and the machine com-
pany would have suf'fered a loss. The machine compa:p.y was 
not compensated by the worsted company for their part in 
developing the idea. 
In other cases involving the ideas of research . 
personnel of the Uxbridge Worsted Company, money was paid 
to firms for developmente Sometimes this proved profitable 
and at other times a complete l·OSS. For example, a local 
machine shop was given money by the Company to develop and 
produce shears with a speci~l turntable. This machine 
turned out to be very su~cessful and·has since been imi-
tated by other manufacturers. On the other hand, $10,000 
was paid to the Batelle Institute of Columbus, Ohio, for 
a study which attempted to increase the size of the yarn 
84 
package obtained in the spinning operation. The project 
was a railure. At a later time various machinery manu-
facturers discoYered a partial solution to this matter. 
The problem was rundamentally as follows: Yarn packages· 
of over 3i inches in diameter were techn!cally possible 
but were economically impractical to produce. If they 
could have been made practical, economies could have been 
effected elsewhere in the production process. 
To return to the pin-drafter, arter a rew years of 
experimentation and improvements, the Warner and Swasey 
Company put the machine into production, and it became an 
immediate success. The worsted 9ompany receives a royalty 
on each machine sold. 
Operating Data 
The pin-drafter was immediately successful and is 
now used ior competitive imitations are used) in the pro-
duction process or virtually every modernized plant. 
The pin-drafter was designed to improve the process 
known as ugilling". In this process the sliver is atten-
uated, rubbed,and twisted :So that it ~inally emerges to go 
to the uroving" operation having the appearance, but not 
the strength, or heavy knitting yarn. 
The older typical gilling operation involved the 
following steps. The sliver would first be put through 
a double-can gill~ox; from here the two strands of fiber 
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received from the first step were put through two 
two-spindle gill-boxes; from here the strands went through 
a six-spindle draw-box, and then to two eight-spindle 
draw-boxes. Finally the sliver went through a twenty-
eight-spindle finisher, and then to two forty-spindle 
reducers, after which the slivers were ready to go to 
the roving frames and finally the spinning frames to 
complete the process. This typical process required five 
operators and involved a total of 136 deliveries while pro-
duction per hour was at the rate of thirty-~ pounds of 
sliver. On the average it has been estimated that the 
waste involved in this rather long drawn-out process came 
to five and one-half percent. The packages of sliver that 
emerged from the process were not uniform in size, some 
weighing as little as three pounds while others ranged up 
1 
to eleven pounds at different stages of the operation. 
When the pin-drafter is used, the lap goes through 
the following stages, which replace the old gilling and 
drawing operations. The first step involves the use of two 
lT . his does not mean that there was tnis much ·lack 
of uniformity at anz ~ stage of the drawing and gilling 
operation. At one stage, however, the package emerging 
would be three pounds, and at another stage it might be 
eight pounds. This meant that there was a problem of haVihg · 
the right combination of machines if continuous production 
on all machines was desired, or else there would be some 
idle machines while still others were performing their 
operations. 
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dual-delivery pin-drafters. The sliver is delivered from 
the machine into tall cans. From here it goes through a 
set of three quad-delivery machines, after which it is 
ready for the roving and spinning operations. In contrast 
with the standard Bradford system described above, however, 
the opera~ion using pin-drafters requires only two opera-
tors and involves only twenty-two deliveries. ~reduction 
per operator hour is 105 pounds, and estimated waste is at 
the rate of 3! perc·ent. Estimated savings resulting from 
the use of the pin-drafter, as compared to the standard 
Bradford system, come to thirty-five percent, and finally, 
the sliver is delivered in uniform twenty-two pound "pack-
agesn at all stages of the operation, leading to ~eater 
standardization and eliminating the problem of discovering 
and maintaining the right combination of machi~es for 
continuous operations. In order to present a better 
summary picture of the comparison of standard Bradford and 
pin-drafter operations, the above information is summarized 
in TableiD. 
· TABLE ~II 
<· 
-
COMPARISON OF DRAFTING AND GILLING OPERATIONS 
ON STANDARD BRADFORD AND PIN-DRAFTING SYSTEMS 
Number of operators involved 
Number of deliveries involved 
Production per operator-hour 
Waste (ball-to:p through spin)' 
Weight of packages 
Standard 
Bradford 
5 
136 
31 lbs. 
5~% 
3-ll lbs. 
Pin-
Drafter 
2 
22 
105 lbs. 
3~% 
22 lbs. 
Source: Data provided py Warner and Swasey Company. 
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The pin-drafter is a very versatile machine. Some 
mills are using the machines in their combing departmen~ s 
as well as in their drawing and gilling departments. Al-
though the above comparison has been made in terms of the 
Bradford system, the machine is also used on the French 
sy.stem and the Amer;tcan system. The pin-drafter will 
handle wool, synthetics,· or blends of the two. The ma-
chine completely eliminates.three out of the six steps 
formerly involved in the drawing and gilling operation, 
reduces labor requirements and waste. The waste figures 
should not be overlooked by the casual reader. Wool is an 
.expensive raw material, and the waste iss old at a 'greatly 
reduced priae. One manUfacturer who uses pin-drafters 
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indicated to the author that the reduction in waste alone, 
if the machine did not reduce other costs, would have made 
tne machine a valuable contribution to the industry. 
The pin-drafter .lends i·tself a·dmirably to the use of 
statistical quality control methods which reduce the cost 
·of maintaining uniform quality be requiring only sample 
testing instead of testing the compiete lot of' the product. 
Quality control methods are now being used in a few ad-
vanced firms, although they are not generally used through-
out the -industry. 
Verification 
The above figures can .be disputed on tne grounds 
that they were provided by the manufacturer. Verification 
and additional information can be obtained from an excellent 
cost analysis of the macnine1 which. compares various sys-
tyms: In su~ary, operating expenses to produce l/24s 
French by conventional methods cost 8.4¢ per pound, the 
same article using pin-:draf'ters costs 4·4¢ per pound; 
l/35s French cost 8.4~ per pou~d by conventional method and 
5.2¢ per pound by pin-drafter; l/32s English cost 12.0~ per 
pound by conventional method and 8.3¢ per pound by pin-
drafter; l/43s English cost 13.2¢ per pound by conventional 
lMichael J. Korosky, How Pin-Drafters Are Being l'il:sed·, 
How to Improve Woolen and Worsted Mill Operations ( New 
York: · 1\/Ic-Graw-HiJ.,l Book Company, Inc., 1959). K"onosky: 
W'..as an Assistaht Professor, Wool Department, Lowell Textile 
Ins~itute~ when this study was made. 
method and 10.5¢ per pound by pin-drafter. 
In another study reported in the same article, a 
mill with a capacity output of 175,000 pounds per week 
determined that it required seventy-four machines (at 
85% efficiency} operating two forty-hour shifts per week, 
and that average savings were three cents per pound. The 
mill calculated, conservatively, as follows, in determin-
ing how Long it-took the machines to pay for themselves. 
It should be observed that the calculation is direct, and 
does not consider the effects of taxation, differences in 
investment, etc. 
TIME REQUIRED TO PAY FOR EQUI.PMENT 
$481,000 (74 machines @ $6500 cost) : 
$0.03/lb. 16 million lbs. of product(approximate) 
175,000 lbs.jwk.average = 
16,000,000 lbs.product = 
87,500 lbs.jwk. 
87,500 lbs. at 50% capacity 
183 wks.production (approximate) 
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Weaving Machine 
Most woolen and worsted executives with whom the 
author has consulted:: nave agreed that the "weaving· ma-
chinen is the most revolutionary change to be made in the 
industry since the development of' the automatic loom in 
1905. The weaving machine is more efficient and employs 
a different principle than the ordinary loom which it re~ 
places. 
The history of the weaving machine is a fascinat-
ing account of a European inventor who, like his United 
States counterparts, could not interest established tex-
tile machinery manufacturers in his device. A European 
precision machinery manufacturer, not in the textile 
field, became interested in the development of the ma-
chine, but had only a moderate degree of sucoess. Thanks 
to the interference of the previously-mentioned Uxbridge 
Worsted Company, the Warner and Swasey Company acquired 
the rights to the machine, and toge-ther with ~the worsted 
company applied the combined knowledge of textile and ma-
chinery experts to produce this most important machine.· 
The inventor of the macnine, Rudolph Rossman,while 
employed by the Deutsche Wolle Company, GrUnberg, Silesia, 
had not completed his invention when this company failed . 
in 1928. His first partially successful weaving machine 
was built shortly thereafter in cooperation with a woolen 
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manufacturer. Rossman attempted to interest a number of 
textile machinery manufacturers in his invention, but re-
ceived no encouragement. The Textil-Finanz A.G. of Swit-
zerland, a financial group, became interested in Rossman's 
machine. It was arranged by Texti~-Finanz A.G. that 
Sulzer Brothers, a precision machinery manufacturer of 
high reputation in the manufacture of sucn items as pumps, 
engines, and other precision products, provide the engi-
neering development for this. machine. For a short period, 
Rossman was in charge of his project at Sulzer Brothers, 
but then left. Sulzer Brothers continued with the develop-
ment of the machine for over·ten years. Tne engineering 
problems involving many new concepts in the engineering of 
machinery proved.to·be prodigious. 
The officials of the Uxbridge Worsted Company first 
heard of the machine in 1944 from a·Swiss technician who 
was at that time in the United States. The Uxbridge Worsted 
Company sent an official to Switzerland immediately after 
V-E Day for the purpose of viewing the Sulzer weaving ma-
chine. Sulzer had some machines in operation, but these ma~ 
chines were hand-tooled, not adapted to mass production,and 
possessed certain operational imperfections which made them 
unsatisfactory f'or modern factory use. 
The high degree of cooperation then existing between 
the Uxbriage Worsted Company and the Warner and Swasey 
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Company (because of the pin-drafter experiments) made it 
possible for the machinery manu~acturer to become inter-
ested in the machine, acquire the licenses for manufacture 
in the year 1945, and continue with the engineering devel-
opment. One of the weaving machines was installed in the 
research:department of the textile company and exhaustive 
tests and improvements requiring the use of the personnel 
of both the machinery and the textiie manufacturers were 
conducted. The machine was ultimately developed and has 
eecome very popular in use. 
The worsted company does not receive royalties or 
other direct financial benefit from the sale or the p~­
fected ,mahhmnB• But it did receive the advantage of long 
·experience· with the machine when it was finally produced, 
and obtained a substantial temporary advantage from being 
the first to employ these efficient machines. 
Operating Data . 
The typical automatic loom in the woolen and worsted 
industry, prior to the introduction of the weaFing machine, 
operated at the rate· of about 120 t·o 135 picks per minute. 
The Warner and Swasey Company turned out tbre e models of 
the weaving machine, the models differing primarily in the 
width of the cloth they can weave. The machine which weaves 
the narrowest cloth, of course, can operate at the highest 
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speed. The speeds at which the macn-ines can operate are 
provided in the table below: 
Model M-2820 
Width 8o" 
Picks per 
minute(standard) 240 
M-2860 
95tt 
230 
M-2960 
110tt 
220 
Source: Warner and Swasey Company. 
Even the widest and slowest weaving machine oper-
ates at a speed which is 63% above the upper limit of the 
typical old-style loom, and on the narrower loom (80") the 
speed is greater by almost 78%. Additional economies are 
also present since the new machine does not use internally-
. filled shuttles whlQh require frequent refilling with yarn, 
and the precision manufacture of the machine reduces down-
time and maintenance costs. 
Whatever else may be said about textile machinery 
prior to Warner and Svvasey 1 s entry into the textilemachin-
ery business, it. could not beccalled precision machinery. 
Certain recent developments in spinning have come close in 
appearance and oper~tion to precision machines~ but for the 
most part the basic design of textile machinery has not · 
changed since the introduction of the automatic loom~ 'l'his 
is a large, cumbers one, noisy machine which is very durable, 
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and which can produce the finest cloth, but which could not 
by any stretch of the imagination be called a precision ma-
chine. 
Warner and Swasey built the weaving machine along 
the lines of the turret lathe and other machine tools in 
which the company has long specialized. The finished prod-
u¢t is not only .a highly efficient textile machine, but has 
the appearance of a well-made, streamlined, modern tool. 
The Pacific Converter 
Unlike the pin-drafter and the.weaving machine, 
which ~equired axtensiv~ development by professional engi-
neers after the basic discoveries of the inventors, the 
Pacific converter was invented and substantiaLly de~eloped 
into ·its final form by a wooien and worsted company before 
being turned over to the engineers of the machinery manu-
facturer. This is all the more astonishing when we con-
aider that the Pacific conver.ter,·is a highly complex 
precision machine. 
Prior to the year 1937 practically all chemical 
. ' 
.fibers had been used as filament (long,· cont-inuous strands, 
many hundreds of yards in length). In the manufacturing 
process many filaments are produced simultaneously and lie 
parallel. to each other. At about 1937 ·the chemical·. fiber 
began to be used in staple form, the staple being produced 
by taking the parallel filaments and chopping them into 
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little pieces approximating the size of animal or vegetable- · 
fibers. These chopped-up bits of fiber no longer lay par-
allel. To spin yarn from chemical staple these chemical 
fibers w.ere treated in the same manner as nailUral staple, 
involving many expensive steps to lay the short fibers 
parallel-once again and put the fibers in the form of 
1ttoptt. These fibers proved difficult to blend with wool 
as they lacked the crinkle of' natural wool. E. Dean 
Waylan and Robert G. Wilkie (the latter being the princi-
pal inventor of the converter) noted the obvious ineffi-
ciency of taking parallel fibers, making them non-parallsl, 
and then going to considerable trouble and $xpense to lay 
them parallel again. 
The same thought occurred to many other inventors 
at about the same time, and man:y attempted to perform 
this apparently simple, yet in practice exceedingly dif-
ficult task. Thirty-eight patents were taken out by var-
ious persons who attempted to accomplish this task by an 
improved technique, but only three, to the knowledge of 
the author, have proved workable. The Pacific Mills in-
novation was, by several ye~rs, the .first such machine 
on the•market. 
It also appeared at about this time that the wor-
sted industry might be faced with the alternative of con-
verting its own tow to staple or giving up the idea of 
blending wool with chemical .fibers. It appeared that the .· 
limited amount o.f' chemical fibers then available for blen~ 
ing might be diverted for blending with cotton, since cot-
ton machinery was better adapted .for blending these fibers 
than was worsted machinery. 
To Wilkie 1 s best recollection he .f'ir.st began work-
ing on the converter early in 1937. At this time Paci.f'ic 
Mills was headed by a president who did not particularly 
favor research, and neither money nor special equipment 
was made available for this purpose (the machine.was 
.finally perfected under more .f'avorable.auspices). Inspired 
with the idea of the converter and with the support of 
Waylan (who is himself an inventor) Wilkie developed the 
basic idea of the converter. Between August and October 
of 1937 he sandwiched nis work on this project in amongst 
his other· duties. In October Wilkie was given permission 
by his immediate superiors to devote full time to the 
project •. Since no money was made available ~or research 
by a disinterested top-management, his expenses were 
hidden as "operating eXpenses." The little money which 
was made available to him was used to pay labor costs 
associated with the project. The necessary materials 
were largely begged, borrowed, or stolen from other de-
partments o.f' Pacific Mills. Wilkie recalled with a 
smile during our interview, 
The slashing department had the gears 
which we needed. Walter Ritter and I 
walked into the area where the gears -were 
stored. I got the overseer into a corner 
and did the best I could to distract him 
while Walter stole the parts. To this day 
when the mills are entered by us, the per~ 
sonnel make a show of trailing us and nail-
ing down all of their equipment. 
Present models of the Pacific converter bear the 
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marks of this heritage. Certain parts are employed to day 
not because an engineer predetermined them to be the best 
possible size, but hecause these parts were availab.Ile.: for 
the light-1'ingered research personnel, and when these 
parts were incorporated into the machine they operated 
effectively. 
The technical details concerning the operation of 
the Pacific-converter wi~l not be explained here, but it 
is interesting that the inventor overcame a particular 
technical difficulty using technical advice available free 
of charge from other firms. 
Perhaps the most important single part of the con-
verter is the high-angle helix multiple-blade cutter which 
rotates against a revolving an-vil to cut the continuous 
fiber into the desire_d length. Most synthetics are very 
abrasive to cutting tools, and since the manuracture of 
this cutter i~volves a large amount of expensive machining, 
and since frequent shut-downs to repair or change blades 
would make the machine less effective, it was of prime 
importance to select a steel which. would have the neces-
sary desirable properties. Literally dozens of steel 
manufacturers were consulted and given the information 
concerning the requirements of the cutting blade. E~ch 
one of the manufacturers replied to the effect that he 
had just exactly the steel which was required for the job. 
The personnel of Pacific Mill.s, af.ter study of the steel 
specifications which were provided to them by the steel 
manufacturers, eliminated the steels which were obviously 
unsatisfactory. The remaining list of steels was given 
to sev.eral machine shops who expressed willingness to man-
ufacture the cutter. Of these machine shops all of them 
eliminated certain of the steels as unsatisfactory; there 
was a divergence of opinion on some steels; _and all 
agreed that four of the steels would probably be satis-
factory. A steel W-as selected that was unanimously con-
sidered to be satisfactory. 
It turned out that the choice of steel could not 
have been excelled. When the Warner and Swasey- Company 
later started to manufacture these machines, after exper-
imentation with other steels, they finally fell back upon 
_the specifications provided by Pacific Mills. The cutters 
have turned out to be eminently s~tisfactory, and they have 
provided practically trouble-free operation in almost every_ 
installation. 
-1-· ~ ' 
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When the converter was in its initial experimenta-
tion phase, although other chemical fibers were being pro-
duced, only acetate was available in the form of "town. 
Since tow is the raw material of the converter, the ma-
chine was developed on acetate, although the machine 
proved to be effective with all kinds of tow. 
The raw material itself presents certain problems. 
Poor &Uality tow is not improved by conversion. On the 
contrary, all the imperfections persist and tend to in-
crease to an extent. The manufacturers of tow, Du Pont 
for exampLe, were extremely cooperative in eliminating 
certain undesirable features of the tow and improving it 
for the requirements of converte·r operation. 
When the manufacturers of chemical .fibers other than 
acetate were impressed with the possibilities of the con-
verter, they also provided their f'iber in the form of tow 
for use with this machine. 
During this period when the machine was being im-
proved, the machine was being used commercially. Top (the 
finished product of the converter) was produced for use in 
the factories of Pacific Mills, and some top was sold to 
other factories, being produced on a commission basis. 
The first large-scale use of the converter occurred 
in a Southern plant owned by Pacific Mills.in Rhodiss, 
North Carolina. In an interview granted the author the 
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president of Pacific Mills,. H.M. Bliss, stated that a 
Southern mill rather than a Northern mill was used for the 
test because it was feared that the tradition-bound North-
ern workers would not give the machine a fair trial, while 
Southern workers, considering this a challenge, were likaw 
to work with the new machine to the best of their ability. 
After the machines had proved successful, Pacific 
Mills was faced with the decision on whether to keep this 
new.innovation to themselves or whether to share it with 
the textile industry. It was decided, for several paasons, 
to make the machine avai·lable ·to all. The most important 
determinant, according to Rufus Hale' Assistant Treasurer 
of Pacific Mills, in a discussion with the author, was 
that chemical fiber manufacturers (DuPont was specifically 
mentioned) would not contin~e to manufacture tow, except 
possibly at premiUll'l prices, unless a sufficiently large 
market were found for the tow. Unless the converter was 
-made available to all manufacturers who could use it,there 
seemed little likelihood of a broad enough market develop-
ing for chemical tow. Pacific Mills, of course, enj9yed 
exelusi ve use of the converter for a period of time before 
it was made generally available, and was consequently s.ev-
era:l years ahead of its competition. Furthermmre, the 
royalty earned by P·acific Mills on the sale of each ma-
chine tended to make other companies slightly higher-cost 
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producers than Pacific Mills ($5,000 royalty per machine 
payable over five years). The machines are widely used in 
the United States, South America, France, Belgium, Italy, 
Japan, and Canada. 
Although Eacific Mills had invented, developed, and 
had been using the converter in their production processes, 
it was decided to permit the Warner and Swasey Company to 
manufacture the machine for general sale. 
As has. already been indicated, Warner and Swasey 
·was a precision-inanhinery manufacturer which had only re-
cently entered the textile-machinery field. lN.b.en the 
Warner and Swasey Company entered the pteture, the machime 
was given to them as a perfected, operating machine. The 
developmental changes which were made by Warner and Swasey 
were alterations which did.not substantially affect the 
operation of the machine, but rather made the machine more 
suitable for mass production. The converter was introduced 
to the textile industry in 1949· 
Because of strikes and other problems Warner and 
Swasey was initially one-and~one~half years behind schedule 
in filling orders. This created problems for certain firms 
who had depended upon prompt receip.t o:f converters. For 
example, a Canadian firm had built an entire plant around a 
process; the heart of which was composed of Pacific con-
verters and pin-drafters (previously mentioned). To assure 
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a continuous supply of raw materials tney had contracted 
for delivery of tow on a regular basis. As the tow piled 
up in their warehouses and the converters failed to mater• 
ialize, the firm became increasingly embarrassed. Pacific 
Mills loaned the Canadian firm a converter which operated 
continuously, day and night, for a period of abo~t a year, 
until Warner and Swasey could deliver converters. In spite 
of this hard, continuous operation the machine provided 
trouble-free performance. 
Operating Data1 
Comparative figures of converter operation as com-
pared with other methods of performing the same tas~are 
likely to be misleading because of the machine • s versa-
tility, the use of synth·etic tow as raw material, and the 
fact that the machine can be used on natura.l fibers ether 
than wool. 
When synthetic tow is the raw material, the con-
tinuous filaments are cut to predetermined lengths. The 
fibers are then condensed, and drawn, crimped s.Liver is 
packed into containers in preparation for the following 
drawing operation. All of this is done continuously in 
one operation by one machine. Because of the use of con-
tinuous synthetic fibers, operations which are necessary 
1Figures published by American Textile Machinery 
Association. M.B. Andrews, 2.E.•ill• ~ p. 21. 
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with naturaL fibers are completely eliminated. 
The converter also functions as a blending device. 
The above-mentioned operation can be carried out using 
more than one type of synthetic tow, and the various syn-
thetics are automatically and precisely blended in the 
above-mentioned one continuous operation. 
Natural fibers such.as wool may be blended with the 
synthetic fibers in this oper>ation, and the percentage of 
each fiber going into the blend can be very accurately 
controlled. 
The converter performs tasks which were impossible 
for old machines. Even where the tasks are similar, the 
converter replaces a battery of assorted machines. For 
example, compare the machine operations required in the 
.Conventional worsted method of converting tow to yarn, 
1 
with the operations reql.lired using the Pacific converter. 
Conventional Method 
Opener 
Card 
First Preparer-Gill 
Second Preparer-Gill 
Can Gill 
l.J..-Spindle Gill 
6-Spindle Weigh, Box 
8-Spindle Weigh Box 
10-Spindie F~n1Bher 
Reducer 
Rover 
Spinning 
New Method Using Pacific Converter 
Pacific Converter 
First Pin-Drafter 
Second Pin-Drafter 
Third Pin-Drafter 
Reducer 
Rover 
Spinning 
lprofessor J. H. Kennedy, The Pacific Converter, 
Textile World Report t·o Managementjl950. 
The capital cost of the Pacdfie converter (price 
$12,000 in 1950) was a fraction of the cost of the room 
full of equipment it replaced. The floor space required 
for a converter production line (supply-creel-converter-
storage) is a mere 6' x 50 1 1 compared with several times 
that amount f'or conventional machinery. Labor costs by 
users were reduced considerably •. (Estimates by users inte~ 
viewed range f'rom 1/3 to 2/3 1 but no concrete published 
data are available. All of' the estimates provided could 
be accurate since the s~ving depends upon the nature of' 
the work and type of labor used .. ) Output varies from 100 
to 180 pounds net per machine-hour. 
Summary 
The name Warner and Swasey has been as$oCiated with 
the thre.e innovations thus f'ar mentioned in this chapter. 
Warner and Swasey were elected to .manufacture the con-
verter because of their success with the two previously 
mentioned inventions, and because of the lack of' interest 
on the part of' other textile machinery manufacturers. 
Warner and Swasey found it necessary to apply a 
large amount of engineering development to the pin-drafter 
and to the weaving machine before they were ready f'or 
f'actory use in the woolen and worsted industry. Very 
little work was required by ~'iarner and Swasey f'or· the 
aevelopment of' the converter. When the converter was 
105 
turned over to Warner and Swasey by Pacific Mills, it was, 
for all practical purposes, a complete machine which had 
been tested by factory use. Pacific Mills had not only 
originated the invention, but developed it in their re-
search department, and put it into operation in actual 
production. The product of the machine had not only been 
used in their own mills, but had been sold to other firms 
for use as raw material. 
The machine was permitted to go into production to 
be sold to other firms in the woolen and worsted industry 
instead of remaining the sole property of Pacific Mills. 
A variety of reasons reinforced management•s decision to 
let other firms use the machine, not the least of which 
was the knowleggetthat synthetic tow would be available 
at premium prices, if at all, unless a mass market for the 
tow were to be created. The only .practical method of 
creating this mass market was through the sale .of the 
machine to other firms •. 
The aforementioned inventions, the pin-drafter, 
weaving machine,and Pacific converter, touched off a wave 
of textile-machinery improvement that has not yet ended. 
These innovations have resulted in increases in efficiency 
which are so great ~hat they are not ye~ generally compre-
hended by the general public. Consider the following 
items, reflecting the increases in productivity: 
There is no absolutely accurate index 
for measuring man-hour productivity for 
the. entire textile industry as production 
patterns for individual mills vary from 
narrow to wide degree; however, the trend 
based upon case histories, is upward as 
textile ·mills replace obsolete equipment 
with modern machinery. Due to the numer-
ous technological developments the pro-
ductivity rate per man hour in the textile 
industry has greatly increased within the 
past ten years, surpassing that of other 
industries in the country as a whole. This 
report clearly establishes approximately a 
50% increase in ~~hour Eroductivity may 
be obtained in 1957 a~ compared to produc-
tivity rates of 1947. 
On an annual basis, using a compound 
interest formula, output per worker in the 
broadwoven segment in the domestic textile 
industry increased at the rate of 3.5 per 
cent per year from 1947 to 1957. 2 
Evenness Tester 
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The evenness tester is an example of an important 
innovation invented and developed by Pacific Mil.ls per-
sonnel~under more .favorable conditions than the Pacific 
converter. At the date of this writing there are several 
brands of testers on the market. It is not our purpose 
here to compare brands or to discuss the technological 
aspects of the Pacific Mills evenness tester Which is ~sed 
_ 
1M.B. Andrews, .Profit Life of Textile Machinery, 
American Textile Machinery Association, 1958, p. 12. 
2' . 
Will.iam H. Miernyk, A Projection of Textile Pro-
duction in the United States to 121Q (Boston: Northeastern 
University Bureau· of Business and Economic Research, 1959), · 
6. . 
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in testing and quality control. 
In the year 1922, E. Dean Waylan patented a mechan-
ical tester which was to be used in research, quality con-
trol, and development. The patent was sold to Saco-Lowell 
Shops who then marketed•it as the Saco-Lowell Sliver 
Tester. This simple tester is still used, principally in 
the ·cotton industry. In 1940 Pacific Mills purchased some 
of thes~ testers for purposes of quality control in their 
mills. They also wanted to use the sliver testers in con-
junction with th~ir studies of the Pacific converter and 
of synthetic fibers. There was a need for a machine to 
test the evenness of sliver because it was experimentally 
determined that even the most highly trained humans were 
not capable of consistently good judgments of evenness 
without the aid of equipment. 
Pacific Mills found the Saco-Lowell testers only 
partially satisfactory. The two principal failings were 
that the machine was too slow and that the machine could 
not test anything finer than ravings. Saco-Lowell was 
requested to improve their machine for Pacific Mills, but 
declined to do so. 
A series of improvements was made to the Saco-
Lowell machine by ·the research personnel of Pacific Mills. 
Wilkie was finally of the opinion that an entirely new 
machine was necessary and convinced ~aylan of its 
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importance. He received permission, in 1943, to drop his 
existing work (a drawing project) and work full time on the 
testing machine. 
Wilkie now had at his disposal a well-equipped re-
search facility with competent personnel. Funds were made 
available to him for the project. A research program was 
set up. It was decided to construct a mechancial type 
testing machine which could measure materials much finer 
than ravings. In due course (about a year) the mechanical 
·machine was developed and put to nse •. 
But research personnel continued to make improve-
ments to the mechanical tester, giving it much of their 
thought while working on other. projec·ts. Ultimately it 
was decided that:an electronic-type tester might prove 
more satisfactory than the mechanical type. This involved 
a completely different principle which had never before 
been used in such apparatus. Again funds were obtained, 
but this time the project was carried on as an additional 
undertaking rather than the exclusive undertaking of the 
research department •. 
Once again the work was crowned with success. An 
excellent electronic tester was developed which was super-
ior to the mechanical model in many ways (faster, higher 
magnification, compression tester). 
Management decided once again to make their machine 
109 
available to the industry. Since Pacific Mills is not a 
machinery manufacturer, the Anderson Machine Shop, Inc., 
Needham, Massachusetts, was called upon to manufacture the 
tester. The Anderson Machine Shop received a machine which 
w~s, for all practical purposes, entirely developed and 
ready to· -be put into production. 
The Development of All-Purpose Spinning 
The problem in using synthetics or blends of syn-
thetics and woolens does not arise in the weaving room, 
but at an earlier stage. First there is the problem of 
blending as such. This was solved by the Pacific converter~ 
But innovations were also required in the spinning process, 
and experimental work was being performed by various per-
sons before World War II. 
It had always been assumed, for centuries, that one 
fiber could not be spun on another system; i.e., that wool 
could not be spun on cotton, or cotton on the woolen sys-
tem. Several companies have come·out with highly efficient 
I 
techniques for spinning worsted and synthetic blends by 
techniques similar to those used in the cotton industry. 
The Whitin Machine Work~ and the Saco-Lowell Shops produce 
competitively similar equipment with which manufactUrers 
can cut labor costs by about two-thirds over previously 
used techniques. The equipment produced by these machinery 
manufacturers was invented, developed, tested, and produced 
entirely within their own organiza tiona. 'I'he invention 
and development of these machines was a combination of 
organized research and development coupled with the in-
ventive genius of individual men. 
Collins and Aikman Corporation· 
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It is of interest to observe the approach to the 
problem taken by the Collins and Aikman Corporation, a 
producer of woolens and wo~steds. Whitworth F. Bird, the 
inventor, of ColJ.ins and Ailhn.an, was earlier associated 
with Eugene Gwaltp.ey of the Saco-Lowell Shops. Both had 
somewhat different ideas of how to attack the problem, and 
each, in time, invented a workabl~ system for his company. 
There is still considerable secrecy surrounding the 
Bird system. So far Collins and Aikman have retained a 
complete monopoly. ·Bird's system can spin yarn out of any 
one fiber or blend of fibers, both natural and synthetic. 
Among these which have been successfully employed on the 
system are wool, cotton, rayon, nylon, acrilan, dynel, 
orlon, dacron, and vicara. 
The advantages of this system are obvious. If the 
market demand for one type of fiber declines, a switch can 
be made to another fiber and fabric. This means that a 
mill can operate more· continuously. and thereby enjoy the 
~eduction in overhead costs which continuous operations 
.; .. ·· 
bring. It is also claimed that the Bird system has reduced 
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direct costs. For example, in the manufacture of a 
sixteen-ounce upholstery fabric, Collins and Aikman claim 
that they have been able to cut costs as much as 75¢ a 
yard on a fabric that usually cost $2.50 a yard and up to 
manufacture in the past. 
One significant feature of this innovation is yet 
to be discussed. Since Collins and Aikman is a textile 
concern, not a machinery manufacturer, it is necessary to 
explain how they developed and produced the precisibn ma-
chinery used in the Bird system. 
The system was originally developed from Bird's 
ideas under conditions of great secrecy. Brooklyn, New 
York, a non-textile area, was selected as the site for 
development and the original construction of the machine. 
The facilities were concealed in a garage. The principal 
requirement in the hiring of employees for the project 
was that they had never seen a piece of textile machinery 
before. The rorkers developed a strong loyalty to this 
secret project and their results were excellent.· This is 
an interesting illustration of the lengths to which a 
woolen and worsted. manufacturer wlll sometimes go to keep 
a wall of secrecy around any new development he is under-
taking. 
After the original parts were fashioned in crude 
form by Bird and his associates, the parts were sent to the 
Saco-Lowell Shops in Maine where they were finished. 
In 1947 Eugene Gwaltney, director of research of 
the Saco-Lowell Shops, inspected the machinery. After. 
the Bird system was perfected and in use, the Saco-Lowell 
Shops developed and marketed their own version, employing 
a somewhat different principle, which is known as the 
ttmodified system. 11 The Saco-Lowell system can be con-
verted to the Bird system by the addition of one special 
piece of equipment. 
. . 
Finally, the Wnitin Machine Works of Whitinsville, 
Massachusetts, developed its so-called "American system11 
which is a competitor of the above systems. 
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The importance of these developments can be illus-
trated by events in one Collins and Ai~man mill. The 
Bristol, Rnode Island, mill of this company generall¥ 
manufactures automobile upholstery material. By 1951 it 
had installed the Bird system and in that year, in the 
first quarter,. automobile output was curtailed by thirty-
seven percent mf the last quarter of 1950 level. Had this 
occurred in the past, the Bristol mill would nave cut back 
its operations. Tnis time, however, it did not do so. In-
stead, the mill started spiim.fng various types of synthetic 
blends for the knitting and weaving trades and the mill was 
kept operating at capacity. 
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The worsted yarn combed on the Bird system is some-
what inferior in quality to that combed by the regular 
combs (French and Bradford). For some kinds of fabrics the 
difference might be sufficient to render the Bird system 
unsuitable. In the case of worsted to be used in automo-
bile upholstery, however, it seems to be just as satis-
factory as the more expensive worsted top. 
Summau 
The invention and development of the Bird swstem 
was largely the work of one man, operating with a relative-
ly unskilled organization, under conditions of utmost se-
crecy. The bulk of the engineering was accomplished by the 
technically trained invento~ (Northeastern University grad-
uate) with some assistance from the Saco-Lowell Shops, a 
leading textile machine~y manufacturer. 
Long-Draft Spinning and Roving 
The Saco-Lowell Shops 
In the following report concerning the Saco-Lowell 
Shops I am indebted to A. K. Landau, A. L. Landau (a father-
and-son team of executives), and to other employees of the 
Shops. I have also employed, principally for background 
material, several Saco-Lowell Bulletins, and the study by 
G. Gibb entitled The ~-Lowell Shops, Textile Machinery 
Building in New England 1813-~ (Cambridge_: Harvard 
University Press, 1950). 
The Saco-Lowell Shops are machine builders, not 
woolen and worsted manu~acturers. Throughout their long 
history (the earliest o~ t,P.e parent companies being organ-
ized in 1813) the Shops have excelled in the manu~acture 
o~ many types o~ machinery. History records that the 
parent companies were organized not to produce. machinery, 
but cloth. Early in their history. the Shops evolved into 
the manufacture:· o~ machinery. In view o~ the textile 
origin, it is not surprising that although other types o~ 
machinery were also manu~actured, the manufacture of tex-
tile machinery has been of utmost importance. 
The Shops have generally specialized in the manu-
~acture of cotton, rather than woolen and worsted, machin-
ery. In 1898, however, a parent company known as the 
Lowell Machine Shop gained the distinction o~ being the 
first United States manufacturer of.worsted machinery. Up 
to this time the English had a monopoly of the textile ma-
chinery manufacturing business. Although unauthorized to 
do so, the Lowell Machine Shop virtually copied the ma-. 
chine.s of the English company· of Prince-Smith & Stella. 
Th~se United States reproductions of English machines were 
sold at prices substantially under those of their ~oreign 
competitors until the United States machinery became well 
accepted by Uni.ted States worsted mills. At this time the 
prices of the United States manufactured machines were 
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increased above those of the English. In 1926, due to the 
limited sales of this type of machinery, the Saco-Lowell 
Shops ceased making worsted machinery. The bulk of this 
business fell into the hands of the Whitin Machine Works, 
a principal United States competitor. 
At about this time, however, the Saco-Lowell Shops 
became interested in long-draft spinning and rOving for 
the cotton textile industry. The Shops attempted to de-
velop inventions which had originated in Spain and in · 
France. Ultimately these successful developments were 
utilized not m:erely in.cottons, but in various blends of 
fibers, natural and synthetic, and in worsted.s. In April 
of 1952 the Saco-Lowell Shops announced Gwaltney Spinning, 
' 
and were thus again in the business of manufacturing ma-
chinery for the worsted industry. 
The re-entry of the Saco-Lowel1 Shops into the wor-
sted machinery manufacturing field with its long-draft 
spinning and roving (using similar, but not the same, ma-
chinery as that used for cotton) marks more than the addi-
tion of a new mechanical innovation. Here we see machin-
ery Which, with some changes, can serve more than one type 
of fiber and ble~ds of these fibers. Although it is yet 
impossible· to process cotton and wool on the same unchanged 
machinery, the day may come when there will no longer be a 
separate·cotton industry, worsted industry, rayon industry, 
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etc. Steps have already been taken so that some day in 
the distant future the several textile fibers may con-
ceivably be processed on the same machinery, replacing 
the extsting industries by an all-inclusive, completely 
flexible textile industry. 
Research After 1938 
Although research of quality had been carried on 
prior to i938 under the auspices of E. E. Blake, a clear-
ly defined research department emerged in this year under 
Eugene Gwaltney, the first Director of Research. Saco-
Lowell Shops had b.een faced by severe competition, and· 
the management was determined to make a market for ita 
products through technological improvements.· 
The most significant product of this research for 
the purpose of this thesis is long-draft roving and spin-
ning {modified from cotton machinery) as applied to the 
worsted indu_stJ:>Y• The Saco-Lowell Shops, the Wb.itin 
Machine Works, and the Collins and Aikman Corporation 
were simultaneously but independently working on the same 
idea, and the three Corporations each emerged with some-
what similar solutions to the problem. The machinery of 
each of these companies is in fact presently employed com-
mercially in the manufacture of worsted yarns. 
When Gv1altne-y ·· first embarked on research with 
longer fibers-such as synthetics and wool, he met with 
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certain problems, some of which proved to be insuperable. 
For example, a:fter many experiments during the middle 
1940's in treating these raw fibers in a manner similar to 
cotton, this project was abandoned and it was decided that 
it would be preferable to purchase top. In attempting to 
draft the top, many problems 'fiiD.erged, particularly the 
problem of static electricity. Due to this stat·:i,c elec-
tricity it was ·impossible to put the drafted top. properly 
into a can (tall cylindrical container). Experiments to 
reduce the effects of the electrioi ty using alpha ray bars, 
Chapman Neutralizers, heat, and humidity were ?f no avail. 
· An attempt was made to use a balling motion rather than a 
can. The balling experiments were fairly satisfactory, but 
stretching of the f'ibers due to the ehanging direction of 
movement and the expense involved caused these experiments 
to be abandoned. The pin-drafter developsd by Bachmann-
Uxbridge solved this problem. 
The next steps in the production process are that of 
roving and spinning. Here the Saoo-Lowell researchers were 
successful in their endeavors. The same basic machinery 
which was used for cotton fibers was applied to the longer 
worsted and synthetic fibers. It was soon determined that, 
although the basic principle was sound, the rollers of the 
cotton machinery were of too small a diameter, causing 
"lap-ups" in the longer fibers. ·Furthermore, "Z spinningn 
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was not. too effective because of single zone control. 
An SS-4 model was developed which employed larger 
rollers, and although it retained the single-zone feature, 
a definite nip over the apron provided satisfactory con-
trol. The nip roller was gapped so as not to break the 
long fibers. The same basic system was used both for 
roving and for spinning. Certain improvements have of 
course been made, but the latest system which is presently 
in use is basically the same as the earlier systems. 
A worsted factory employing the Saco-Lowell equip-
ment might have its production set up as follows: 
1. Purcha.se of manufacture top. 
2. Process the top through one or more pin-drafters 
or other drafting device. 
3· Saco-Lowell Roving Frame. 
4· Saco-Lowell Spinning Frame. 
5. The yarns thus prodUced are used in further 
production. 
The Executive and Operational Committee of the 
Snops voted on the amount of appropriations and had much to 
do with the selection of projects upon which research wouJd 
be expended. Althougn ohhers were also on the committee, 
the principal personalities involved were David F.Edwards, 
then President, put now Chairman of the Board; M.D.,Shaffuer, 
then Treasurer, but now President; W. F. Lowell, Vice 
President and-Sales Manager, and E• C. Gwaltney, Vice 
President and Director of Research. 
119 
All of these men were in favor of research, but in 
varying degrees. Gwaltney was a fine salesman for the idea 
of progress through research, thoroughly enthusiastic, al-
. 
though a hard~headed realist. Gwaltney was at his best 
when faced with opposition which he could often override 
through ~he sheer force of his powerful personality. One· 
of Gwaltney's driving ambitions was to be remembered after 
death for a contribution to the industry. 
Vice President Lowell, with his experience as a 
sales manager, believed that research would provide inno-
vations which would enable him to expand his sales. When-
ever sales declined, he would put the pressure on the re-
search group to produce something saleable. Lowell was 
completely convinced of the beneficial aspect of research 
on sales. Tog.ether, Gwaltney and Lowell made a good team. 
Matched against this team, in a sense, were Edwards 
and Shaffner. · These men, too, were in favor of research. 
But they tended to be cool, calm, and not overly enthus-
iastic concerning trie nebulous promise of the laboratory. 
Edwards, in an earlier year, had restored Saco-
Lowell Shops from an insolvent concern to a sound, prof'it-
able operation. This was done through his farsighted and 
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meticulous management. 
Malcolm D.· Shaffner, Treasurer and later President, 
was an astute financial manager. 
The latter two men were primarily concerned with 
the matter of money, and although lending.their support to 
the research program, succeeded in keeping it in econom-· 
ical check. 
The board of directors of the Shops was, of course, 
advised of the progress being made in the research pro-
gram and passively approved of the actions of the officers 
of the Corporation.· The stockholders were similarly made 
aware of the program of research and voiced no objection. 
Gwaltney had a tremendous drive to proceed with his 
work and was annoyed at the details required of a depart-
ment head. He had no respect for the lines of routine and 
for record-keeping and tended to avoid both. For example, 
when he would require parts he would simply demand and ob-
tain them and worry about the approval of these orders at 
some indefinite futnre time. He would avoid the use of the 
drafting board, ~irst building his machinery and then let-
ting the draftsmen copy the working models. When asked by 
Shop officials of the progress he was making he could radi-
ate enthusia.sm, prophesying splendid results, but would 
provide little or no real information.· 
Just prior to his death in November of 1951, 
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Gwaltney was asked to release the splendid spinning frame 
which now bears his name, nThe Saco-Lowell Gwaltney Spin-
ning Frame.n Gwaltney was somewhat hesitant, but this in-
vention had been in process a ~ong period of time. Lowell, 
backed by Edwards, was anxious to put the machine on the 
market to bolster sales. When the machine was put on the 
market, there remained certain "bugs" to be overcome, but 
these have since been corrected. 
In the above discussion the force of particular per-
sonalities has been emphasized. Yet it cannot be too 
strongly pointed out that the developments in research did 
not take place in the mind of one man. Approximately one-
hundred persons cooperated in the research department, and 
it was the combined ideas of the group, working as a team, 
and organized under Gwaltney,- that produced the resulting 
innovations and improvements. 
The .research peop~e a!e, of course, not the inno-
vators but the inventors. The innovators, who were respon-
sible for putting into. production· the products of research, 
are the above-mentioned officers of the concern. The author 
is tempted to name Lowell who wholeheartedly encouraged 
research in an attempt to st~mulate .sales. In all fairness, 
however, each of the above officers was important and re-
quired the cooperation of the rest. It was the mutual con-
viction of the group that innovation was necessary in order 
for the Shop .to get back into the business of making 
----···---
~------­
----- ---
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machinery for the woolen and worsted industry. In this co~ 
nection it must be observed that the principal competitors 
of Saco-Lowell Shops had also installed research programs, 
thus introducing interesting problems in competition tbr~ 
research and innovation. 
Operating Data 
The use of this machinery produces economies in a 
variety of ways. The yarn produced tends to be stronger 
and more uniform, introducing economies in further pro-
duction processes, and producing a better fabric. Bates 
1 
Manufacturing Company reports that the system produces 
"fine quality ya:rn,n "a lower percentage of seconds," and 
that "The breaking strength of the yarn processed on these 
frames is higher than that of similar yarn produced on our 
ol<tt frames." 
Important economies are produced in certain commonly 
utilized types of yarn by the reduction in winding costs 
associated with the use of a larger package. However, as 
the count of the yarn increases, the saving decreases, this 
saving becoming insignificant for large counts. 
Bates also reports increasing workloads (number of 
1 Letter from Bates Manufacturing Company, York 
Division, Saco, Maine, to W.F. Lowell, Vice President, 
Saco-J;.,owell Shops, dated August 27, 1953, published in 
Saco-Lowell Bulletin, October 1953. 
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spindles per worker) o~ spinners by 50%, with good results. 
In spite of the increased number of spindles :tended, Bates 
remarks that their workers say nthey would not go back to 
their old ~rames.u Tnis is entirely credible since the 
newer types of machinery require less physical e~fort on 
the part of the worker. 
· It is difficult to estimate precisely the over-all 
economies of this new system o~ spinning, as the savings, 
if any, will vary according to the type o~ yarn which is 
spun. But where the machine can be efficiently employed 
the savings are very substantial. Tne American Textile 
. . 1 
Machinery Association report by Andrews reports a reduc-
tion in man-hours, in some operations, of sixty-six per-
cent. The new machinery is also more compact than the 
old, resulting in a floor space saving o~ 50%. 
Two !!'hat Failed 
---------
The Abbot Worsted Company, during the decade ~ol~ 
lowing World War II, not only Rept pace with the most 
modern production techniques, but introduced innovations 
o~ its own. Tnese innovations must be classified as minor 
because of their small impact on the woolen and worsted 
·industry. The company, although it was .large f'or an 
1 M.B. Andrews, 2.E.!_ cit., p .. 25. 
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independent (it has since merged), was not large compared 
to the giants of the industry. When operating at capacity 
Abbot. employed 2,200 persons. 
Although interviews disclosed the management and 
certain key employees as being highly research~conscious, 
and much aware of developments -in other firms, the general 
concensus was tnat because of its limited size the Company 
could not afford the extensive laboratory facilities of 
Bachmann~Uxbridge Worsted Company or Pacific Mills. In 
spite of tnis, money, space, and personnel were provided 
by management to permit following through on certain ideas 
which management hoped would yield good results. Some, 
but not all of these ideas were successful. It is note-
worthy that the management was willing to discuss their 
mistakes as well as their successes. This characteristic 
appeared to be common among all the important innovators 
interviewed in this study. On tne other nand, it appeared 
to certain members of the Abbot management that some of 
the 11mistakesn of the Company might have developed into 
great triumphs if they had been exposed to engineering de-
velopment by a s"killed research personnel or by a machin-
ery manufacturer. 
Among the innovations which the Company introduced 
are many improvements to· existing machinery, a unique 
method of wool-grease recovery using a series of chemical 
treatments and settling tanks which separate the grease 
without polluting the nearby streams with waste products; 
and improvements in materials handling. 
To illustrate the relationShip between engineering 
and invention we have selected for study not one of the 
successful minor innovations, but two failures -- that is, 
inventions which did not become economically successful 
to the Company. 
Cotton Spinning Modified for Worsteds 
The cotton industry, for various reasons, had de-
veloped methods of converting cotton fibers into yarn 
which were much less time-consumin~ and expensive than the 
methods of the worsted industry. The cotton system could 
not be used for worsteds, however; because of the different 
charac.teristics of the fibers. The Abbot' Worsted Company 
was a leader in the attempt to modify the cotton system to_ 
worsteds. The project was ultimately abandoned •. As we 
have already seen in previous discussions, it remained for 
.Stronger hands to succeed where Abbot_. had fa.'iled. 
In 1935, Guy E. Branch, Superintendent, observed in 
a trade maga~;ine that a Czechoslovakian citizen, .. ~ named 
Weinberger, c~aimed to have a method for spinning wool on 
cotton machinery. Branch consulted with the officers of 
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the Corporation, all of whom were impressed with the 
potentially great_ reduction in costs if the inventor's 
scheme was practicable. Branch was authorized to meet and 
talk business with the inventor. An arrangement was made 
whereby the inventor would build such a machine, the Com-
pany paying certain expenses, and the inventor receiving 
a share of the profits, if any. 
The company, pursuing this e.xp eriment, purchased 
twenty-four used cotton ftpinning frames. The inventor, as 
good as his word, actually adapted this cotton equipment 
to spin wool. The system should have been a great money-
maker, but the machine would not operate well, and a poor 
end product resulted. After a long period of futile ex-
perimentation in an effort to improve the system, the 
project was dropped. 
The inventor's ideas were not discarded by the in-
dustry, however. Lewi~, ~td., of Truro, Nova Scotia, 
acquired the services of the same inventor and soon put 
his macnines into actual commercial production without sub-
stantial further development. The end product, as has 
been stated, was an inferior quality of yarp, but these 
yarns sold well, nevertheless, because of World War II 
shortages. With the disappearance of shortages, Lewis, 
Ltd., dropped the modified cotton system and returned to 
the old standard Bradford system of yarn manufacture. 
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The yarn from the new equipment was not competitive in a 
normal market. 
As we have already noted in earlier pages, other 
firms were more successfUl in modifying cotton equipment 
to the woolen and worsted industry. Weinberger was on the 
_right track, and_ the successful machines of other firms 
were very similar ·to the Abbot: experiments which failed. 
It is the opinion of the author that the difference be-
tween success and faiiure was the lack of professional 
engineering and development required to improve the in-
vention for general mill use. -. 
That the company's attempt to spin worsteds on the 
cotton system turned out unsuccessfully does not redound 
to the detriment-of the management. On the contrary, it 
was among the leaders in sponsoring an idea which ulti-
mately proved to be important when completed by others 
with greater facilities for machinery research and 
development. 
In any event, it is not.surprising that those who 
are among the first to do something are not those who ·be-
come rich from their efforts. Changes, alterations, and 
rapid improvement made by others may quickly make a new 
idea or invention obsolete. 
Surely a textile or machinery manufacturing firm 
with competent engineering personnel might have had better 
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luck with the ideas of the C~ech inventor. Given the 
original idea, the combined ideas of many men often result 
in a much better solution to a problem than the ideas of 
one person alone. Known engine·ering principles and prac-
tices applied to novel ideas are capable of improving 
complicated new inventions. · This principle was borne out 
by Superintendent Branch when he ..stated humorously, and 
with a smile, nThere comes a time in the life of every 
invention when the.inventor ought to be strangled and his 
ideas turned over to an· engineering or research group for 
development, to get the 'bugs' out of it.n 
Pot -Spinning. 
Pot-spinning is a method of spinning whereby in the 
process· of spinning the yarn is thrown: against the inside 
of a rapidly rotating cylinder (pot). The yarn package is 
thus built up from ttthe outside inn rather than the cu·s-
--
tomary ninside ou-tn. ·Pot-spinning has very distinct ad-
vantages. Spinning can be· done at extremely high speeds, 
the spin of the yarn is almost perfect, economical large-
size packages result, and the end-breakage is only a tiny 
fraction of that with other methods. At present, unfor-
tunately, there are problems yet to be overcome, particu-
larly in doffing, which make the machine unsuitable for 
general .t:actory_use •. Several experimental machines have 
been built, however, and many textile fibers have been 
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successfully pot-spun. Good results are achieved under 
laboratory conditions, but the machine is not yet practical 
with ordinary operators under ordinary factory conditions. 
John J. McCann, the inventor of the machine, is a 
resident of the city of Lowell and is a textile engineer. 
Long before McCann became interested in the Abbot .. .Worsted 
Company, he had ordered built his first expePimental pot-
spinning machine. The first machine was built for McCann 
by Harold Laurin in the secrecy end privacy of a con-
verted hen-coop. 
The machine, however, failed to attract the interest 
either of textile manufacturers or textile-machinery manu-
facturers .and was finally junked in 1939· 
Tne idea was not forgotten, living in the mind of 
the inventor and intriguing many of those who had heard or 
or seen the machine. The management of the Abbot Worsted 
Company, living and working in or near the Lowell area, 
were exposed to the information concerning this local 
invention. 
Nine years later, in 1948, when a wave of innovation· 
was sweeping over the woolen and worsted industry, the 
management of the company reactivated the idea of pot-
spinning. 
McCann was then (1945) put under contract with the 
company. Later an arrangement was worked out whereby the 
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invention was put into a new corporation owned jointly by 
McCann and the Abbot\. Worsted Company. A small laboratory 
was put atthe disposal of McCann. Although McCann was 
virtually unsupervised, he had at his disposal skilled 
labor as required, and the use of plant facilities and 
funds. McCann 1 s operat~ons were conducted from the Conan~ 
Houghton Building where there was space available. 
Initial successes with McCann 1 s machine caused 
great optimism, and glowing reports were published in 
local newspapers and trade papers. One enthusiastic 
textile engin:aer, not in any way associated with Abbot, 
reported: 
Centrifugal spinning as developed to 
a practical stage in the McCann pot frame, 
promises to provide to worsted spinning 
problems the long sought answers which 
super-heterodyne has been to radio ci~­
circutts. With ppoduction speeds of. one-
hundred yards per minute, against the 
conventional twenty yards, with greatly 
~educed end breaks and.a package size up 
to four-and-one-half pounds, the system 
is expected to combine the· unique ad-
vantages of twisting the yarn around its 
axis at considerably greater uniformity 
than the spirally-w£und yarn on a ring, 
flyer or cap frame. · . 
lRobert L. Enrick, "Woolen and Worsted Yarn 
Manufacture,n .Manual of the Textile Industry of Canada, 
1951 edition, p. 9· · · 
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But progress with pot-spinning was slow and develop~ 
ment was n·ever successfully concluded. Although the ma-
chine was improved and entirely rebuilt, the problems were 
not satisfactorily solved. Simultaneously, other firms 
were improving methods of spinning by other methods, re-
markably increasing the rate of speed at which yarns could 
be spun, and the size of the yarn package. With each such 
improvement, pot-spinning became relatively less attractive. 
Since the machine was never put into actual mill 
use, from an economic sense.it must be classified as a 
failure. 
It is the belief· of the author that McCann's prob-
lems were not insuperablej and that the machine could have 
been rapidly and successfully developed if McCann had 
worked in cooperation with other skilled engineers, per-
mitting them to expand on his basically sound idea. This 
belief is shared by employees Who worked with McCann on 
the project who claimed that McCann was unwilling to let 
others participate in the development of this machine. 
The idea of pot-spinning was not unique with 
McCann. F.red Sawyer, of the same city, previously had 
assembled a similar machine. Prince-Smith, textile manu-
facturers of England, actually manufactured and sold some 
pot-spinning machines in this country after World War II. 
The machines, however, were too "gadgetyn, performing 
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erratic service, and recovery of end breaks constituted a 
problem. To the author's knowledge, none of these machines 
remain in service.ln the United States. 
Pot-spinning is being used successfully in the rayon 
industry, but the problem is. different from t.hat of wool. 
Rayon is spun immediately after it has been made and while 
it is still wet with chemical solution. The pot does not 
merely spin the yarn, but acts as an extractor, removing 
most of the liquid by centrifugal force. When the pot.is 
filled with rayon, the yarn is in the form of a moist cake 
which is stuck together. There are, consequently, no 
doffing problems. 
The .failure of the above two inventions associated 
with the Abbot Worsted Company was probably due to the 
failure or inability of the company to support a large-
scale research and engineering program; along with its 
failure to enlist the support of other firms, such as ·ma~ 
chinery _manufacturers, who might have provided the neces-
sary facilities and personnel. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Prior to World War II ?evelopments of textile ma-
chinery inventions were carried on by textile machinery 
manufacturing companies. These companies tended to be very 
cons~rvative and did not strongly support research and de-
velopment. An exception to this case must be made in the 
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consideration of long-draft roving and spinning~ particu-
larly. Research and development have beome increasingly 
important for machinery manufacturers ov:er the.p~st twenty 
years, yet in 1944 expenditures for the industry were less 
than one. million dollars, about one-half of one percent of 
the value of annual sales. In 1960 it is anticipated that 
the industry will spend seven million.dollars for research 
and development, almost three.and one-half percent of the 
value of annual sales, evidencing a marked change in the 
1 
attitude of textile-machinery manufacturers. 
During the war and post-war years an important 
group of inventions came into being, primarily originated 
by persons working in w·oolen and worsted, rather bhan ma-
chinery, firms. The Pacitic converter and Pacific even-
ness tester were not merely invented, but the highly 
specialized engineering development performed almost en- · 
tirely by the personnel of the textile company. This type 
of development is possible only in cases Where the textile 
firm is large enough to support engineering personnel who 
are capable of engineering development work. Such men 
would not be found in a typical woolen and worsted estab-• 
lisbment. 
1M. B. Andrews, ££• cit., pp. 10-11. 
The Bird system was also invented and almost en-
tirely developed by a textile company, Collins and Aikman. 
A small amount of assistance was received from a machinery 
manufacturer, the Saco-Lowell Shops. 
In some cases involving minor, but financially suc·-
cessful innovations, the Gentle Air Slasher of the 
Bachm.ann-Uxbridge Worsted Company, for .example, the engi-
neering was provided by the woolen and worsted mill spec-
ialists, rather than machinery specialists~ This was pos-
sible in cases where the principles were simple, the ma-
chinery not of the precision type, and the fabrication not 
particularly difficult, especially where some of the com-
ponent parts could be furnished by other firms. 
In yet other cases, ideas which may have been bas-
ically sound, and which were partially developed under the 
auspices of a textile firm, may have failed because of the 
lack of professional engineering development which might 
have been provided py a machinery manufacturer~ The 
potentially important inventions upon which experiments 
were conducted at the Abbot Worsted Company are cases in 
point. 
When textile-machinery manufacturers evidenced their 
lack of interest, the pin-drafter was developed by a ,~. 
p:f>e6ision-machinery manufacturer who had previously not 
engaged in the manufacture of textile machinery. The 
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development o:f this important innovation was a joint 
e:f:fort o:f the Warner and Swasey Company, a machine manu-
:facturer, and the Uxbridge Worsted Company. The develop-
ment o:f the machine was conducted on the premises o:f the 
textile manu:facturer. 
The Warner and Swasey Company soon after became 
interested in other textile inventions which became im-
portant: the weaving machine and the Pacific converter. 
The weaving machine, like the pin-drafter, was developed 
by the Warner and Swase:y engineers with the support of 
textile mill personnel at.the Uxbridge Worsted Company. 
This case was especia.Lly interesting since the textile 
company had no direct financial interest in the weaving 
machine. 
The Pacific converter, also a product of the Warner 
and Swasey Company, required relatively little developmen~ 
as this had been accomplished by the personnel of Pacific 
Mills. 
Textile machinery manufacturers, while accused of 
excessive conservatism, were not standing completely 
idle during this period. The Whitin Machine Works and 
the Saco-Lowell Shops were adapting efficient ·cotton-
system machinery to the spinning of worsted and synthetic 
blends, resulting in machines which became important dur-
ing the middle 1940's. Increased expenditures on 
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research in the following years proved fruitful and re-
sulted in many improvements in machinery and manufactur-
ing techniques. 
The author agrees with the pers.onal opinion ex-
pressed by A. L. Landau of the Saco-Lowell Shops that 
increased study of the problems of. the textile industry · 
by personnel of poth the textile and machinery industries 
may, some day, el~minate. the distincti.on between various · 
branches of the :texti~e industry·. At pr·esent the. woolen 
and worsted industry is diatinctly different from the 
cotton industry, which is in turn distinct from the rayon 
industry, etc. The future may bring improvements in ma-
chinery and production techniques which will.result in 
factories within which textiles of all fibers will be 
prod-q.ced·. 
1.31 
CHAPTER V 
. ! 
IS THE ECONOMIC ORG~HIZATION OF THE 
INDUSTRY CONDUCIVE TO INNOVATION? 
The typical woolen and worsted e.stablishment con-
sists of a single establishment, small in size. In 1947, 
a prosperous post-World War II year, there were BoB woolen 
and worsted manufacturing establishments which employed a 
total of 179,733 workers, or an average of 222 workers 
each~ Further analysis reveals that only twenty-seven of 
. 1 
these establishments employed 1,000 or more workers. No 
comparable data have been published for companies. It 
should be observed that a company may include more than 
one establishment. A published analysis of income tax 
returns for. the same period reveals that there are 571 
woolen and worsted manufacturing companies which filed 
2 income tax returns. 
In spite of the fact that the typical firm was 
1947· 
1Census .·2! Manufactures, Bureau of the Cen.sus, 
2
statistics of Income, United States Treasury 
Department. 1947 . 
........... ________________ __ 
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small, the above data disclose that a significant number of 
individual establishm~nts and companies were of large size. 
The largest of these companies was the giant American 
Woolen Company. Sales of this company in 1951, then at 
their historical peak, amounted to 253 million. 
The following generalizations concerning the war 
and post-war period are personal observations, supported 
. 
by interviews with many men in the woolen and worsted in-
. dtistry:· 
(1) ·As a class, smaller firms_in the industry are 
much more obsolete in· equipment and meth.ods than larger 
firms. A high proportion of' these ·firms, in ·spite of·.· 
their corporate structure, are owned by individuals. Some 
of the companies have become family-owned corporations on 
the death of the f'onnd·er of the firm. Most of the attrac-
tive positions, as well as some of' the less desirable jobs 
in these firms are held by family members, whether or not 
they have financial investments in the firm. 
The genera.l obsolescence of these firms is not 
always due to their great age, but also because they 
frequently "ht~ild-inn their obsolescence by purchasing 
outdated, used machinery, and often operate in decrepit, 
outmoded buildings which do not permit a satisfactory 
process flow. It has not come to the attention of' the 
author that any small firms have engaged in significant 
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innovational activity, or have engaged in research and 
development. The managements of' thes·e firms privately 
dep+ore technological change, charging that it is of' value 
primarily to larger concerns that can afford to replace 
their equipment. 
(2) Most of' the larger companies which were finan-
cially able to undertake research did not do so, and did 
not engage in innovational activity. Many were content to 
be followers of innovators, rather :than. leaders. Some, like 
the giant American Woolen Company, were not good followers; 
their methods became increasingly obsolete, resulting in 
failure of' the firm. While there were many laboratories 
in larger mills which served for testing materials, and 
providing day-to-day advice on problems, there were very 
few research departments worthy of the name. The research 
departments which were found were concerned entirely w~th 
applied research on specific probiems. In no case, even 
where large research staffs were encountered, was it ob-
served that any noticeable amount of scientific research, 
for its oWn sake, was being conducted. Research is not 
synonymous with innovation, of course, but research often 
provides the inventions which are the source of techno-
logical innovation. Research departmenis were added to 
woolen and worsted firms as staff' departments. The re-
search department was primarily responsible to the 
president of the firm, who had ultimate authority. Sales 
and production personnel were, of course, encouraged to 
bring their problems and. suggestions to research. ~his 
relationship is more fully described elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
(J) In a very real sense, the creation of research 
departments by tne larger firms was it.self an innovation. 
In prior years machinery manufacturers and not woolen and 
worsted manufacturers had invented, developed, produced, 
and marketed technological devices. The woolen and wor-
sted manufacturer merely purchased or declined to pur-
chase the new machines, his decision being·aased upon ob-
servable performance and operating statistics provided by 
machinery manufacturers.· Hence the financial.risk to the 
woolen and worsted manufacturer was small• Furthermore, 
woolen and worsted firms had no real incentive to enter 
technological research so long as the textile-machinery 
industry appeared to be responsible for tne design and 
production of new equipment. 
Large Firms - The American Woolen Company 
The largest and mpst important of all the woolen 
and worsted companies was the now-defunct leader of·the 
industry, the American Woolen Company. The firm did not 
innovate~ became a very laggard follower, and ultimately 
failed. 1 This case is worthy of notice since many large 
firms were subject to the same difficulties,· becoming 
temporarily relatively high-cost producers •. 
When the American Woolen Company was founded in 
1899 by William Madison Wood, it arranged its productive 
' 
facilities to be a ~mass producer of standardized products~ 
employing the most modern productive techniques of the 
period. It was capable of producing enormous quantities 
of standardized material at low cost. For ~e long per-
iod during which blue serge material was the fad, during 
World Wars I and II when uniform cloth was in demand at 
almost any price, and during the years of scarcity fol-
lawiJ:?,g these wars~ the American Woolen Company enjoyed 
large profits. 
_Unfortunately this company did not choose to 
modernize, much less to lead in the development of new 
technological improvements. The author can personally 
attest, having visited every department of the Wood Mill 
in 1954 shortly before it terminated operations, that this 
1Textron obtained control of the American Woolen 
Company in July, 1954, merging the two companies with 
Robbins Mills in February of 1955. The bulk of American 
Woolen mill capacity was liquidated permanently, although 
four of the mills were reep~ned under new ownership. 
mill, then the worldts largest, contained one of the most 
obsolete collections of equipment he bad ~ver seen in a 
large firm. Ancient mules and looms which would not be 
given floor space in any large, mo.dern United States fac.;. 
tory, were employed in the production process. But side. 
by side, in some departments, were a few brand-new, thor-
oughly modern machines. The seven-story "U" shaped struc-
ture was J'laid 1;o contain 'in excess of ·2,500,000 square· 
feet of floor space, arid was a materials-handling mon-
strosity. 
In fairness to the management, improvements in the 
firm's technological position would have been financially 
difficult during the lean years from 1924 through 1938. 
But large profits were made from 1939 through 1951. The 
firm might have been saved had wholesale modernization anq 
other steps been taken during this period. In fact, how-
ever, the company was content to nmake-dou with the old 
equipment except where replacement was mandatory. 
This po.licy cle~rly committed· the company to the 
economic graveyard. Great losses of about six million 
dollars in 1952 and about nine-and-one-half million dollars 
in 1953 proved fatal. 
'During the post-war years American Woolen installed 
some Warner. and Swasey weaving machines, Pacific converters, 
pin-drafters, and other modern machinery in its mills, but 
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it did not completely modernize any of its Northern mills. 
The Southern mills of the company fared relatively better. 
In the blending of woolen and synthetic fibers, 
American Woolen was a late follower of its competitors. 
· It did not take the lead in the development of any new 
blend. The following statement made by the company is 
revealing:. 
You've probably been wondering how 
soon·American Woolen would get into blends 
in a.big way. The answer is that long ago 
we decided we would produce them o~ly when 
we were satisfied that we had blends we 
could be proud to put. our name on. 
. . . 
The letter (an advertising circular) from which the 
above quotation was taken then went on to describe three 
fabrics manufactured by American Woolen, all of which were 
blends of orlon and wool. 
It is significant that by the time American Woolen 
had discovered a blend it could be proud t0 put its name 
on, a number of other companies had been m3:rketing such 
blends for years. As a matter of fact, some of them had 
already<discarded·orlon~wool blends in favor of dacron-
woo~ blends, so that American Woolen was at least two steps 
lAdvertisement reprinted in the Bulletin of the 
National Association of Wool.·Manufacturers, Vol. LXXXII, 
1952, pp. 3:...32 .• 
behind such companies. 
The president of the company at the time of this 
study, Francis Wh.ite, came up through the ranks. He had 
worked in the mills of the company and was a thoroughly 
competent production man. This, however., may have been 
more a factor of weakness than strength. White and his 
associates were of the opinion that the industry's prob-
lems could be solved only by production men. And the 
solution to the industry's ·problem, in their opinion, 
was to reduce costs, mainly, it should be pointed out, 
by reducing labor costs through holding -down wages, and 
increasing workloads. These views were expressed in a 
widely published address given by President White to the 
Greater Lawrence Chamber of Commerce on January 17,1952.1 
In this address White said: 
We have all heard and read recent state-
ments and speeches made by.people ·who never 
sorted wool, ran a card, tended a spinning 
frame or.operated a loom. Most of them 
never ran a .business in their lives, never 
had to compete in world markets to survive; 
and only had to ask someone to vote them a 
bigger budget if they ran out of money. But 
somehow. they have learned more about how to 
operate this great industry than have we who . 
have spen~ most of our lives working in 
textiles. 
1This speech was .reprinted in full in the Bulletin 
of the National Association of·Wool Manufacturers for 1951, 
Vol. LXXXI, pages 3-14 to 3-26. All references to this 
speech are to this source. 
2 Ibid, pp.3-15. 
This statement indicated clearly the attitude of 
the r:ecent top management in t.his company toward outside 
advice. This advice was neither sought nor·accepted if 
offered freely. It is not clear exactly who "the peoplen 
who offer this advice were. Apparently reference was 
made to the members qf various committees and commissions 
who had been assigned to study the problems of the Nor-
thern textile industry, and perhaps. to various govern-
ment "bureaucrats" who make periodic studies of this and 
other industries. 
It was believed tha~ the problems facing the com-
pany must be faced and solved from within. 1 Tne answer 
to the companyts problems, management believed, was the 
reduction of unit costs. Unit costs must be·~ut by im-
. 2 proving the productivity of.machinery and. workers. Crit-
icism that the company had failed to keep its mills 
modern and to turn to the manufacture of olends was 
denied or brushed aside as being of no importance. The 
whole answer to the problem was to reduce unit costs, and 
more specifically to cut labor costs. 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid,. p. 3-23 .. 
It is. entirely possible to agree wit~ the company's 
attitude that if its Northern mills were to remain com-
petitive with the new mills in the South, it must have 
labor costs in line· with those prevai+ing in the South. It 
did .not follow, however, that there were no other aspects 
of the problem. When there was a strong demand for woolen 
and worsted products, the company was ·a profitable one. No 
one could deny that the firm did an eminently satisfactory. 
job of producing the standard woolen and worsted products, 
and men the demand for these rose, as it did, for example,_ 
when military expenditures increased, the firm operated 
successfully and profitably. But profits were closely 
hinged to the demand for standard woolen and worsted items, 
and when this demand fell off, so did the level of profits. 
During the period of relative stagnation in the industry 
and during the Great Dep:aession, Ame::rican Woolen operated 
at a loss. But this was true of many other woolen and 
worsted manufacturers as well. World War II brought.the 
industry out-of its profit .doldrums, but it reached its 
p~ak profits during the post-war period when the great 
backlog of demand for consumer goods was being satisfied, 
and before the foreign woolen and worsted industr~es had 
recovered from the d·evastating effects of the war. With 
the onset of the decline in the textile industry which 
commenced in 1948, however, the firm 1 s profit level· 
plummeted sharply. The fiscal year 1951 was again a 
profitable one with profits well above the 1950 level. 
This again was due to an increase in the buying of standard 
1 
items by the military. The.years 1952 and'l953 again 
showed large deficits. 
Two conclusions seem to stand out from an analysis 
of the managerial behavior of the former giant of the 
woolen and worsted industry in this country. In the first 
place, the company enjoyed handsome profits in some years. 
It could well have ~fforded, therefore, to iricrease its 
research and developmental efforts. It was not a lack of 
funds in the post-war period which kept this firm from 
attempting to innovate. The second conclusion is that 
when profits were high, management was complacent. There 
was·evidently little cost-consciousness at such times and 
no urge to make changes in established practices. 
When market conditions worsened, however, manage-
.ment stressed cost-cutting, usually, as was mentioned 
above, in terms of reducing labor costs. Management· 
neglected new raw materials. .Nor did they modernize equ:ip-
ment and plant. 
In all fairness to White of American Woolen, it 
must be stated that many of the firm t s proplems were 
1Ibid, p. 3-17. 
inherited from an earlier generation of manag·ers. American 
Woolen went through the long period of· operating at a, loss 
extending from 1923 to 1939, with only a few years showing 
profits. 
President Francis W. White took over management of 
the company during a period when military demands for 
woolen and worsted items kept the mills operating at or 
near capacity, and the firm showed the greatest profits 
of its history. With the slump of 1948-1949, however, 
White ·initiated a new policy for the company. This in-
cluded the opening of the Raleigh mill in North Carolina 
and the gradual liquidation of the h.ighest-cost units in.· 
the North. At the time of. this study, and before the 
change in management, 
· American Woolen was in the midst of 
a rigorous program of e~iminating its 
less efficient manufacturing capacity. 
For years, except ,in time of shooting 
war, it had an ·ability to tur:h out a 
considerably greater1yardage than the market would absorb, · 
It had recently closed down ~ermanently the firm's 
Pittsfield mill (at Pittsfield,·Maine), the Arden mill at 
Fitchburg, Massachusetts, and tne National and Providence 
mill at Providence, Rhode Island. Tne Snawsheen mill in 
Andover, Massachusetts,· was ~emporarily closed during the 
1Boston Globe, September 11, 1953. 
15'0 
latter part of 1953, but this was regarded as a temporary 
move due to·a lack of markets for gabardine-type fabrics 
made in this mill. 
Other mills such as the Wood and Ayer mills, of 
Lawrence, Massachusetts, had their capacity reduced some-
what in the process of "rationalizingn the firm 1 s opera-
tions. 
In all of this, however, the American Woolen Com-
pany accompl·ished too little and too late. While White's 
management may have been superior to that of the earlier 
management of President Moses Pendleton, White was far 
behind other firma:... in his actions. Other important 
firms such as lV1. T. Stevens, Bachma:nn-Uxbridge, and Pacif'ic 
Mills had completed the rationalization of their woolen 
and worsted divisions before American Woolen Company 
started its program. When the American Woolen Company 
e~mmenced its purchases of modern machinery, when the 
company began to belatedly manufacture blends of Wool and 
synthetic fibers, it was year~ behind more aggressively 
managed concerns. 
Perhaps ·the attitude of the American Woolen Company 
towards progressive change can be summarized by the state-
ment of John Chupka, Secretary-Treasurer, Textile Workers 
of America, AFL~CIO. 
It was my duty·for·many·years to be the . 
. chief negotiator with the American .Woolen 
Company. Our union as early as 1946, began 
to prod the American Woolen Company, asking 
them to .set up a research department to in-
vestigate the potential of some of the new 
man-made fibers that were then being:manu-
factured. 
l51 
I specifically recall one conversation 
that· I had with the pres;id~nt of American 
Woolen Company. In the course of our 
negotiations I broached the subject to him •. 
The synthetic article, ·which to us appeared 
to have the greatest potential at that time, 
as a threat to woolen fiber, was dacron. 
I discussed the matter with him. He be-
littled the importance o~ the new man-made 
fiber. But, more than belittling it, he. 
said to me, 1 Look, I have been in the woolen-
worsted game all my life. I have reached a 
point today that I am ln the neighborhood o.f 
sixty years of age. And if, at this time of 
my life, it means that I have to start dilut-
ing the woolen fiber with a synthetic, then 
I want to go out of business.' 
Now, gentlemen, I can appreciate the 
sentiments.that are attached to a statement 
of that type, but I certainly can't appreciate 
the sense of responsibility it revealed. This 
man was speaking about .the futur~ of a company 
that had twenty-five plants rnd employed 
twenty--five· thousand people. (Its output, 
from various estimates, ranging from fifteen to 
twenty percent of.total industry output --
au thor 1 s brackets.) 
ls . tatement of John Ch~pka, General Secretary-
Treasurer, TWUA,'AFL-CIO, Hearings B@fore a Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
U.S. Senate, 85th Congress{Wa~hlngton: U.S.Government 
Printing Office, 1958). · 
Small Firms (100 Employees or Less) 
In this section of the thesis. the. author must rely · 
largely upon his own personal observations, and discussions 
with members of the industry. Published factual data for 
significant portions of this section do not exist, but -the 
author believes that his observations and discussions have 
resulted in valid conclusions. 
Some of the . smaller firms visi t'ed were partially· or 
almost completely modern in both use of pew machint?rY and 
use o:f synthetic :fabrics• Another. type o:f management, 
a~parently much more common among the smaller companies, 
steadfastly refused to adapt to new. conditions, either in 
production techniques, or :fibers employed. Even at this 
late date there are managements ~ho regard 'the new syn-
thetics and blends of these synthetics with wool as a 
tempora~y fad. These men believe that no changes are 
needed or desirable in the woolen and w·orsted industry, 
except for higher tariff protection aga~nst damaging 
:foreign imports. 
Many o:f the small independent mills continued to 
follow traditional methods o:f manufacturing standardized 
woolen arid worsted items. Some of these mills, operating 
in relatively isolated areas, had been able to compete 
with more modern m~lls because they were able to hold 
down their labor costs, a most important :factor. Smaller 
woolen and worsted mills operating in isolated communities 
often escaped union organization, and their wage scales 
were well. below the union .level. 1 
As is true of the larger companies, the managements 
of these small mills were usual~y well versed in the pro-
duction of woolen and worsted. fabrics, although in general 
the smaller mills spaciallze in woolen rather than worsted 
goods. 
Many mills in this class, probably a majority,could 
not even be classified-as followers. They resisted new 
ideas· both in the production process and the manufacture 
of new products. In defense of ·these firms we should point. 
out that adaptation. to new techniques and products may bav.e 
been impossible for many because of financial reasons, and 
that some elderly owners (of whom..·there were many) were 
unable or unwilling to learn the new techniques required 
for operation of new machinery and production of fiber-
blended textiles. 
1 A current problem in depressed areas is that 
unemployed textile workers are accepting scarce jobs in 
non-union textile firms and are then unwilling t.o co-
operate with union officials. 
See statement of Thomas J. Pitarys, President, 
New Hampshire AFL-CIO, and Manager, Granite State Joint 
Board, TWUA, Nashua, N.H., ~· 
During World War II and the post-war boom these 
small firms prospered. Following this period,with in-
creasing competition from abroad ~nd at.home in wool. 
and blended materials, coupled with generally rising 
wages which destroyed their non-union advantages ·in some. 
cases, large numbers of these small firms failed. 1 For· 
years, during this period of protracted te:xtile recession, 
it was necessary only to scan the classified advertise-
ments of theBoston Sunday newspapers to obtain continu-
ing evidence of' ·the large number of liquidations ·in. this 
group. 
The general obsolescence of the small firms which. 
failed could be discerned by reading the lists of machin-
ery offered at auction on their liquidation. 
Numbers of these small firms remain in operation to 
this date. The non~adapting firm will continue to remain 
in operation so long as there remains a substantial demand 
lDuring the years from the end of World War II to 
the end of 1957 machinery in place declined by over 50%: 
looms, -51%; worsted combs, -59%; worsted spinning 
spindles, -63%; woolen spinning spindles, -63%. Cloth 
production dropped 41% 'from 604 to 329 million yards. · 
Losses in yard·age were caused primarily by imports. Ma-
chinery in place could decline significantly more than 
yardage because of increases in efficiency of new ma-
chines. Statistical data supplied by National Associa-
tion of' Wool.Manufacturers, ibid. 
for standard woolen and worsted cloth, and it remains pos-
sible for them to pay lower than standard wage rates. It 
appears, however, that the present technological revolu-
tion in the industry, plus the increased competition from 
abroad as the foreign woolen and worsted industry seeks 
to broaden its international markets, will continue to re-
duce the importance of these marginal firms as a class. 
These are the mills in the backwash of the main 
stream of development in the woolen and worsted industry. 
Their methods are becoming more obsolete day by day, and 
while there will always be a demand for standard woolen 
and worsted goods, this·demand will be supplied more and 
more by the innovators and tb,e followers who are able to 
produce both woolen and blended fabrics on one of the new 
.all-purpose systems. 
The Innovators 
The American Woolen Company, giant in the field, 
producing twenty percent of the .output of the industry, 
was plainly not an innovating firm. The same must be said 
. . 
of almost all of the large and medium-sized firms in the 
industry. 
No eyidence has been observed to indicate that any 
of the small firms have engaged in successful innovational 
activities. This is a surprising conclusion, as it might 
be assumed that among the hundreds of small firms there 
might be at least one firm possessed of more than ordinary 
inventive and entrepreneurial genius. Managements of these 
small firms are in a someWhat frustrating position with 
reference to innovation for cost-cutting improvements. If 
they were better capitalized they could·obtain immediate 
efficiencies, not through innovation, but through moderni-
zation. They already know how to be more.efficient woolen 
and worsted producers than.they currently are. 
Although there have been.no recent cases of major 
innovations among smaller firms, the author does not rule 
out the possibility that such innovating activity might 
occur in the future. Many of the managements of such 
smaller firms interviewed appear to be at least as intel-
ligent, forward-looking, and businesslike as those of· 
larger firms. 
For reasons stated earlier in this paper, it is ap.-
parent that large firms find it easier to support and use 
the results of research than do small and medium-sized 
firms. The two firms which ·have been se·lected as being the 
most important innovators in the woolen and worsted mndu.s-
try maintained substantial research departments. 
It appears that unless the woolen and worsted .manu-
faeturers are willing to engage more wholeheartedly in col-
lective research, or unless research by the government is 
more important in the future, those large established firms 
151 
that can meet the expense of large-scale research will 
probably have. the edge in invention and improvements. This 
statement must be qualified with many reservations. Indi-
vidual inventive genius may some day operate out of a 
small woolen or worsted firm endowed also with persons of 
entrepreneurial ability. Or in the small firm, the 
inventor-entrepreneur may appear. Or perhaps a new firm, 
large or small, may arise to capitalize on a new invention •. 
The fact that such activities have failed to occur in 
recent years is no assuran~e that they will ne~er occur. 
Although size is apparently a matte~ of importance, 
the personalities involved are also of primary importance. 
Walter:· of the Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted Company and Bliss 
of the Pacific Mills were unusual persons, capable of 
striking out successfully in several directions at onoe. 
Innovations in the Schumpeterian sense were only one 
aspect of the changes wrought in these companies. 
The Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted Company is large 
enough to support a substantial research establishment, 
although small in comparison with other firms in the indus-
try. The company has a total· of seven plants in Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, Georgia, and Alabama, employing about 
2300 persons. 
As we have seen in other_portions of this paper, 
Walter/, in advance of need, set.up his post-war planning 
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cormni ttee and research department;·. Under his guidance the 
Bachmann-Uxbridge ·company became innovators par-excellence. 
Pacific Mills is a much larger firm, but it is a 
large producer o~ cottons as well as woolens and worsteds. 
Its research facilities were devoted to the benefit of the 
entire firm an~ not merely to the woolen and worsted de-
partment. 
When Bliss became presid:e.nt of his company, Pacific 
Mills was a high-cost producer, operating in outmoded fac-
tories-and using ancient equipment. In many respects the 
picture was the same as that facing the American Woolen · 
Company, which failed. Without doubt, President Bliss 
·saved Pacific Mills from a~similar fate. This was recog-
niaed by Howard Bennett, Director of the American Woolen 
Company, 'Who offered Bliss the Presidency of American 
Woolen,. whic:Q. offer Bliss declined. 
According to Howard Bennett: 
On May 4, 1953 -- this was nearly a yea:ro 
before I wen-t into tne American directorate 
of my own accord, with no advice from anyone 
else, and without talking to anybody-.about it; 
I went to H.Bliss, tremendously able, and at 
that time, successful president of the Pacific 
Mills -- the man who saved it -- and said some-
_ thing like this: 
'Mr. Bliss, you know of tne terrible condi-
tion i:ti the American vVoolen Company. It r s ·im-
possible. If you will agree .to it, I will go 
go Joe Ely, who is the strongest man on the 
board and on the executive committee of the 
American Woolen Company, and I'll force through 
the proposition of your being made president of 
the American. • Bliss didn 1 t dispute me at all 
in my statement that the American was in 
awful condition, but he did tell me very 
affirmatively that he wouldn't think of 
taking the presidency responsibility. But 
I had made the try, the attempt, to get a 
good management into the company -- and in 
this particular instance -- the best pos-
sible management.l 
l59. 
As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, Bliss later 
left Pacifid Mills for the .Ludlow Manufacturing and Sales 
Company where he once again became very much involved in 
innovational activity~ Bliss admits to this being part of 
his technique of management. 
Conclusions 
The woolen and worsted industry consists of a large 
number of firms, the majority of which are small, but in-
cludes a substantial number of large firms. These firms 
range in size from tiny togiant-size concerns. Entry 
into the industry is easy because of the relatively small 
investment required, and the availability of locations, 
machinery, and personnel. 
The major innovations have arisen out of the large, 
but not the largest,firms. While many of the large firms 
have followed the .lead of the innovators, the largest of 
them, the Am~rican Woolen Company, did not do so and failed. 
lHoward Bennett, nThe End of the Doublecross --
A Study in Mill Management,n America's Textile Reporter, 
June 30, 1955. 
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Small firms have had great difficulties in surviving 
the post-war period, large. numbers of them being forced to 
liquidate. Small firms have made no innovations of impor-
tance in the period under study·. Although no innovations 
have arisen from these firms, this thesis· does not postu-
late that such an occurrence is an impossibility in the 
future. 
No new firms (or mergers or consolidations of old 
ones) have arisen .to exploit new innovations, technological 
or otherwi.se. All of the innovational activity has occurred 
within the framework of the larger existing o'rganizations. 
Successful innovation has appeared only in larger. 
firms with highly competent management capable of .entre-
preneurship in the real sense. These entrep~eneurs sought. 
novel profit~making opportunities, and were in strong 
enough positions in their own firms to effect and utilize 
these innovations successfully. 
CHAPTER VI 
IS CAPITAL FREELY AVAILABLE 
FOR RADICAL NEW DEVELOPMENTS? 
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All of the major innovations in the woolen and 
worsted industry in the period under study were fostered 
and developed within the framework of existing firms. In 
none of the innovations was it necessary for a new firm 
to come into existence or for an old firm to expand great-
ly to exploit the opportunity pr~sented. 
This is a matter of importance. If a new or great-
ly expanded firm appeared to take advantage of an inno-
vation, then ·the decisions of investors and lenders who 
would be called upon to provide the capital would be a 
matter of great importance. This was not the case in any 
of the innovations under study. 
In each case under discussion the inventor of the 
device made some sort of arrangement with an entrepreneur 
in a large, financially sound, existing.corporation. The 
entrepreneur in each case financed ·the innovation without 
recourse to the money markets for either equity capital or 
long-term indebtedness. The innovating firms borrowed 
short-term funds from banks for various purposes. In no 
case did the acceptance of the loan by the banker depend 
upon an evaluation of the innovation~l activity of the 
corporation. 
It should not be supposed that the later mergers 
and consolidations affecting the i~ovating firms were 
connected with the need for financing these innovations. 
These corporate changes were effected for other purposes. 
Not all firms, or even a large number of firms, in 
the conservative woolen and worsted industry were capable 
of or willing to provide new capital for ventures involv-
ing new ideas. Most firms were simply too small to be 
effective in raising the sums of money required for re-
search,development,and marketing the new ideas. Indeed, 
many of these firms were so marginal that they found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to maintain a reasonably 
modern plant. Interviews with managements of small firms 
reveal an unenthusiastic attitude toward collective re-
search and development financed by small firms. The . 
mftnagements of these plants ~re keenly aware of the 
destruction of their asset values which has already 
occu'rred as a result of the new mechanical innovations 
which have appeared. 
Most large~ firms,. the American Woolen Company 
·being an extreme case in point, were simply not inter.ested 
in or aware of the impact the new production methods and 
new products were to have on the industry. 
Lulled into a sense of security by a relative lack 
of change in the industry during the preceeding years, en-. 
joying war and post-war profits, and sec~e in the know-
ledge that past technological innovations.had come from the 
textile machinery industry and would immediately become 
available to all who cared to purchase them, these firms 
focussed their attention elsewhere. Some of these firms 
not only avoided their leadership responsibilities in in-
novation, but were laggard followers, refusing to change 
as rapidly as eircumstances required for their own econ-
omic well-being. 
A very few firms with leaders of vision aggressively 
sought out new inventions, financing them out of existing 
capital of the firm. Management in these firms observed 
that the quest for new methods and new products was an 
expensive undertaking, yet it amounted t~ only a very small 
percentage of -':the sales dollar. The executive. officers of 
such firms considered that such research and development, 
although new to the industry, was a part of their. ordinary 
operating expenses. Small expenditures were, at first, 
made. Initial successes led to increased expenditures 
without complaint by stockholders or directors of the firms 
involved. 
In some cases there also resulted interesting inter-' 
industry financial cooperation. The Warner and Swasey Com-
pany, a machinery manufacturer, evidenced a willingness to 
cooperate financially with textile manufacturers indevel-
oping their novel ideas. 
Collins and Aikman, as we have already explained, 
generated new ideas within the framework of their own or-
ganization, developing them secretly. This was possible 
since the company was capable of financing this develop-
ment out of its own funds and did not have to'disclose the 
details to investors. No outside financial assistance was 
invited. 
Bacbmann-Uxbridge, in the case of some devices such 
as the Gentle Air Slasher, i.nvented the machine, performed 
the research and development,.used the machinery within 
their own plant, and actually manufactured this equipment 
for sale. It was possible for the shops of the textile 
firm to manufacture this machine since it was primarily 
an assembly job, the complicated components being pur-
chased from other firms. The financing of this innovation, 
accomplished entirely internally, from the invent1on to the 
ultimate sale of the device, put no strain on the financial 
reseurces of the company. 
The important pin-drafter, by the same company, was 
invented by personnel of the company. The development of 
the pin-drafter occurred on the premises of the company, 
but used some specialists who were employees of and paid 
by the Warner and Swasey Company, the machinery manufac• 
turer. After the machine was jointly developed, the ex-
penses being shared by the two firms,. the machinery manu-
facturer produced the pin-drafter, using his own available 
excess capacity. 
The important weaving machine was invented in 
Europe and largely developed by European industry and 
capital. News of this invention was disclosed to 
Bachmann-Uxbridge officials by a Swiss technician during 
World War II. Bachmann-Uxbridge officials acquainted 
Warner and Swasey officials with the news ·and appraised 
it as an important invention. Immediately after World 
War II Warner and Swasey acquired rights to the machine, 
which ·was then further developed on the premises of the 
Bachmann-Uxbridge Wors.ted Company. Although Bac~ann­
Uxbridge shared the developmental expenses with the Warner 
and Swasey Company, the·textile firm acquired no royalties 
or other financial rights in the machine. It did obtain 
the advantage of prior knowledge and experience w.ith the 
machine, and was the first and axe lusi ve owner of a ·battery 
of these machines for a short. period of time. 
Warner and Swasey was, at· that time, very much 
interested ·in obtaining new civilian items of production 
to replace the lost military demands on _ins productive 
facilities, and were easily convinced of the desirability 
of appraising the machine by the inventors of the success-
ful pin-drafter. 
Pac~fic Mills personnel, after the assumption of· 
·the presidency by Bliss, found.their new ideas were well 
received. The Pacific Mills innovations arose out of 
their own personnel and were developed in their own re-
search laboratories. Af~er being substantially per-
fected, the new inventions were turned over to manufac-
turers for production under various arrangements bene-. 
fiting the Pacific Mills. All of the research and devel-
opment costs were authorized by the president as ordinary 
business expenses, and he was not challenged •. 
The Pacific converter was invented by an employee 
of the company and was almost entirely developed by the 
research department of the company. Warner and Swasey,the 
machinery manufacturer, completed the development, making 
. . 
the converter suitable for mass production, finally pro-
ducing the converter for sale. 
The evenness tester was invented and completely 
developed by research department personnel of Pacific 
. ' 
Mills. The machine was similarly turned.over, but as a 
completed article, to the Anderson Machine Company of 
Needham, Massachusetts, for production. 
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The diammonium phosphate (DAP) process for dyeing 
wool was invented. and developed by the research personnel 
of Pacific Mills. This patent was sold to the Victor 
Chemical Works who issue certificates granting free use 
and technical service to mills using the process. 
Conclusions 
This chapt·er is intentianally brief and unencum-
bered with detail. The purpose fuf brevity, in this case, 
is to emphasize that in the author's interviews with 
principals who were successful innovators, in no case was 
financing mennioned as an important obstacle. The moneys 
·-used for research and development were charged to ordinary 
operating expenses and did not even merit individual item 
recognition in published financial statements. While the 
dollar amounts are large, they were small in comparison 
with total sales revenue. 
We.have already made much of the conservatism of 
the textile machinery manufacturers at the beginning of 
this study and of their general unwillingness to make 
changes, large or small, to existing machinery. While 
this was true at the beg~nning of the study, the remark-
able increase in expenditures for research by these firms 
points out the change in attitude of these concerns. The 
current flow of new types of machinery from these firms 
is further evidence of their willingness to invest in new 
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ideas. 
Small firms are apparently not interested in 
financing research and development. These firms have 
found it difficult to survive in the face of. loss of 
markets and destruction of their asset values by improve-
ments in technology. Little enthusiasm was noted for the 
concept of cooperative research.for the benefit of the 
industry. 
While finances might have been a limiting factor 
in the case of smaller firms, capital for innovations 
was readily available in the cases of the larger firms 
involved. Where larger firms did not contribute to the 
flow of innovations, the limiting factor was not capital 
but entrepreneurship. 
or course, it is entirely possible that inventive 
men in smaller firms, encouraged by the successes of 
recent innovations, might attempt to transform their 
novel ideas into reality. If this should occur, then 
other financial tec~iques involving inter-firm co-· 
operation or the raising of new capital might be re-
quired. No evidence of such a possibility has been · 
revealed by this study. 
CHAPTER VII 
DO THE ENTREPRENEURS POSSESS 
THE REQUISITE SKILLS FOR 
SUCCESSFUL INNOVATION? 
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The observations of the author and the private 
opinion of large numbers o:f persons a.ssociated with the· 
industry indicate that the leading innovating woi!>len and 
worsted firms in the period under study are Pacific Mills 
and the Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted Corporation. The flow 
of innovations :from these firms, including the most im-
portant innovations of the period, has been truly re-
markable. Textile machinery manufacturers are not studie~ 
in this chapter. The reason.for this omission is that 
these companies are members o:f an industry different :from 
that under study in this. thesis, and it is plainly a part 
of their business to develop and.market new mechanical 
devices. 
As has been mentioned in an earlier portion of this 
work, no important innovations had appeared in the woolen 
and worsted industry for a period of many years prior to 
the period o:f this study. Neither the woolen and worsted 
nor the machinery industry had advanced important new 
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changes. The woolen and worsted industry was composed 
·primarily of small establishments which were f:i,.nancially 
incapable of ind:ulging in costiy research and development, 
counting themselves fortunate if they could keep their 
equipment'in good operating condition. 
With but few exceptions, large ~irms, includ~g the 
largest in the industry, were unwilling to do things dif-
ferently. Even after innovations had been demonstrated to 
be superior, many firms, including the largest in the in-
dustry, were reluctant to change. Some, of course, fol-
lowed promptly, while others were laggard followers. 
Pacific Mills and the Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted 
Corporation were following courses di!ferent from those set 
by other firms. No special economic reason existed for 
these two firms not following in the pattern set by other 
firms of comparable size. But two men, one in each of the 
respective companies, believed in and followed the manage-
ment technique of addressing production problems to solu-
tions by scientific methods, of carefully studying the 
conclusions disclosed by these methods, and making changes 
where study revea~ed these changes to be worth while.· 
Evidence will be here provided to support the propo-
sition that if these men had been associated in similar 
~apacities and under the sam~ conditions in industries 
other than the woolen and worsted industry, their 
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leadership would have nevertheless resulted in innovation 
in these other indus.tries. The foregoing statement 
implies that qualities for successful entrepreneurship may 
be naturally present in, or· may be cultivated in, an.~dndi­
vidual. Innovations generated oy these persons will not be 
the result of mere circumstances of position. 
Location of the Entrepreneur in Pacific Mills 
Role of the Stockholder 
A careful study of the annual reports to stock-
holders and other materials sent to stockholders reveals 
that these persons were not well informed, nor were they 
consulted at all in the matter of research and innovation. 
No published financial data at all were.released to the 
stockholders concerning these matters. A thorough study 
reveals that the following items are the only items of 
information provided to stockholders during the period 
studied: 
A non-financial reference to the word "researchn 
may be· found in the text. of the annual report for the 
year ended January J, ~942, of this company. 
If stockholders or other interested persons had 
carefully read a two-page color advertisement which was 
published in several leading magazines during 1946, they 
might have noticed the words, rrA tip of our hat to the 
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scientist in his testingl laboratory ••• " which appear 
incidentally to the major message in the text. 
The 1946 annual report to stockholders contains a 
photograph of a few persons in laboratory aprons, .each 
posed at a piece of laboratory equipment. A one-word 
caption appears -- nResearch". There is no further 
elaboration of the matter. 
The 1948 annual report to stockholders provides 
a picture of the Pacific cohverter with the following 
announcemen-t: 
Pacific Converter 
The Company's research department is 
continually seeking more efficient and 
economical manufacturing-methods. During 
the year, the new Pacific Converter, a 
product of the research department, has 
been made available to other manufacturers 
on a royalty basis. This machine elim-
inates several production processes in the 
manufacture of synthetics and blends. 
The 1949 report_belatedly reports: 
The company is doing extensive research 
on new fibers as they are introduced in 
order to determine their qualifications for 
use in its products. The whole field of 
synthetics offers fascinating possibilities 
in fabric development. 
The annual report for 1950 reveals that (1) syn-
thetic fibers are being blended with wool to utilize the 
1Italics are the a~thor's. 
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best qualities of each,and (2) they are also blended 
"to ease the strain on the consumer's pocketbook." 
The same report was also relatively rich in in-
formation concerning the research program, containing the 
following i terns: 
Research is a, key f.actor in the con-
tinuing progres.s ·of your company. Pacific 
Mills Research Laboratories are constantly 
at work on projects leading to the develop-
ment of new products, to the study and 
adaptation of new synthetic fibers to the 
company• s products and to technological 
improvement in the complex equipment and 
processes involved in the manufacture of 
modern textiles. 
The Converter and Evenness Tester, two 
recent machinery inventions, are examples 
of production equipment developed by the 
company's research organization. Both are 
contributing factors to low production 
costs and quality control. 
Accompanying a photograph of the converter and 
the evenness tester are the words: 
The Conver.ter ••• ttis currently being pro-
duced lby the Warner and Swasey Company, 
Cleveland, for di-stribution po the. industry 
under an agreement wit~ Pacifia Mills. 
The Pacific Evenness Tester is now being 
built by the Anderson Machine Shops, Inc., 
Needham Heights, Mass. 
The annual report of 1952 states: 
The company has continued its program of 
general research aimed at the improvement of 
its present products, the development of 
desirable new fabrics and improved production 
methods. An outstanding research study 
directed to the recovery of lanolin (wool 
grease) has just been completed. 
, No further comments concerning research, develop-
ment, or innovational activity are made in any later 
annual reports. 
The scanty information provided to the stock-
holders, particularly the total lack of financial in-
formation, provided the stockholder with no effective 
means of evaluating, much less taking action upon, 
matters concerning research or innovation. The stock-
holder was merely spoon-fed desired items of information. 
At no time were the stockholders, large or small, in any 
way involved in the decision-making process as it affected. 
innovational activity. 
Role of the Directors 
The minutes of the Board of Directors were not 
available for study. When the Burlington Mills organi-
zation acquired control of Pacific Mills the records of 
the latter company were removed to Virginia. The author 
was assured by Bliss, recent president of Pacific.Mills, 
that these records contain neither numerical data con-
cerning research, development, or innovation, nor do 
they contain personal views of the directors in this 
matter. 
The (annual) Report of the President and Treasurer 
to the Directors was available in printed form beginning 
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with the year 1925. A careful study of these reports 
indicates but one passing reference to innovation. Some 
reports-provide figures concerning new equipment and 
modernization. Although the reports of later years pro-
vide much statistical and accounting data, including 
ratios, concerning various aspects of the business, 
·!!2. figures whatever were provided concerning the cost of 
research and development. A study of the accompanying 
financial statements provides no clue as to the amount 
- of money spent for this purpose. 
On the other hand, Bliss apparently assumed that 
the directors had knowledge of the research program as 
evidenced by the following closing remarks from the 1953 
Report: n ••• but our customers can rest assured that we 
will give them the best that our_ engineers and research 
Jllen ~an devise. Respectfully submitted, ••• n 
In spite of lack of written documentation, officers 
of the firm declared to the author, in separate private 
interviews, that the directors were more or less fully 
aware of the growth of research and development and of 
the introduction of innovations in the production process. 
It must be noted that some of the directors were 
otherwise employed in the firm, one in the research de-
partment, and that they were aware of and_ approved of 
these activities. Other directors obtained their 
information concerning research and development from 
informal conferences with the officers of the corporation, 
and these directors similarly provided their informal 
approval. 
Funds were newer especially appropriated by the 
directors.- Research and development expenditures were 
treated as ordinary business expenses, and received no 
more attention from the directors than the purchase of 
any other type of labor, material, and equipment. 
The directors were nevertheless keenly interested 
in research and results of research; o.ften visiting,- and 
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one actually employing himself in·the laboratories of the 
co~poration. Samuel Cabot, a director of Pacific.Mills, 
and a research chemist, co~tributed greatly to a new and 
highly ef.fective method of lanolin recovery whicli·was 
then used by the mills. 
In spite of the keen interest and approval of the 
directors, their role in the decision-making process con-
' 
cerning innovation was largely passive. The o.ffioers o.f 
the· corporation, or more precisely, ~- M. Bliss, Presi-. 
dent and Treasurer, accepted the risks and made the de~ 
cisions concerning innovation. The directors can be said 
to have piayed _an active role in the decision-making 
proce~s .only in the sense that ·they· did not inter.fere 
~n work about which they were merely in.formed. 
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In a way, this is accordance with the traditions 
of the textile industry, which make the treasurer of the 
firm the truly responsible officer of the firm. Bliss, as 
president and treasurer, willingly assum~d the responsi-
bility ~or these decisions. 
Role of ~ President and Treasurer 
The Innovator· 
Henry M. Bliss, who assumed the chief office in 
Pacific Mills in the year 1941, was then forty-six years 
of age. Awarded the degree of Bachelor of Arts, Harvard 
College, in the war year of 1917; he immediately entered 
the·armed forces,' serving as a first lieutenant in the 
U.S. Infantry. He was awarded the French decoration, 
the Croix-de-Guerra. 
Active in his home community, he £erved ,on the_ 
Newton, Massachusetts; Board of Aldermen from 1925 to 
19~9· 
His interests and business aetivities were 
widespread. Although president and treasurer of Pacific 
Mills, an enormous task in itself, he was at the same 
time a trustee -and member of the executive committee of 
the Ludlow Manufaeturing and Sales Company (later serving 
in a more important capacity in one of their divisions 
after separation from Pacific Mills), a director of the 
Boston Manufacturers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, a 
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director of the Mutual Boiler and Maehinery Insurance Com-
pany, and a director of the Second National Bank. of Boston. 
During the years Bliss served as·president of 
Pacific Mil_ls he successfully introduced many major 
changes in the operation of·his company. As will be seen, 
after carefully calculating the consequences,.Bliss was 
11Till~ng to make any changes which wou+d improve the posi-, 
tion of the company, regardless of· how drastic they :Qli"gb.t 
appear •. 
A description· of. these· major -changes will be out-· 
·1~ned. here to indiea~e the daring, though calculating 
nat~e of Bliss. I:t_ltlovation ~lll. the Schumpeterian sense 
. 
was only one· aspect of these major chaJ;lges., and these in-
novations,· in the strong hands ot: Bliss,. were success-
tully put into e.t'fect ;in the ordinary course of business. 
· When Bliss became president and treasur.er of 
Pacific Mills the company was-making money on certain 
aspects of its operations but lo~ing a great de.al of 
money in other phases. 
Bliss to9k the extreme step of shrinking the size 
of the oompany 1 s operations- by one.-.third, closing sever.al 
mills,·particularly certain losing mills in the Northern 
portion of.the company's operations. The immediate 
eft:ect of this change was to improve th~ company's; 
p_ositio:tl. in two· ways: ( l) the remaining operations of the 
179 
firm were more profitable than had been the case previous-
ly with the entire firm, and (2) the proceeds from the 
sale of the no longer needed properties markedly im~roved 
the working-capital position of the firm. 
Controls over inventory were introduced, the ob-
·ject being to prevent t~e company from possible losses 
due to adverse raw-materials prices. 
New mills were ereeted in ·the South. The South 
was chosen as the site for new woolen and worsted mills 
.for a variety of reasons, the principal reasons being, 
according to Bliss: (1) reduced labor costs and (2) low 
constru.ction costs of. new, thoroughly modern .fact.ories. 
Research and development :were s'upported and en-
coura~ed, resulting in many technological improvements, 
the more outstanding of which we have discussed. 
We are here primarily concerned with the latter 
aspect of the changes introdu.ced. by ];>resident· Bliss •. Re-
search and development proved to be the seed-eorn out of 
which important ·innovations a~ose. How amd why the re-
search department was established and operated, and the 
methods by·which ideas were transformed into actual bus-
iness innovations were briefly but mlearly summarized by 
Bliss in a.n interview granted the· author in July, i958. 
At the time of the interview Bliss was no.longer presi-
dent of-Pacific Mills but· was the principal executive 
officer of the Ludlow Paper Company, associated with the 
Ludlow Manufacturing_and Sales Company. Certain enlight-
ening aspects of this interview follow. 
Bliss had concluded a discussion on the reduction 
of the operations of Pacific Mills by one-third and the 
sale of many of the Northern mills as one of his first 
ficts in the office of president· and treasurer. ·The aufuor 
pointed out to him that according to information obtained 
from research department officials, during this same time 
period the research department was greatly expanded. Bliss 
was asked how the expansion of the research department 
could be reconciled with the shedding of other portions 
of the company and the great need for building up working 
capital. 
Blisst We were very fortunate in having in 
our organization people like Mr. Leiteh, Mr. 
Waylan, and Mr. Wilki~ who had fresh ideas 
on how things should be done. The woolen 
and worsted industry, particularly after the 
introduction o:f synthetic .fibers, had many 
technical problems which were begging for so-
lutions. Nobody was prepared to solve these 
problems o~tside of the woolen and worsted 
industry. 
Author: In mechanical matters, I should have 
thought that machinery manufacturers would 
have a bread-and-butter interest in making 
changes in their equipment. If they make 
radical changes in their equipment, they 
could make existing machinery obsolete, and 
thus make a fine market for themselves. 
Bliss: The fact remains that much of our ma-
chinery. was almost the same as that used by 
the English one hundred years ago. Tex-
tile machinery manufacturers had.not been 
particularly aggpessive in introducing 
changes. Their research departments were 
almost non-existent. They did make a 
number or changes in cotton equipment 
during this period, but this is probably 
because cotton machinery represents a 
much· larger market than wool machinery. 
Author: When you set up your research de-
·partment in 1941, where did you obtain . 
your funds? Did you spend the money on 
your own authority, or did you apply to 
the board of directors? 
161 
Bliss: We didn't jump into research head-
first~ The fine research laboratories, 
equipment and personnel which you inspected 
in Lawrence were acquired gradually over 
time. The moneys that wer.e spent came from 
income and were charged off.to operating ex-
penses. Some o:r the equipment.and materials 
were· transferred f.Pom other portions o:r the 
business. 
Author: This is very interesting. But were 
~here. any. faetors within your company which 
compelled you to go into research? . 
Bliss: Some of our better men had been de-
veloping improvements on their own, sand-
wiching this work in bet~een their regular 
work ~ssignments. I :felt that the.re was 
value in providing time, money, and equip-
ment to these people to see what. they could 
do. The board o:r directers had no opposition 
to the use o:r .funds since research.was con-
sidered to be a legitimate function o:r 
management. · 
R.eseareh· is always a gamble. Sometimes . 
. you get .your money's worth and sometimes you 
do not. But during profitable years this 
gamble is minimized by the reductio~ in t~es 
paid to the government. · Our outlays .for r-e-
search were written off as a co-st ot doing 
business ••• like advertising expense. This 
reduced our profits a~d our taxes. But we 
would have gone into research under any 
circumstances. With the competitive sitbuation 
such as it was, we felt that we had to 
obtain advantages through research. 
The time was also ·ripe for research. 
Practically no improvements had been,made 
in woolen and wor~ted machinery for ma~ 
years, yet improvements in m.aea!.nerf·liad 
been occurring in other fields. New ....scien-
tific knowledge had come into being-~ieh 
had not yet been applied to the woolen and 
worsted industries. We felt: that it was 
possible to get g6od results from our in-
vestments in research. And. we were in a 
position to use any cost-cutting improve-
ments or new ideas which mignt be generated. 
Author~ What did you men, sir, when you said 
the company was in a ;position to use the re-
sults of research? 
Bliss: I meant that the company was.making 
money and was Willing to venture capital if'. 
there was a chance .of making an even larger 
return. 
Author: But wasn 1 t 'this the period during. 
Which you were closing down certain portions 
o~ your plant? 
Bliss: Yes. Business could have been 
better, but it could have been worse, too. 
You must rem·ember. that liq'Q.id.&ting certain 
portions o~ our_plant provided improvements 
in working-eapital position. We also antici~ 
pated better business conditions in fuhe near 
.future.· 
To review, Bliss, -who was then very much occupied 
with o.ther changes in Pacific Mills, decided as a matter 
o:t business practice to establish a research department, 
and to use the :fruit~l results, if any, for the benefit 
of the business. He recognized that research was a· gamble, 
· but after evaluating the factors a~fecting the odds, he 
established and encouraged the gradual growth of research 
activities at Pacific Mills. 
In the .course of the interview, the author wished 
to establish Whether in the opinion o~ Bliss, size or the 
company was an important factor in the willingness o:f the 
management to undertake research. His opinions can be 
summarized as :follows~ 
(1) A large-scale program is probably more effec-
tive than several smaller-scale research programs whirih, 
in total, spend the same amount .o:f money. 
(2) Large firms are more capable o:f conducting 
large-scale research because the eXpenditure is only a 
•· small percentage o~ the sales dol!ar. 
(3) Large firms are in a bett~r position to us·e 
the results of research than small firms. For example, 
if a given amount of research effort costing_ nxn _.dollars 
yields a method which saves i¢' per pound in the·manu.fac-
ture o.f woolen yarn, the low-output firm might take a 
number of years to save the cost of the research, while. 
the high-output .firms might save the c~st of the research 
during a very short pe~iod. The.same thinking, and cap-
ital costs, outlays, and·availability also affect the de-
cision of low-output firms t~ modernize equipment. They 
may be unable to, or may find it unprofitable to, modern-
ize ~~:tsting~equipment in situations where rational 
managements of larger firms should.consider these changes 
a matter of business necessity. 
In another portion of the interview the author 
attempted to determine the resistances to innovation 
which were prese:t:J.t. The author, frankly; found it dif-
ficult to believe less.er offioers and employees who had 
been questioned previously and w.ho stoutly maintained 
that there was perfect harmony; that is, complete laek of 
opposition~ to research, development, and subsequent in-
novations among the stockholders and directors. If the 
remarks of these of'.fice:r:os and employees were to be ta.ken 
at race &alue it would appear that Bliss had a perfect~y 
free hand in these decisions, using the company's funds 
for these .matters as he saw fit. The· question concerning 
such opposition was placed pointedly before Bliss., who 
introduced a new and intere·sting facet., that of employee 
opposition, in his answer. 
Bliss~ During my presidency·of the cor-
poration there was no opposition from the 
directors or principal stockholders.· The 
directors were yoUng, forward-looking men . 
who needed no convincing that research 
might produce fruitfUl_results. Of course, 
if we had gone into research in a large way 
at the beginning,. there might have been some 
question as to the wisdom of such a gamble. 
But the research program was increased in size 
.slowly, and only as it produced results. A 
board of directors could scarcely question an 
expenditure of money for a department that had· 
proved so success.ful.1 The stockholders 
were silent in the matter, practically 
speaking. But we did ·run into trouble 
with some of our mill managers and em-
ployees. 'Let me provide an example. Many 
years ago our sales department was agitating 
for something new and different in the way of 
materials to give our sales a boost, and we 
decided upon blending synthetic fibers with 
cotton in the cotton mills and with wool in 
the woolen ~ills. . 
To be sure, the intlDdcitmtion of· this new 
·raw.material provided plenty of changes and 
production problems for the mill managers. 
Some of th.e managers accepted this as a chal-
lenge an.d licked their problems.- .Other mana-
gers, falling back on the traditions of the 
past, resented the introduction of new mater-
ials. They argued that the blends could not 
be ma~ufactured. They were not really willing 
to give them a fair chance. ~he machine oper-
atQrS in these mills resented the change too, 
and did not try to make the new methods work. 
Author: It seems odd that some mills could 
produce blends of cotton <Dr wool with synthetic 
fibers, while others could not. You would think 
that personal competition and pride would cause 
all of the managers and employees to aceept·and 
produce these new fibers. . 
Bliss:: Southern mill ·employees and mill mana-
gers are good. Their fathers and grandfathers 
haven't told·them how much or how little work 
they ean perform; they haven't been taught to 
oppose new ideas. The production of synthetic 
blends was a challenge to the mill manager, was 
·an opportunity to prove himself. 
Author: Are you saying that all of the mana-
gers of mills loeated in the North opposed the 
. lrf another officer, a leading employee, and the 
available records are to be believed, the directors were 
informed r.ather than consulted in the matter of expendi-
tures for research. · 
shift ~o synthetics, while all o~ the 
Southern managers applauded the change 
and made it work? 
Blisst Not all of the Northern managers 
opposed the changeover, but all of the 
opposition came from Northern.managers. 
Author::· That is to .say,_ no Southern mana-
gers opposed the changeover but some, per-
haps many, Northern mill managers opposed 
the cl;l.ange .. 
Bliss: In many of our. Northern mills the 
personnel from the mill-manager·on down 
were suspicious o:f any kind o~ change .. 
Wheneve~ our research .department developed 
an improvement it was almost standard prac-
tice with us to put it into operation in a 
Southern mill and later introduce it into 
all of our mills ·when., there could no longer 
be any doubt o:f its value. The Northern . 
worker from the lowest mill hand to the mill 
manager is educated to the tradition that 
there is a certain b.est way of doing eaeh job, because his :father and grandfather did 
the job in that way. Changing the job thus 
results in suspicion and ~ear. He is also 
educated to the fact that a worker on a par-
ticular task can produce a known amount of 
work, or tend a given number of machines. 
Mechan.ical changes whieh increase produc-
tivity are viewed with alarm.· Indeed, any 
change in the estabfished method of doing 
things is resented. · 
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The author recognizes that some statements made 
here are serious charges against Northern textile workers 
and mill management. Whether or not these charges are 
true is not investigated here, although a reverse situa~n 
is described in this thesis in a ulhinn official's account 
of his attempt to induce the president of the American 
.Woolen Company to explore the possibilities in blended 
fibers.· The importance of the chaJ:ges against managers 
and mill workers lies in the fact that they were acted 
upon by Bliss. 
To review briefly, Bliss encountered no resistance 
to his plans for innovation in either the stockholder 
group or board of directors. But problems arose among 
the operatipg personnel of the mills, from the mill mana-
gers on down. Some of these personnel, in Northern mills, 
feared and resented change, and .did not try to make the 
new methods work. The opposite was true in the Southern 
mills, Where the personnel considered this a challenge 
and exerted themselves to make these innovations success-
ful. Other portions of the interview reveal·that in gen-
eral the Southern worker and mill manager was attempting 
to prove himself' as good or better,1, than his. Northern 
·counterpart. In any event, it· became almost standard 
practice at Pacific Mills to·introduce new inventions 
first in the Southern mills and later, after there was 
no longer doubt of' their value, to .introduce them in 
Northern mills. 
. . 
Another matter of interest is the guidance and 
direction of research·and the conversion of invention.to 
innovation. 
According to Bliss, and verified by research de-
partment employees, the problems studied by research 
personnel originated in a variety o~ ways. Research 
personnel sometimes had problems of their own upon which 
they worked, such as developing testing apparatus. Manage-
ment was, of course, glad to support these projects. But 
almost all _projects handled by research were channeled 
through top""management and were approved or disapproved 
before work was begun. _The problems would reach top-
management ~i ther through their own ol?servations t through 
problems suggested by mill superintendents, by employees, 
or by the researeh personnel themselves. The research de-
partment had a voice in denermining the problems upon 
which they should work by an evaluation of these prob-
lems for management through the director of research. 
To illustrate the nature o:f the various appro ache.s, 
· when the company began working with the new synthetics, it 
was apparent to everyone, from the mill hand to the presi-
dent, that great problems were being encountered in dyeing 
and finishing.· Machinery manufacturers, chemical dye and 
:fiber manu:facturers were unable to provide sa,tis:fac·tory so-
lutions. The dyeing of wool :fibers, while a satis:factory 
chemical process, also seemed capa~le of improvement •. ~op­
management turned these problems. over to the researeh. de-
part:m.ent, where chemists finally pf,'ovided improved methods 
of dyeing and ·finishing. 1 
. lA highly publicized improv~ment was the chemical 
technique developed by J"ohn R. Dalton, director o:f ehemi-
eal research, Paci'fie Mills, Worsted· Division. See G. M. 
Moisson, rtPacific Mills DAP (diammonii::un. _phosphate) Process 
Improves Wool Dyeing, u Text:J.le World, 1959. 
Pacific Mills sold the rights to Victor Chemical 
Works o:f Chicago, Illinois. Development occurred under 
the presidencr o:f H.M. ,Bliss. 
Many improvements to machinery were proposed by 
top":"'management, mill personnel, and the research men 
themselves. I:a this regard it must be remembered that 
most research personnel were also good men in the mill. 
Literally scores of a.daptat1ons to existing machinery 
were made, some major and some less important, which con-
tributed to more efficient, that is, less costly cperaticns. 
Author:. What top-management people were 
involved in the decision-making process at 
this point, and on what basis did they make 
their decisions? 
Bliss~- There was no hard and fast procedure. 
In the dyeing and. finishing problem which I 
mentioned to you, the research people, who 
are not out of.toueh with the mills, had al-
ready given the matter consideration even be-
fore they were:direeted to do so by me. In 
another ease, one of our ·officers had an idea 
for the improvement o:f a machine. He di.seussed 
the matter with me and I took. it up with Mr. 
Wilkie who thought it was a good idea too. 
Author:. Would I be correct in saying that all 
research projects had.to be cleared through the 
o:ffiee of the president? 
Bliss: :That would be substantially true, but 
would l·eave ·an erroneous impression. I was 
guided in my decisions. by the beliefs and atti-
tudes o:f other memb~rs of management and by the 
research people. Very often their ideas would 
be supported by .figures which would indio a t·e 
the possible benfits tp be derived. 
Whether Bliss personally played the greater part in 
the determination of the projects to be studied by the re-
-
search· department is, in spite of the foregoing statEments, 
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somewhat indeterminate. The research department was sub-
ject to a variety of forces from within and without the 
department. The director of research, certain individual 
inventors, and some department heads were forceful persons 
who. were capable of dominating not merely because of their 
. ofi'icial capacities but also because of the great force of 
their personalities. An important function of the director 
of research was to evaluate and deterniin~ the priori ties of 
the various requests. In this matter the president, B~iss, 
might occ-asionally set the primary goal. 
But there can be no question concerning the intense 
interest of the president in the activities of the research 
department. At all times he was fully aware of the studies 
undertaken and the progress which had been made. 
Not all o·f the studies resul.ted in sound changes, 
from an economic sense, and it was necessary to determine 
which improvemebts would be put into production and which 
would be shelved. 
In the words of Bliss, "We wanted to use every im-
provement which they could offer if it would save us money 1 
or if it would enable us to improve quality without too 
much additional expense." 
This meant that costs would be carefully reckoned 
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in the laboratory. If the invention or improvement looked 
promising to management on the basis of laboratory-
determined probable cost figures, the idea would be put 
into actual production in one or more of the mills, where 
careful records were maintained on actual factory operating 
experience. Mill operations sometimes exposed certain 
ttbugsn which could then be improved. If the study revealed 
that the savings or improvement in quality justified the 
capital outlay, the invention would be generally adopted 
throughout all of the mills. 
The above procedure is another illustration of the 
advantage of the large firm over the small firm in the 
matter of resear.ch. The small firm, if it chose to under-
take such studies of improvements, might have to involve 
all of its production in such experiments, while the large 
firm could conduct valid experiments using only a small 
percentage of its productive facilities.' 
Movement to the South· 
Pacific Mills was one of the first companies to 
move woolen and worsted mills South on a large scale. Th.is 
movement was accomplished under the presidency of Bliss. 
The primary purpose of this discussion is to indicate the 
flexibility of mind and the capacity to make important 
novel decisions on the part of Bliss. These character-
istics are important in a person who ~uld successfully 
initiate innovation. Another purpose is to make signifi-
cant interesting observations concerning how this move-
ment affected the mechanical innovations under study. 
Since the primary purpose of the· Southern movement was 
merely to obtain lower-cost labor, w~ should not claasify 
this movement as a Schumpeterian·innovation. 
Historically the textile industries have been 
especially_interested in reducing labor costs. This 
naturally follows the fact that labor costs are an im-
portant part of the costs per yard of fabric. Schumpeter 
provides an early example in his chapter on Historical 
Outlines. 
Woolen textiles, being the chief English 
industry and the mainstay of export ·in the · 
sixteenth century, may serve as an instanee-
of·a first type of entrepreneurial action in 
non-agrarian fields •••••• The entrepreneur 
had to act outside of the organizations of 
small masters -- to leave them if he was 
one of them -- also often to move out of the 
towns controlled by them into country dis-
tJ?icts where J::!! found cheap labor iii. order to 
finance and carry out the commercial tasks 
involved. He had to overcome resistance and 
nfix thingsu with looal.author:tties ":'-·the 
.implications of the latter expression sug-
gesting well one side of the innoviting activ-
ity of entrepreneurs at all times. 
Again, citing early historical examples picturing 
resentment of workers towards innovation, Schumpeter 
describes acts of violence on the pa:rt>t of workers, 
· lJ.A. Sehumpeter, Business Cycles_; (New Yorkt 
McG.I'aw-Rill Book Go., Inc., 1939), Vol I, 240. 
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political activities by craft guilds culminating in the 
highly restrictive Weavers Acts of 1555, and a later 
royal proclamation directing that a new machine for the 
1 
manufacture of needles be. destroyed. 
As we shall see, there was a time ·lag of severa~ 
years between the southward migration of the cotton in-
dustry and the beginning of the migration of the woolen 
and worsted industry. The reasons for this delay in-
clude the attraction of the Boston wool market, New 
England's freight-rate advantage (which has now been 
iost), the availability of skilled workers, and the fact 
that before air conditioning was develop.ed the· climate 
of New England was better suited to wool manufacturing 
than that of most Southern states. However, 
All the reasons just mentioned for 
staying in New England ••• were subordinated 
to one outstanding reason -- there was no 
serious competition from other regions that 
could not be met by conventional means. 
Even if production costs were potentially 
lower in the South than in New England, so 
long as other producers did not settle in 
the South there was no pressure to make the 
move.2 
1 . Ibid., PP. 243-244. 
2 Miernyk, W.H., and Bright, A.A., ~Textile 
Industries of ~ England, Staff Memorandum No. X, 
Oommittee of New ·England of the National Planning 
Association, August, 1952, PP• 23-24. 
It is true that there have been woolen and worsted· 
mills operating in the South for.many years, but until 
World War II there was no evidenee that other mills were 
planning to follow.those mills. In some eases the South-
ern mills were non-eompetitive with the Northern mills. 
The Ameries.n Woolen Company, :for example, had a Southern 
mill for more than twenty-:five years. This mill, however, 
produced knitting yarns whieh were not used to make woven 
:fabries• The product o:f this Southern mill was sold to 
1 
:final consumers. 
In its early days this mill was not "in competition" 
with the twenty Northern mills which this co"mpany mainr 
tained, since the Northern mills were engaged in the pro-
duction of :fabrics, not yarn to be sold on the open mar-
ket. 
Pacific Mills and other textile :firms, however, 
had previous experience with Southern cotton mills, some 
of which had operated in the South for many years. Their 
managements reasoned that if their Southern cotton mills 
were able to produce at lower costs than Northern eotton 
mills, and they saw .. this to be true in situations where 
they could draw comparisons, then a Southern woolen mill 
could also operate at a lower co~t than Northern mills. 
1America 1 s Textile Reporter, Vol. LXV, 
Nov. 22, 1951, P• 1. 
Management had heard all of the arguments that had 
been advanced as to why the North was -c~~perior as a loca-
tion for the production of woolen and worsted fabrics 
more highly skilled labor, the nearness of the Boston 
wool market, nearness to the New York market where most. 
finished goods are sold, better climate, and so forth. 
But there came a time when the executives of Pacific·Mills 
and other firms, which had at the same time some cottQn 
and rayon mills, decided to make the test. 
Until 1916 Pacific Mills operated entirely in the 
North. In that year the corporation had just completed 
a new print works located at Lawrence, Massachusetts. 
This print works had a capacity of 3,600 miles of cloth 
per week, and a bleachery was built to handle a similar 
1 
capacity. The print works contained fifty-one printing 
machines, and the bleachery contained eighty bleaching 
kiers, but the corporation did not have sufficient weav-
ing capacity to keep the print works and the bleachery 
going at capacity levels. 
A representative of the company went South in 
search of added weaving capacity. He found that a com-
bine known as the Parker Cotton Mills Company (later 
1Memoir~ of a Corporation, Pamphlet VIII (Boston: 
Pacific M~lls,-1950T 12. 
known as the Hampton Mills Company) had over-exte~ded 
itself financially and was in need of cash. This com-
bine had four mills at Columbia~ South Carolina, which 
Pacific was able to purchase, the acquisitions adding 
200,000 spindles and 5,000 looms to the corporation's 
capacity -- and Pacific Mills was now ·in business in the 
South for the first time. In 1924, Pacific Mills built 
a cotton-sheeting plant at Lyman, South Carolina, with 
564 broad looms. This plant also included a bleaohery 
an~ a compaete finishing department. 
In 1933 the company liquidated its cotton op.er-
ations in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and in 1941 it liqui~ 
dated its rayon division in Lawrence and another rayon 
operation at Dover,. New Hampshire. Meanwhile, the com-
pany b·egan to devote its Lawrence properties to the ·pro-
duction of worsted cloth, although it continued some of 
. 1 its rayon and print works operations in Lawrence. 
By this time President Bliss of Pacific Mills 
was beginning to Wol;lder why a successful Southern wor-
sted operation could not be started. In 1945 the 
oorppration acquired a milL at Carrboro, North Carolina, 
libid., p. 15, and The American Wool and Cotton 
Reporter, Vol. LXV, June 28, 1951, PP• 96-97.--
whi(}h had been built in 1898, · and began to install wor-
sted machinery. As soon as twelve looms were in place 
the mill began to function and by May 1, 1945, it was in 
lMemoirs of a Cbrporation, Pamphlet lX (Boston: 
Pacific Mills, 1950), 18-19. 
2The American Wool and Cotton Reporter, op. cit., 
p. 97. 
is true that the compgny had had previous experience 
with the Southern cotton industry. Nevertheless, the 
old opinions about the North as the ideal location for a 
woolen or worsted mill were still prevalent atthe time 
Bliss authorized the move. 
Bliss was taking a chanee when he decided to open 
the· worsted milL at Carrboro because it is true :that even 
today the degree of skill required in the manufacnure of 
worsted cloth is greater than that needed to manufacture 
cotton cloth. While the theory proved sound that since 
the company had found satisfactory Southern cotton 
workers, it could just as satisfactorily train Southern 
worsted workers; the.fact remains that ha-d the Southern 
workers failed to measure up to the more experienced 
\ 
workers in the L~wrenee mill, the project might have 
failed. But the miil proved successful and almost im-
mediately some production was diverted from the Northern 
to the Southern mills. 
Bliss did not rely on the experience of other · 
co~panies in making his decision to shift part of the 
worsted production to the South. He took this step on 
the basis of Pacific Mills' previous suceess in manu-
facturing cotton in the South. 
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Some pertinent extracts from an interview follow: 
Author:: When you were president of Paci.fic 
Mills, all of your Northern cotton mills 
were permanently shut down, the world's 
largest cotton printing facility in Law-
rence was closed down, and a number of 
Northern woolen and worsted mills were 
closed down. At the same time your firm 
was building corresponding new capacity in 
the Southern areas of the United States. 
Was this your decision or was it made by 
others? 
Bliss: Many men contributed to these de-
cisions, but I must accept final responsi-
bility for them. The action taken by the 
company reflected my wishes. 
Author: How did you arrive at the decision 
to move? 
Bliss:: Our decision to close the Northern 
cotton mills was based on the cost analyses 
which we had made. Our Southern mills could 
produce cottons at a significantly lower 
price per yard. The decision to close down 
a relatively new print mill in Lawrence, 
which was, as you stated, the largest in the 
world, was again a matter of costa. This 
mill had such a huge capacity that even when 
all of our Northern cotton mills were opera-
ting at capacity they could not provide suf-
ficient yardage to keep the print mill busy. 
I saved millions of dollars for the company 
by closing down this one operation and moving 
the work South. The.decision to close some 
of our Northern woolen and worsted mills and 
build Southern factories was ba.sed on our 
experience with cotton. I believed that 
Southern workers could produce woolens and 
worsteds on modern machinery if given an 
opportunity to do so. When we made our move, 
we took none of our Northern workers with us 
with .the exception of a minimum number o:f 
of supervisory personnel. We wanted to leave 
behind such de.eply· ingrained ideas as the· 
amount of work that could be done on each job, 
and the lore,tradition, and superstition 
of the industry. 
Author: I have heard a number of reasons 
offered to explain why mills moved South. 
Could you tell me what you observed in your 
financial analysis that induced you to make 
this great change'? 
Bliss: Of course ·there were a number of 
factors present. that tended to favor the 
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South. But if everything else had been equal 
with.the exception of the favorable labor sit-
uation, we would haye made the move in s:n.y 
event. There was a·large labor-cost differ-
ential brought about because of two factors. 
First there was a lower hourly wage rate. 
Second was the fact that the Southe~ worker 
was willing to accept higher work loads that 
were made possible by the introduction of new 
machinery. The attitude of the Southern 
worker was a pleasing change, too. In a 
Southern community the mill management was 
made to feel as if they were really wanted, 
that the jobs what they contributed to the 
community were appreciated. Our Southern 
employees not only work for us, but with us. 
They were loyal·, and .b.ad a fine, healthy at-
titude toward their work. The very fact that 
they were inexperienced in woolens and worsteds 
provided an extra incentive and Challenge to 
make good. They were always anxious to set 
records which were superior to mills in other 
parts of the country. 
Author~ In dollars and cents, just how much 
~id the Southern movement gain for Pacific 
Mills? 
Bliss~ Let me put it this· way. When we set 
up a Southern mill. it would be brand-new from 
top to bottom, machinery and equipment included. 
Overlook anything which we might.have realized 
from the sale of the obsolete Northern pl~t. 
We estimated that we ·could recover our oapi tal 
investment in five to six years. Our actual 
performance bore out our estimates. 
Author: I did not imagine that the 
profits were that great. If what you 
say is true, why doesn't every Northern 
mill close its doors and move South? 
Bliss: The figures which I quoted were 
true of the time during which Pacific 
Mills moved their mi'lls. They are no 
longer true today. It remains advan-
tageous to move South, but not to the 
degree which I sp.ecified. 
Author: What has happened to change 
the situation? 
Bliss:. Two very important changes have 
occurred. First, the labor-cost dif-
ferential between Northern and Southern 
producers has narrowed. Second, factory 
building costs have advanced ve_ry sharply. 
Combine the results of these two facts and 
you can see that it would take a much 
longer period of years to recover the cost 
of moving a mill. 
In summary, Bliss examined the operating results 
of Pacific Mills' Northern and Southern cot~on operations 
and made the drastic move of closing down his entire 
Northern cotton operation 2n favor of the South. As a 
logical continuation of his analysis, he determined that 
it would be profitable to take the even more radical step 
of moving woolen and worsted, particularly worsted, oper-
ations to .the South. He did this on the basis of his own 
analyses,. rathern thalll following the .. lead of others. It 
had previously been believed that for a variety of reasons 
woolen and worsted operations would remain in New England 
because of the previously stated advantages of the area • 
. When his own data provided findings contradictory to the 
general beliefs of the business community, he accepted 
his own findings. He also refused to accept the general 
belief of the inferiority of the Southern worker, since 
his own experiences with Southern cotton workers belied 
the fact. 
Entrepreneurial Behavior of 
Bliss in Another Industry 
Bliss, at·the. time of the interview in 1958, was 
no longer associated with Pacific Mills or with the woolen 
&nd worsted industry, but with Ludlow Manufacturing and 
Sales, Needham, Massachusetts. . In discussing his present 
situation, he revealed his management philosophy and his 
attitude toward innovation. Bliss is proving to be an 
innovator in this new position. : 
Bliss: The task o£ top-management is the 
same in practically all industries. A good 
top-manager can use the same techniques in 
any of a number of different industries. 
For example, as presid.ent of Ludlow Paper 
it is not important that I be able to dis-
tinguish one type of paper from another, 
although this· information might occasionally 
prove useful and interesting. A top-manager 
can hire a good mill manager to take care of 
his day-to•day production problems. The same 
applies to salesmen, a~countants, and others 
who handle important d~y-to-day problems. But 
top-management should be different from these 
men in this important respect. A top-manager 
should be less interested in where his firm 
has been, and where it is going today; he 
should be more interested in where his firm 
. is going. Where will 'it be six months from 
now, a year from now. 
It is his function and responsibility not 
merely to mainta.in.the statu.a of the concern, 
but to make and carry out plans for the 
future.. He should be willing to accept 
and spend money on new id,eas and improve-
ments if he is convinced they will improve 
the situation of his firm •. It is his re-
sponsibility to maintain an atmosphere in 
which new ideas are encouraged and put into 
practice. · 
New research and development are only 
one small aspect of looking ahead in busi-
ness, and one of the riskiest on.es at that. 
But a company cannot survive in this day 
and age unless it learns to t~im the costs 
o:f producing and selling old products, or 
develops new materials'and products which 
are superior either in physical character-
istics or price. . · . 
By the way,· did you know that Mr • .Wilkiel 
came with us to Ludlow? We do a great deal 
of work here with jute. Up to now a chem-
ical ingredient contained in jute made .it 
very difficult to dye. As a consequence 
practically all the jute you see is used 
:for commercial purposes. The little jute 
that goes into household use, other than 
in rug backing, must be dyed in dark, hard, 
solid colors. Mr. Wilkie s research group 
has recently overcome this problem so that 
we can now dye jute in all colors, including 
light pastels. Don't be too surprised i:f 
you see articles such as draperies, rug 
:facings, seat covers and others made out 
of this material •. 
The above remarks.are highly significant. Bliss, 
an important innovator in the woolen and worsted indus-
try, on moving to another industry. continues with this; 
innovational pattern. The innovations now emerging at 
Ludlow represent a continuation of a definite technique 
of management very mueh in evidence when Bliss was 
1Inventor of the Pacific converter and :finally 
Director o:f Research at Pac~:fic Mills. 
president of Pacific Mills. This is not the ease of an 
inventive genius such as Thomas Edison, whose fertile 
mind p~odueed an uninterrupted flow of inventions for 
the period of his lifetime. We are discussing a_pro-
fessional business manager who uses innovation as one 
of a kit of managerial tools to improve the future 
position of his firm. 
Conclusions 
Under the highly skilled management of ·Henry M. 
Bliss, many changes were made in Pacific Mills. Inno-
vation in the Schumpeterian sense was only one of the 
many types of changes • 
. The basic philosophy of management of the company 
was altered. It is well known, and substantiated by the 
company's annual reports, that preceding managements had 
made or lost their reputat.ions and the fortunes of the 
company by speculation in raw materials. President Bliss 
was determined to earh manufacturing profits through ef-
ficient business operations rather than .speculative 
profits. Under his guidance, the efficiency of the com-
pany was improved in many ways! inefficient mills were 
closed, and modern equipment was provided for remaining 
mills; new f.actori.es, built and operated at lower costs 
than were possible in the North, were constructed in the 
South; new techniques of inventory control and quality 
control were employed; and a successful research depart-
ment developed new types of machinery, improved old ma-
chines, developed practical new fabric blends, and devel-
oped new chemical techniques. 
New inventions and devetopments were encouraged by 
the positive attitude that management should encourage and 
utilize new ideas, and that management should be willing 
to make new investments where appropriate to improve the 
position of the firm. To repeat his remark, 
Now research and development are only 
·one small aspect. of looking ahead in bus~ 
iness, and one of the riskiest ones at 
that. But a company cannot survive in 
this day and age unless it _learns. to trim 
the cost of producing and selling old 
products, or develops new materials and 
products which are superior either in 
physiaa~ characteristics or price. 
It was repeatedly pointed out during interviews 
with management personnel that research and development 
can be employed only by large_ firms. Eufus Hale, 
Assistant Treasurer of Pacific Mills, and others made the 
point that research expenditures at Pacific Mills were 
never more than a tiny percentage of sales. It was also 
contended by him that t~e scale of research is important 
in producing effective results. Hale stated most dra-
ma~ically: By the very nature of. the research operation, 
if a million dollars were expended by one hundred small 
companies in one hundred small research programs the 
206 
results would probably not be as effective as a million 
dollars expended by one company in one research program. 
A most interesting observation to be derived from 
the study of Pacific Mills was that the firm's success in 
innovations was apparently the result of the.philosophy 
! of its very capable president. Innovational activity was 
not important at Paeific Mills before his arrival, nor is 
there any eyidence to indicate that innovation has sue-· 
cessfully continued sin~e his departure fro~ the company. 
An exception to the above should be made in the 
· case of cotton. Pacific :Mills was active in sponsoring, 
and provided fifty percent of the financial support for, 
the Cotton Research Company. This was an early attempt 
at group research. Several companies cooperated in the 
vennure. The Gotten Research Company was formed in 1919 
and expired in 1928. 
But the effects of this venture upon the operating 
personnel may have been of great importance. E.D. Walen 
of Pacific Mills was in charge of the operations of of 
. 
the Cotton Research Company. He was the. original in-
ventor of the sliver tester later m.arketed.by the Saco-
Lowell Shops, followed in more recent years by the 
Pacific Mills ele~tronio-type evenness tester. Walen 
is the person who .was earlier mentioned as providing 
inspirational and practical support to Wilkie, the 
inventor of the Pacific converter. Walen was vice-
president of Pacific Mills under PPesident Bliss, and the 
two were of one mind in the matter of the importance o.f 
research, development, and innovation. 
Bliss le.ft Pacific Mills shortly after the con-
trolling stQck was acquired by Burlington Mills. Accord-
ing to his statement, he was offered a most satisfactory 
position in the new management. He declined the offer as 
it would have meant moving to another section of the. 
country. Bliss then assumed the presidency of the 
Ludlow Paper Company, a firm not associated with the 
woolen an~ worsted industry. As indicated in the pre-
ceding pages, he continues to employ research, develop-
ment, and innovation· as. part of his philosophy.o.f manage-
ment. Bliss is proving that successful innovation is a . 
technique of· management which, unde~ certain circum-
stances, may be transferred from one industry to another. 
Location £! ~ Entrepreneur !£ Bachmann-Uxbridge 
Role of the Stockholder 
- - - --..-,..;~--.o;;;..;-.=.. 
President Walter.r 'of the Bachmann-Uxbridge 
Division of the Ameraee Corporation pointed out in a 
. 1 personal interview with the ·author that the stockholders 
were not, as a group, consulted in decisions concerning 
innovation. Nor Were individual large stockholders a 
factor in these decisions. These statements are forti-
fied by an examination of the available annual reports 
of the corporation. In no report is the sto.ckholder 
notified of the axtent or the research program or tne 
results of innovation. A careful analysis of the pub-
lished statements of the corporation reveals no indi-
cation of research expenditures, nor royalties received 
from the sales of innovations. An interested stock-
holder who relied entirely upon the publications of the 
company migb.:t .have noticed the--following casual refer-
ences to the fact that his company was doing things dif-
ferently from the typical woolen and worsted firm~ 
1 
Uxbridge, Mass .. , Sept. 1957 •. 
Only thirty-eight years have elapsed 
since Uxbridge was founded. For a tex-
tile mill thirty-eight years is barely 
maturity. Uxbridge machinery is thor-
oughly up to date, for the mill ~onsors 
a continuous progr~ of research which 
constantly results in mechanical improve-
ments and refinements leadinf ·to ef-
ficient, low cost production. 
. Our Research Department, which has de-
veloped new and improved ~achinery over a 
period of years, has continued its contri-
butions towards improved quality and lower 
operating costs. We feel that our mills 
and maChinery compare more than faborably 
with any in our industry, and that we are 
in a strong competitive poaition·both in 
respect to flexibility of production and 
low oosts.2 · . 
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In another annual -report,3 pictures of various 
machine operations were shown with the notation in fine 
print under some of these pictures that the company had 
developed these machines in the research department. 
The stockholder, then, was merely a passive fac-
tor in the entrepreneurial proeedure. He was scareely 
notified of the important-events occurring within his 
company; He was moat certainly not consulted, nor bore 
· 1~ Uxbrldge .... Worsted Company, an illustrated 
hard-cover booklet published by the company, 1945, p.6. 
·· 2Bacbmann-U.xbridge Wo:r>sted Corporation Annual 
Report to the Stockholder, p.2. (The first public offering 
pf the stock of the merged company was ·made in the month. 
of March 1957. The l950.report was the first ~ual report 
rec~bred by these stockholders..) · 
3The Amerace Corporation Annual Report to the 
Stockholde~s. This was the first annual ~eport of the 
newly-merged firms. 
any responsibility for the changes. 
~ of the Banker 
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The Uxbridge Worsted Company, the Bachmann-Uxbridge 
·Worsted Company, and the Amerace Corporation have relied 
upon the First National Bank of Boston for their credit 
requirements. An interview with John B. Gray, Assistant 
Vice-President, Credit Department, First National Bank 
of Boston, revealed the followi~g information. 
The financial statements provided to the Bank 
were much more detailed than the statements provided.to 
the stockholders. Nevertheless, it was impossible to de-
termine from these statements how much money was devoted 
to research, or how much revenue was derived from royal-
ties or other income on the machines sold. Gray assumed 
that these figures had probably been lumped with the ex-
pense and sales figures for the cqncern. 
The bank was aware that the Bachmann-Uxbridge 
Division was "highly progressive" and had been so even as 
-
the Uxbridge Worsted Company, Inc. But the bank's intene.st'. 
was limited as follows: 
Author: Did the results of the oorporation 1 s 
research enter into your credit granting 
decisions in any measurable way? 
Gray: We are interested in the results of 
research only as they may be measured 1n 
terms of profits and general improvements 
in the financial position of the company. 
We would be much more direetly concerned, 
of course, if w:e were involved in the equity 
sense, that is, as stockholders. As a 
creditor we do not share the 
of view as the stockholder. 
course, now more interested 
all picture for the Amerace 
rather than the outlook for 
its divisions. 
same point 
We are, of 
in the over-
Corporation 
any one of 
2ll 
The latter remark concerning the Amerace Corpora-
tion is interesting in view of the ·tact that the merger 
resulted in a company producing a diversified line-of 
products, the Bachmann-Uxbridge Division being the sole 
textile _producer in the group. 
Briefly summarized, inquiry developed that the 
worsted company had never requested special financing 
for their innovations. Their. credit rested primarily 
on the broader general position of the company rather 
than on the possibilities expressed by their innovational 
activity. 
So little interest in these matters was evidenced 
by the bank that the financial details of this_type of 
activity were neither requested nor revealed, being 
lumped together with the ordinary operating expenses of 
the firm. The banker neither requested nor re·ceived any 
voice in the innovational activity of the worsted company. 
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Role of ~ Directors 
The various Boards of Directors of the Uxbridge 
Worsted Company, later the Ba~bmann-Uxbridge Worsted Com-
pany, finally a division of the Amerace Corporation, were 
very much aware of the introduction of new production 
techniques, and the creation and growth of the research 
program. Their attitude was one of approval. While they 
·did not have an opportunity to vote in favor of funds for 
the projects, neither did they oppose the expenditure of 
funds for these purposes. 
The directors received information concerning these 
radical new ideas and their deve_lopment during informal, 
personal meetings, and offered their opinions and approval 
in similar fashion. ·The minutes of the meetings of the 
Board of Directors reveal ~e formalities. The really 
. . 
important aspects of decision making involving the 
directors were described by Presid.ent Walter.'·. to the 
author as follows: . 
We are a very close group here. We 
arrive at decisions through informal con-
ferences. No records are kept 'of what is 
said in these conferences and there is no 
formal voting procedure. 
The conclusion must be reached that. the directors 
were very mueh aware of the entrepreneurial activity 
occurring within their company but did not play an active 
part. mut it was doubtless a matter or great importance 
that they expressed confidence in the president of the 
company, who was responsible. for initiating and carrying 
out these activities. President Walter assumed the pro-
fes-sional risks and made the decisions concerning inno-
vat ion. 
As was mentioned in the Pacific Mills study, it 
has been traditional in the textile industry for the 
chief financial officer of the corporation to Wield the 
real power and control. Walter, in his dual.role of 
president and treasurer, had all the authority which was 
necessary for him to engage in the entrepreneur1al activ-
ity of the type which has been described. 
Role .of the President and Treasurer 
The Innovator· 
. B;arold J. Walter, .who becam:e president and treas-
urer of the. Uxbridge Worsted Company in 1932, was then 
thirty-two years of age. He served in the United. States 
Army as a private during World War I. Fol-lowing his 
discharge from the armed forces he earned a Bachelor of 
Arts degree at the University of Colorado in 1922. In 
addition to his duties as president of the woolen and 
worsted· company he has served as a trustee of the 
Uxbridge Savings Bank since 19,30, ·director of the Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company since 1947, a 
director or the Arkwright Mutual Fire Insurance Company 
since 1947. He has served at various times as President 
of the Associated Industries or Massachusetts and Presi-
dent of the National Association of Woolen and Worsted 
Manufacturers. He is serving as trustee of Northeastern 
University and is also active in Army Reserve and church 
acti vi ties. He was a delegate to the Republican National 
Convention in 1947. 
In the office of president of the woolen and wor-
s"ti.ed company Walter proved capable of improving the c.om-
pany's efficiency in many respects, the introduction of 
innovations being one aspect of his managerial activity. 
Mergers~ movement of Northern. mills to lower-eos t Southern, 
-
areas, the early use of synthetic materials~ and thorough 
mode:rnization of plant and equipment were aspects of his 
.successfuL. attempt to become a high-volume, low-cost 
producer. 
Before World War II there was little to distinguun 
the company from many other firms in the industry which 
had gradually grown until they were fairly large concerns; 
but other than increasing their size, and perhaps thereby 
achieving some economies of seale, these firms did little 
that can qe classified as innovations. 
During World War II, however, Walter realized that 
the war-made boom could not last; that the industry was 
bound to become much more competitive than it had been 
for years; and that in the competitive struggle the firm 
that clung s-trongly to t radi tion .rather than branching 
out in new directions would stand the smallest chanpe of 
survival. 
As a consequence he engaged in planning to im-
prove the firm's competitive position. That he was sue-
.· cessful is illustrated by the fact that in January 1952. 
bhe army opened bids for one and one-half million yards 
of wool-nylon shirting. Only. one company bid on the en-
tire amount and this was the giant of the industry, 
· American Woolen Company. This company offered to produce 
the cloth at prices ranging from $3.97 to $3.984 a yard. 
Other companies bid for part of the total, and of those 
the lowest bid was that submitted by Bachmann-Uxbridge, 
which offered to produce half a million yards at $3.68 
l 
a yard. 
It is noteworthy that Baehmann~Uxbridge could 
substaneially underbid the American Woolen Company, the 
largest manufacturer of woolen and worsted fabrics in 
2 
the nation. Inl:J..ovations and other economies had 
lNew England News Letter, published by the New 
England Council, February 19$2, p. 7. . · 
2Bachmann-Uxbridge 1 s sales in 1950 amounted to 
about twenty-eight percent of the sales made by American 
Woolen. Loo. eit. 
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succeeded in making Bacbmann-Uxbridge a low-cost pro-
ducer in the industry. 
Walter realized that' his :inefficient origi:na.l 
plants would be incapable of increasing efficiency with• 
out major alterations. Tb.e Uxbridge (Massachusetts) 
plant had grown over the years into a collection of about 
a dozen small buildings: .. which were connected by passage-
ways. The plant layout was :obviously not conducive to 
efficient "straigb.t-l~nett operations, so in the words of 
a company official, "We finally built' a wall around all 
these buildings, put a roof on top of the wall, and then 
sort of gutted the area inside.ul 
The result is one large, fully integrated mill, 
:the interior of which is as modern in appearance as if 
~t had be.en newly constructed from. the bottom-up. Fol-. 
lowing the. alteration of the building came a rearrange-
ment. of' machinery in order to obtain a continuous prso.cess 
flow. The. wool sorting and m~xing room (on the second 
floor)· was set up so that the wool. could be unloaded 
directly into the room where the first steps or the pro-
duction process take plaee. In this room the wool is 
blended and prepared for the· carding, combing, spinning, 
'iNew England News Letter, op. cit. 
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and weaving operations. The preparatory machinery is set 
up to take the wool directly from the sorting and sizing 
room, and from there it goes directly to the spinning 
frames and males (frame spindles far outnumbered mule 
spindles in the mill), and thence to the looms and 
nweaving machines. It. After this the: cloth is put through 
a new stainless steel dye house and it is ready for pack-
ing and shipping. 
The arrangement of a straight-line process was, 
by· itself; somethi;c.g of: a novelty. Most of the older 
mills in New England are housed in ancient multi-storied 
buildings. This is not true of the Uxbridge plant where 
the production process approximates a production line as 
nearly as can be expected in this industry. Important a~ 
was this obvious change in the Uxbridge _facility, it was 
merely indicative and symptomatic of even greater changes 
that. were going on throughout the·. company under the gu.ld-. 
ing hand of President Walter. R~gardle:;t:s of the degree 
of change or novelty-involved, Walter was prepared_·to 
take any steps which he believed would be of economic. 
benefit to his company. 
The invention, development, and use of the pin-
drafter and w~aving machine have al~eady been discussed· 
and will not be· repeated ·here. To omit tedious repat!-
tion, we will avoid studies of the many relatively minor 
2l~ 
mechanical and chemical cost-cutting improvements which 
were developed a~d incorporated into the .process of pro-
duction. Perhaps the Gentle Air Slasher is the best 
known of· these improvements, becoming widely adopted as 
a superior methpd for the application of sizing to 
yarns. Improvements in literally every aspect of the 
production process emerged with regularity from the re-
B~arch laboratories. A partial listing of these inno-
vations would include many improvements in yarn manu-
facture, an automatic tacker, ·a fabric marker for auto-
mobile fabrics, a truly soluble marking chalk, and 
others. 
Advance Planning ~ Innovations 
The following discussion reveals that ilinov.ations 
of the firm were not merely a series of fortuitous acci-
dents, but were the results of long-range planning. ~he. 
nature of this planning and some of the problems in-
volved are explained. 
I am indebted to President Wal tar for his pereru1al 
cooperation, Assistant Treasurer Evan Urquhart (who is 
apparently director of research activities although he 
disclaims such a title), and to certain employees of the 
corporation for the following information. I have also 
drawn freely from transcripts of statements made by com-
pany officers and executives at meetings held at the 
. ' 
Norwich· Inn in February 1941;., February 194.5, and 
January 1951. These records have been bound into· 
volumes labe-led "Norwich Inn Get-Together," Volumes 
I and Il~- and "Norwich Get-Together, tt Volume f:II.The·. 
. . ' . 
first two volumes were assembled by th~ Uxbridge Wor-
sted Company, Inc.·, and· the third volume by the newly 
/ 
combined Bachmann._Uxbridge·Worsted Corporation. 
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During World War II President Walter and a gro'\l,p 
of executives and officers. agreed th:at up to and during 
World War II the woolen and worsted industry had become 
very backward s:s lccmpared to many other industries. 
Nothing revolutionary had appeared in the woolen and 
worsted industry in over fi~ty years. During World War 
II the ·management of the co'rpora tion had endeavored un.;. 
successfully on ma:ny· o~ocasions to get textile-machinery 
manufacturers to alter or improve machinery in accord-
ance with their suggestions and. specifications. The 
textile•machinery manuracuurers were obdurate in their 
ref~sal to change • 
.An:, example of this oppo'sition to changes 
occurred when the corporation requir~;~d some new looms. 
Due to-war labor shortages women were required t? operate 
these looms, usually a man's j~b. The corporation sug-
gested to the loom ma.nufa:cture·r that certain simple 
changes be m~de on the existing~type looms to adapt them 
for convenient use by women. The corporation was willing 
to pay for the Changes, to donate va~uable ideas, and to 
order the especially adapted machines. The loom manu-
facturers refused to make the desired changes, indicating 
that the textile manufacturer could accept the ava:tlalble 
stock looms or not purchase any at all. Af'ter all, these 
looms had been used successf'ully in production for many 
years, having a:.~proveti record in large numbers of mills; 
and nobody else was complaining about them. No changes 
were desired by machine!'y manufacturers. It was also 
true, of course, that at this time machinery manufactur-
ers were experiencing no difficulty in selling their 
entire output and were hence under no pressure to make 
changes to increase sales. The loom manufacturer declined 
to make the requested changes and the textile firm 
finally purchased the stock looms. 
The above-mentioned executives of the textile 
firm looked forward to the termination of' hostilities of 
World War II and eXpected that at this time domestic and 
foreign competition would become increasingly severe. 
In the light of opinions concerning free trade expressed 
by high national-government officials, the executives of 
the corpora~ion felt that foreign competition might be-. 
come very :timportant and that high-cost United States mills 
might have difficulty in competing with low-ctost :r~r·eign 
producers. All of these predictions, expressed so 
:Creely, became realities. 
Walter determined that the corporation should 
marshall plans for the impending post-war p~iod, rather 
than permit itself' to be swept along by the uncertain 
economic currents o:r the future. Accordingly, he :ror.med 
a Post -War· Planning Committee. 
In addition to the president of "bhe corporation 
who ·displayed a keen . interest in the w9rk of the com-
mittee, its permanent members were the previously men-
tioned Evan Urquh~t, Wil:Cred J. Cabana (in charge of 
the spinning plant), Paul Wenzel (in charge of dressing 
d~partment), and James Shute (electrical engineer) •. 
A primary feature .incorporated into ·the· post-war 
plans was the idea that the company" mu~t not merely keep 
u~ to date, but should lead the industry in .~he develop-
ment and use of new technology.in order to improve the 
position o:r the firm. The Post-War Planning Co~ittee 
was an instrument to e.xpedi te inven:tioi;L and impl.ement · 
innovation. 
Post-War Plannfng ••• must o:f course, be 
eertain that our plans keep us well in the 
forefront of' the 1tindustry widett movement 
in the direction of' more or less revolu-
tionary cfanges expected.in our "Post-War" 
industry. · 
To implement the plans of' the Post-War Planning 
Committee, a research program was established in U~r.1dge 
and at the Glenark Mills in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. 
It developed that research within an operating 
textile mill was fraught with human problems. Cabana 
and Urquhart were carrying out their portion of' the re-
search program at the af'orementioned·Glenark Mill. The 
mill workers, who were afraid of losing their jobs 
through technological change, ~pread fabulous rumors 
throughout the plant concerning the effectiveness of 
·the research program, with emphasis upon the number of' 
employees .that would be displaced. 
To avoid an embarrassing and unnecessary labor 
problem, a nearby vacant handkerchief' plant was rented, 
and research was moved out of the Glenark Mill. 
In 1946 Walter consolidated all research into the 
non-operating Rivulet Mill·in Uxbridge (only a short 
drive .from .the main .. plant o:f the company)· which, in 1944, 
had heen handsomely equipped with machine tools and other 
. l~an Urquhart on Post-War Planning, Norwich Inn 
Get-Together!U.e:bridge, Mass.: Uxbridge Worsted Co.,. Ilin:", 
'i944), -Vol. I, p. 40. 
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equipment required for nesearch. The research facilities 
are found on these premises to this date. 
It is worthy of remark at this point that manage-
ment was disturbed, believing that organized labor in the 
mills, even during this prosperous :wan period, was un-
willing to commit itself on its attitude toward new ma-
chinery: 
We are now faced with tremendous post-
war problems Which must be solved if we are 
to remain in business at a profit. New ma-
chinery.will certainly be put to use. This 
means definite change in the present set-up. 
In praetially all instance~ to date the 
union has hedged on new proposals. They feel 
that they would rather keep what they haye 
now than take a chance on something new. 
Finally, we must remember that the taxation prob-
lem during World War II had an effect upon planned in-
novation. Even after the post-war credit was considered, 
when the company paid out one dollar in expense their 
tax bill was reduced by eighty-five cents.-Gactual, not 
estimated). Thus, if the company expended $1,000 for 
research and development, the· government ·bore $850 of 
lAl Otto, Norwich Inn Get-Together,Uxbridge, Mass.: 
Uxbridge Worsted Co., Inc •. ,· 1~), Vol. I, p. 66. .Without 
attempting to evaluate this charge, it is considered im-
portant that this was the belief of management. The 
meeting was not a aounding board for propaganda purposes, 
but a meeting for internal purposes. 
the cost and the company only $1_50. · Unde:r the circum-
stances it was not costing the company much out~o~­
pocket expense to undertake a research program whieh 
mignt have important rami~ications ~or the company in the 
fUture. The Norwich Inn meetings used the above ~igures 
to demonstrate the relatively low risk involved .in: re-
search and development. 
0~ course, these .tax bene~its were equally avail-
able to other firms which did not choose to engage in 
research activities. As explained elsewhere, research 
and development were not a ~unction of' the woolen and 
worsted industries up to this time. Tax inducements . 
did.not cause typical managements to c?naider seriously 
the possible bene~its to be gained from such a program. 
Movement to the South 
Walter, like Bliss o~ Pacific Mills, was one o~ 
the first to move woolen and worsted productive ~acil­
ities to the South, and ~or much the same reasons. 
·walter and Bliss· arrived at the same conclusions, but 
were reasoning ~rom dissimilar data. Bliss had the ad-
vantage of personal observation and-operating data :from 
his existing cotton mills in the South. Walter had no 
such first-hand data. In 'this respect,_ then, we can 
consider that Walter's move .entailed more risk than that 
o_f Bliss. 
Conclusions· 
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that 
~he innovator in this case 1s President Harold J. Walter. 
Like President Bliss, of Pacific Mills, Walter had many 
additional business and co~ity commitments. Within 
their major occupa·tions also, each: proved capable of 
striking out successfullyin several directions at the 
same time. Each president· drastically revised his 
Northern textile operations. Both were also leaders in 
the development of a new Southern woolen and worsted in-
dustry. Both took a aalculat~d .risk in research and de-
velopment, ~sing and making ~vailable to the industry as 
a whole (albeit for selfish reasons) the major .fruitso£ 
·their innovations • 
. Although other leaders in other industries had 
long been using research and development to. generate new 
inventions, for a variety of reasons, other woolen mad 
worsted firms did not follow this procedure. Walter and 
Bliss had the vision to undertake this ri'sk for the 
following reasons: 
· (1) It was correctly anticipated that·both fo~e~ 
and domestic competition would become increasingly severe 
after World War II. These companies wished to red-q.ae . 
their costs by innovation, among other devices, to meet 
the competitive challenge. 
(2) The companies were large compared to typical 
firms in the industry, altho~gh companies equally a~ 
large, or larger, existed. Their sizep·ermitted the 
operation of larger-scale research and the use of products 
of research. 
(3) The tax situation was such that if research 
pr·oved unsuccessful, the government woulii share a large 
part of the cost. If successful the firms might be-
come great.:.post•war gainers~ 
(4) It was possible to enter research a step at 
a time, improving and expanding facilities a step at a 
time, when and if successful.· 
(5) The woolen and worsted industry had not 
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shared the increases in productivity enjoyed by other in-
dustries. It was suspect~d that the m~chanical,electrical, 
chemical, and other sciences were in advance of currentlt 
. used woolen and worsted techniques and equipment. A re-
search program under these conditions might yield rapid 
results. 
(6) New problems involving new materials, the 
chemical fibers, were arising. These pr~blems required 
answers, and neithei> the chemical Iior the machinery in-
dustry had all of the answers. 
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(?) President Walter and President Bliss occupied 
strong, unassailable positions.within their companies. 
They lncurr~d no opposition ~nom controlling_groups with-
in their companies when making the highly novel decisions 
required in the inpovational procedure. 
In short, these two men, for whatever reasons, 
· assumed posi tiona of entrepreneurial le~dership within 
their industry. Some firms followed· this leadership, 
although others, including giant firms, did not. Under 
their capable guidance both Bliss and Walter encouraged 
and utilized a number of inventions, integrating these 
.innovations into their operations smoothly and· success-
tully, and making some of these inventions generally 
available to the· industry• No very serious labo:r- prob-
lem·s or financial problems resulted, and the anticipa te<i 
reducti'ons .. in cost materialized. 
An interesting side.observation might also be 
made .of the highly varied activities of the two entre-
preneu~s under study. 
Maclaurin . indicates that· tt:aarroVm.esstt is a 
·characteristic of many successful entrepreneurs. In our 
present study we discover that.higb.ly successful entr@Q. 
preneurs can be just the opposite of- narrow. Maclaurin 
states of Mattconi in an account of technological inno-
_vatio~ in the radio industry: 
There was a certain· narrowness about 
Marconi which seems to be characteristic 
of many successful entrepreneurs• . His . 
career bears out a conclusion of Benjamin 
Franklin: . "I· have always tho.ught a ~an 
of tolerable abilities may work great 
changes, and accomplish great affairs 
among mankind, if he fir·st forms a good 
plan, and cutting off all amusements or 
other employments that would divert his 
attention, makes the execution-of that 
same plan his sole study and business. ttl 
Th~ well-round~d entrepreneurs of our current 
study were apparently capable of better planning and 
execution than the above-mentioned ttman of tolerable 
abilities," since it was not necessary for either Walter 
or Bliss to make this planning their "sole study and 
business." 
These innovators also provid·e another 'illus-
tration of innovations arising from within the frame-
work of an existing concern, thus varying from the 
analysis provided bl Schumpeter. 
Nevertheless we must conclude ~hat Bliss and 
Walter were entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense, 
. -
possessing in high degree the skills required for 
innovation.-
lw .R. Maclaurin, .2£.•-ill•, P• 98. 
OHAPTER.VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
During the period under study a con~ulting engi-
neer discussing the textil~ industry said: ttTechnically 
it has_fallen behind for a period of fifty to one hundred 
years, depending on how critical you might wish to be.«l 
He stated further that 11no major fundamental changes in 
textile technology have taken place until quite r~cently-­
since the introduction of the Northrup loom .in 1895 ••• 112 
It by ttquite recently" the author of this state-
ment meant until the period since the end of World War II, 
he was correct.. We have seen that the technological 
changes that have occurred in the woolen and worsted in-
dustry in the post-war period are impressive indeed. It 
is no play on words to state that the industry is now in 
the. midst of a technological revolution. 
Many, if"not most, of the changes that have taken 
1Boston Globe, May i, 1953. The speaker was 
Robert M •. Browning of Booz, Allen and Hamilton, famous 
New York management consulting firm. 
2Ibid~ 
place have gone unpublicized. We have heard many state-
ments to the effect that the Northern textile industry is 
obsolete and backward; that its management is tradition..-
bound7 and that it faces a dim future. The·s.e changes can 
easily be substantiated in some cases. We discussed briefly 
the characteristics of the old guard of man,agement in the 
woolen and worsted industryx who have not taken part in 'the 
present revolution. The study reveals, however, that there 
have been some very important innovations, and that most of 
these innovations have taken p'lace within a relatively small 
number of firms. In. studying these innovations we have em-
ployed the approach of Schum.peter and Maclaurin, both of 
whom·emphasized the role of innovation in a dynamic eeonariy. 
Innovation may take many forms. 1 The outatanding 
innovations observed in this study, however, have been 
technological, altering the production process by develop-
ing new machinery and .new processes as well as ~ew. prpducts. · 
Innovations were discussed which arose from the 
textile machinery industry, although the emphasis was upon· 
those which carrie from the woolen and worsted industry as 
·such. Two woolen and worsted manll;.facturers·in particular, 
iJ .A. SehW!lPeter, The Theory of Economic Develo~­
ment, op. cit., p. 66, an~ BUSiness CyCles, op. cit., p.-4. 
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and the few others we have mentioned, initiated the present 
revolution in the woolen and worsted industry. 
Maclaurin in his article concerning technological 
innovation, stated: 
For industries where products or processes. 
are likely to be rendered.obsolete in ten · 
years or even less, a useful theory. of economic 
development will have to fe based on the.dynamics 
of technological advance. . 
In analyzing an industry, therefore, I think 
it important to ask.the following questions: .(a) 
Are major advances occurring in the sciences 
underlying the industry? (b) Is enginee~ing 
art in close touch with and contributing to these 
advances?; (c).Is the economic organization of 
the industry conducive. to innovation?;. (d) Is' 
capital f-reely available for radical new develop-
menta?; (e) Do the en~reprenaura possess the 
requis·i te skills for successful .innovation?2 
In this study we have attempted to·answer these 
questions for the woolen and worsted. indua.try, centering· our 
analysis on ·.the period following World War II, when an im-
portant group of innovations made·mS:r~ed changes in the pro-
duction processes and products-. of the woolen and worsted.in-
dustry. 
1we should not assume because of· Maclaurin 1 s 
emphasis that technological change is the only important 
type of innovation. Innovations of a non-technological 
nature may also be of gre·at impo;rtance. Witness the changes 
in marketing caused by the rise of the-n supermarket'! 
2 W.R. Maclaurin, 212.• cit., P• 91. 
(a) Are Major Advances. Occurring in~ 
.Sciences Underlying~ Industry? 
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· The woolen and worsted industries,. as we know them 
today, · are the culmination of thousands of years of exper-
ience and knowledge, and have been revolutionized many 
times over ?Y new learning in· many branches of hum~ k:now-
led~e. The evolution of the industry includes changes from 
the most pr:Lmitive types of man:ually operated wooden ap-
pliances to the most highly developed modern machinery • 
. These modern machines a~e triumphs of metallurgy as well as 
mechanics. Sources of power ·have· included the physical 
energy of men, women,and children; animals; the direct use 
of water power through· the paddle· wheel and similar devices; 
the steam engine; and finally the use of e~ectricity. Dye-
stuffs have progressed from those provided by nature to 
.those synthesized by chemical means~ Initially applied 
crudely by dipping tb.'e fabrics or yarns into. open vats, 
dyestuffs are now carefully applied to· materials under 
exaet. Chemical and :mechanical contro"l, With precis~ eon-. 
. . 
ditions of temperatUre and pressure. Selective breeding 
and cross-breeding of ·anima1s.,a·s ·well as· vast improvements 
·in transportation, permit_ modern fabricators to .~mploy • 
va~ieties a.tlid blends . of wool unknown to ancients. A host. 
of man-made fibers developed in recent years by the chemieal 
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industry has provided new raw materials forblending with 
wool fibers. 
The varying techniques of production ref.lect, in 
some measure, the scientific progress of mankinq. Although· 
the industry displayed at various times leads and lags. 
compared with other industries, a remarkable number of 
achievements in many apparently unrelated fiel4s of en-
deavor have been incorporated into the methods of the 
·industry. 
Fo~ many years during the pre-World War II period, 
enormous advances had been occu~ in the various ·fields. 
of scientific endeavor. Many industries were the bene-
ficiaries of these advances, but the woolen and worsted 
industry was laggard. During the period under study, how-
ever, the industry rapidly reduced the extent of its 
t·echnolog1cal lag:t employing the advances made in chemistry, 
metallurgy, mechanic~, and electronics. 
(b) Is Engine~ering Art in Close Touch VVtth 
And Contributing to Th~se Advances1 
Most of the innovations. studied in this paper are 
mechanical in type. It .is a matter of importance that 
,. 
skilled professional enginee~s and other. technical person-
nel were ~vailable in various places to develop the ideas 
of the inventors. The author is aware of the abilities and 
facili tie·s available to the research and development 
departments of various textile-machinery manufacturers, and. 
of the important role which they have played in the post-war 
transformation of the woolen and worsted industry. But our 
emphasis at this point must-be on the engineering and other 
technical personnel .f>f the woo.len and worsted manufacturers 
and more particularly of the engineering personnel of a pre-
cision machinery manufacturer who had not,_ up to that time, 
ever manufactured textile machinery at all. · 
President Walter of the Uxbridge Worsted Company, 
Inc., when he was rejected by textile-machinery·manufactur-
ers with his plan,,. for a pin-drafter, was ref~rred by the 
firm's economic ~dvisor (A.W. Zelamek) to the Warner and 
Swasey Company. The pin-drafter was .Little more than an 
idea at the time, the initial models being adapted from a 
siik process, being almost entirely different from the 
finally adopted method. 
Warner and Swasey sent a ~ighly sk~lled machinery 
. -. 
eng1:neer to evaluate the idea. He was impressed. His 
company assigned him to remain on the premises of the 
worsted manufacturer and·work with the engineering and 
other technical personnel of the t.extile firm. Over a 
period of time there was a definite exchanging of skills 
and ideas between the machinery expert who knew little 
about the~;Wool:en and worsted industry and the textile 
company personnel who knew comparatively little about 
preaision.machinery design. After an initial period of 
unsuccessful experimentation with a rot'ary model, there 
finally resulted a highly successful flat~head model 
pin-drafter. 
It does not appear likely that the pin-drafter 
would have been at all successful without the i.nter-industry 
cooperation described. The Warner and Swa~ey Oompany was 
totally unfamiliar with. the requirements ·of the woolen and 
worsted industry. The woolen and worsted pers.onnel, on the 
other hand, were not as tramiliar with the technicalities 
and problems involved in the creation of successful oper-
ating machinery. This inter-industry cooperation was 
essential because each needed the other. Such cooperation 
would not have been a matter of such great importance had 
the machine beer.i. developed by a textile-machinery: manu-
facturer who would have been much more familiar with the 
manufacturing problems of the woolen and worsted industry. 
The {ibove-mentioned Warner and Swasey Company be-
came involved in the development and production of the 
weaving machine and the Pacific converter, as well as the 
' pin-drafter. All of these machines were important in the 
post-war· years. 
The case study of the Saco~Lowell-Gwaltney Spin-
ning .Frame illustrated the course of an innovation invented 
and developed entirely within the organization of a· 
machinery manufacturer. No outside: engineering was re-
quired since the firm reta~ned its own staff o:f highly 
trained engineering specialists. 
The Bird system o"f Collins and Aikman Corporation 
was invented by Whitworth F. Bird, himsel:f an engineer. 
Bird had initially worked with the above-mentioned Gwaltney 
o:f the Saco-Lowell Shops. When they separated, each man 
struck out separately to solve .the problem and each hide-
pendently -arrived at a dif:ferent solution to his problem. 
Gwaltney backed up his ideas with a highly skilled, tech-
nically trained research department of about one hundred 
persons. Bird, on the other h~nd, in an.attemptto keep 
his development-work a secret, concealed his shop in the 
non-textile area of Brooklyn, New York, 'and hired no 
personnel who had any connections.Whatever with the tex-
tile industry. The Saco..:.Lowell She.ps were retained to 
actually manufacture machinery out of models provided by 
this group. 
Case studies were also made of two promising in-
.. 
ventions that failed.- In both cases _the inventor was pro-: 
vided wit~ money and facilities, but in both cases the in-
ve.ntion was finally dropped. Actual working models of 
these machines -were made, and they would do more or less 
what they were supposed to do:. In.the. opinion o:f the 
author, a principal cause :for-their failure was the :failure 
2}-7 
to employ professional engineering skill to develop the 
machines for actual use in the mill~ 
Prior to World War II development of textile-
machinery inventions was carried on by textile-machinery 
manufacturing eompan~es. These companies tended to be 
strongly conservative and did. not·strongly support re-
search and development. An e~ception to this remark must 
be made in the ease of.long-draft roving and spinning. 
Research and development hav·e become increasingly 
important for textile-machinery manufacturers over the 
. . 
past twenty years, yet in 1944 expenditures ror the indus-
try were less than one..,-million dollars, or about one-halr 
of one percent of annual ·sales. In 1960 it is anticipated 
that the industry will have spent seven million dollars for 
research and development, almost 3~% of the value or annual 
sales, ev1den.cing a change in the attitude of maehihery 
manufacturers. 
It seems likely that the lead in new ideas, which 
. . 
was· temporarily surrendered t-o the woolen and worsted in-
dustry, will once again be regained by the textile machinery 
industry. 
(c) Is the Economic Organization of the 
Industry C1onducive to Innovation? 
· The woolen and worsted industry consists of a 
l~rge number of firms, the majority of which are small, 
but includes substantial numbers of large firms. The 
maier irmev.ati-ons have arisen out of large, but not the 
largest firms. Small firms have made no contributions of 
importance. No new firms came into existence to exploit 
an innovation. Successful innovations in larger firms 
. resulted from entrepreneurs who sought profit-making 
opportunities •. 
Although size is apparently a -matter of importance, 
the then largest firm in the indus~ry, the American Woolen 
Company, and a number of other large concerns showed no 
interest in research and development, nor produced any 
innovations. Large size merely makes it 'QOSsible for firms 
to conduct researc~ programs which might ultimately result 
in innovation. Whether they do so or not is another 
matter entirely. 
(d~ Is Capital·Freely Available 
For Radical .New Developments? 
All of the major innovations in the woolen and 
worsted industry were fostered and developed by existing 
firms. In no case was it neoess.ary for a new fir:m to come 
into existence to exploit the opportunity presented. 
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In each case under discussion the inventor of the 
device ma~e some sort of arrangement with the entrepreneur 
in a large existing·corporation. The entrepreneur then 
financed t;he innovation without recou.r se to capital markets 
for either equity capital or long--term indebtedness. It 
should not be suppose·d that later mergers and consolidations 
involving innovating corporations.were directly connected 
with the need for financing these innovations. 
Not all firms, nor even a large number of firms in 
the conservative woolen and worsted industry were capable 
of.or willing to provide capital for ventures involving· 
riew ideas. The largest number of firms was simp;J..y too 
small to be effective in raising the large sums of money re-
quired for research, development, and marketing these new 
ideas. 
Most larger firms, the American Woolen Company 
being an extreme case in point, were not interested in or 
aware of the impact that new production methods were to have 
on the.industry. In the case.of larger firms which did not 
contribut-e to th~ flow of innovations, the limiting factor 
was not capital, but entrepreneurship. It is entirely pos-
sible that inventive·men in smaller firms, encouraged.by 
the recent successes of larger firms, might.attempt to 
transform their ideas into reality. If this should· o_ccur · 
· in the future, then other techniques r·equiring inter-firm 
2q.D 
cooperation or the raising of new capital might be required·~ 
~ Do Entrepreneurs Possess ~ 
Requisite Skills for ~uccessful Innovation? 
The leading innovating woolen and worsted firms in 
the period under study were Pacific Mills, Inc., and the 
Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted Corporation. The flow of in-
novations from these firms has been con~iderable. Pacific 
Mills and the·Bachmann-Uxbridge Worsted Corporation fol-
lowed courses different from those set by other firms. No 
special economic reason existed·for these two firms not 
following the paths that other large firms·had set. But 
two men, one in each of the respective companies~ b e~ieved 
in and followed the management technique of addressing pro-
duction problems· _to solutions by sciE?ntific· ~ethods, care-
fully studying the conclusions disclosed by these methods 
and putting· them into effect. where study revealed them to 
be practical. 
There is evidence to support the proposition that 
i.f these men had been as·soeia ted in similar capaei ties, 
.. 
under the same conditions, in industries other than in the 
woolen and worsted industry, th.at their leadership would 
have nevertheless resulted in innovation. 
The foregoing remarks imply that qualities ·for 
subeessful entrepreneurship may naturally be pre.sent in, 
' .. 
or may be cultivated in an individual, and that successful 
entrepreneurship is not the result of mere chance or cir-
cumstances of position. 
Under the guidance of the skillful management of 
Henry M. Bliss, many changes were made in Pacific Mills. 
Innovation in the Schumpeterian sense was only one of many 
types of changes. 
· The basic management philosophy of the company was 
changed •. I·t is well ¥nown, and substantiated by the com-
pany's reports·, that preceding managements had enga'ged in 
speculation in raw.materials. President Bliss was dete~­
mined to earn manufacturing profits through'efficient bus-
iness operation rather than speculative profits. 
Under his guidance· the mills were improved in 
many ways: inefficient mills were alosed and modern equip~ 
ment was provided for the remaining mills; .new factories, 
built and operated at lower costs than were possible in the 
North, were constructed in the South; new techniques of in-
. ventory c·ontrol and quality control were employed, and a 
successful research department developed new types. of· ma-
.chinery, improved old machines, developed practical new 
fabric blends, developed new chemical techniques, and im~ 
proved quality control devices. 
Although Biiss himself was not an inventor, he 
encouraged and suppor_ted within his own .firm invention, 
research, and development. 
An interesting observation derived from the st~dy 
of Pacific Mills is that there is little evidence o.f sue• 
cess.ful innovation either before or a.fter the period when 
_Bliss was president of the firm. But when Bliss le.ft 
Pacific M-ills to assume the presidency o.f another . .firm in 
a different industry_, he once again used as a management 
device the tec.hniques o.f research, development, and inno..:.. 
vation. 
The innovator in the Bachmann-Uxbridge concern was 
Harolq J. Walter, president and t-reasurer.· Walter, like 
Bliss,- had many community and business activities outside 
his-principal occupation. Within their major occupations 
each proved capable of strikingout in several directions 
·, 
. at t.he same time •. 
Each president drastically revised his Northern 
. . 
operations; both were leaders· in the establishment o.f a. new 
. . 
Southern woolen and worsted indus.try; both made available to 
the industry as a whole their major inno.v'ations:. 
Although it is true that· research and ·development 
was ·not a new idea in 'other industries, _it was virtually 
·unknown in the woolen and worsted i~dust~ies until estab-
lished by Bliss and Walter. 
Conclusions 
The study of entrepreneurial.behavior in the woolen 
and worsted industry has revealed no reasonable new hypothe-
sis concerning the timing of innovation which is capable of 
simple. applicat·ion. · Nor does· it provide, support for exist- . 
ing theories of innovation in the business cycle. The 
woolen and worsted industries must be viewed as a special 
case, where innovation is studied against the background of 
the existing scene. 
In any such study of an industry, there .is a temp-
tation to generalize from fragmentary data, attempting to 
discover an increase or. decre.ase in the number of innova-
tions over the various phases of. the business ·cycle. Such 
generalizations may· lead to false conclusions.· There is no 
logical necessity under Schumpeterlan theory for innovation 
to appear in- all industri'es simultaneously. Clustering of 
innovations, as described in the Schumpeterian Pure Model, 
might be limited to one industry, a handful or a large num-
ber of industries. But it shoulSI not· be expected that each 
industry would provide confirmation or the theory over each 
business cycle. 
The woolen and worsted industry evidenced little 
change over an extended period pr~ceding World War II. This 
w~s followed by a period which produced ·a large number of 
.. 
innovations which, in total, had a great effect upon the 
industry. 
This study reveals how long-overdue innovations and 
those innovations required to sa.tis:fy new needs could 
scarcel-r qe repressed.· Just as water level tends to seek 
its own height, the level of' technology in the woolen and 
worsted industry attempted suddenly to equal that ?f other 
textile industries and technology as a whole. Machinery 
manufacturers who. normally determined the characte~ o:r tex-
tile equipment had developed new machinery for other tex- · · 
tiles_, but had been retic~nt about making changes in woolen 
and worsted equipment. This was _true in spite of the fact 
that many leading textile-machinery manufacturers equipment 
for more than one textile indust~y. 
Deep-rootec;i conservatism and other factors combined 
to prevent most woolen. and worsted textile m~nufacturers· 
from engaging in inventive activities •. Even those firma 
which were large and profitable enough to af'forg the risk 
did not generally d0 so. But in a free capitalist society 
there are often f'ound men Who thin!! and do. thi.ngs different-
ly •. These innovators in the woolen and wopsted industry 
seized the opportunities ·presented and turned them to their 
own ad-va.ntage. 
New firms did not rise to take advantage of the 
technological gap, although entry into the industry was easy. 
Existing textile machinery was already so highly developed 
that additional improvement required .expensive engineers 
and specialists not normally retained by tex.tile .firms, 
'l'he parallel timing of these innovations with 
prosperity .for business as a whole, as well as .for the 
woolen and worsted industry, di.f.fers with, but does not 
destroy the Schumpeterian Pure Model in the sli.ghtest de-
gree. Thi~ theoretical model assumes,·among other things, 
that cyc·le.-producing innovations are generated. by new men 
in new .firms under conditions o.f competitive capitalism, 
and does not pretend to describe the appearance of inno-
vation under conditions o.f·."Trusti.fied Capitalism.tt 
It is in this area, particuiarly, that this author 
' 
.followed Schumpeter 1 s advice that his work be considered 
n ••• as a motivated program .for .further research~" 1 
Careful study o.f entrepreneuiLial behavior revealed 
no instances whatever o.f new men in· new~ .firms fntroducing 
innovati~ns, however sligh:·t, into the woolen and worsted 
industry. Although ther.e is freedom. of' entry into the in-
dustry, primarily because only a moderate investment is 
required, new firms merely copi~d the techniques of existing 
.firms. 
1 J.A .. Schumpet~r, Business Cycles, op. cit., 
Preface p. v. 
The industry had become hi~ly developed during an 
earlier period in its history, operating under the factory 
system, using machinery, and producing an exeellent final 
product. The early flow of innovations· eventually slowed 
and almost stopped altogether. That this problem is not 
unique is pointed out by Schmookler's statement: UJust why 
invention slackened in most of the emp'iri'cal fields is a 
problem. The lode of invention in any field, scientific 
or empirical, generally runs out-after a time.ul It must 
be observed, however, that this statement can hold true 
only in a given state of scientific and technological. 
development. As these horizons broaden, important in-. 
ventions may once again appear. 
·As indicated earlier, for a very long period up to 
the time of this study machinery manufacturers were respon-
sible for the introduction of new equipment in the textile 
industry. Woolen and worsted textile manufacturers con-
tributed no significant changes to production techniques 
and methods, which became highly standardized through the 
accumulation of lore and tradition in this conservative 
lJacob Schmookler, "Technological Progress and 
the Modern American Corporation,n The Corporation in 
Modern Society, Edward s. Mason, e~(Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1959), ~. 
industry. Faced with highly volatile ~rices for their ~x­
pensive raw material, these manufacturers were preoccupied 
with price changes rather than with im~rovements in manu-
facturin.g efficiency. They were conteljlt to operate .fac-
tories with old machinery. Technical ~evelopments were not 
aggressively sought. There appeared t6 be a de£inite con-
r. 
nection between stability of .fiber pri~es and. manufacturing 
efficiency. In textile industries ' wh~re fiber prices were 
r 
stable manufacturers became highly efficient, anticipati.ng 
I 
manufacturing profits.. Where fiber pr~ces were unstable, 
as ·in wool, manufacturers were les~ efficient, since slight 
I . 
I 
I 
other textile industries where manufacturing efficiencies 
! 
were considered to be of greater importan~e.. Cotton and 
rayon machinery, for example, became mdch improved. Indeed, 
as we have seen, the Saco-Lowell Shops, a major prod1:1cer, 
terminated the manufacture of woolen and worsted machinery 
altogether,· concentrating its ehtire output upon machinery 
for other textiles. This firm did not :return to the 
I 
I 
manufactUre of woolen and worsted equipment until the wave 
of innovation of our study. At this time the Saco-Lowell 
Shops adapted highly efficient co.tton machinery for· use in 
the woolen and worsted industry, an important innova.tion. 
We have indicated that a technological reason for 
the post-war surge of innovation was that the woolen and 
worsted industry had fallen behind other industries, and 
was ~eady for a period of catching up.. This also helps to 
explain the cluster of innovations during the post-war 
period. When the woolen and worsted industry became ready 
to innovate there were many areas where technical change's 
wer~ poss1ble and desirable. . . Improvements occurred rapidly 
and. ~ere of .a far-reaching nature. Often one improvement 
po;tnted logically to another, accelerating the rate of 
change. 
When the time was ripe~ for innovation great mechan-
ical improvements which had occurred in other textile in-
dustries were adapted to woolens and worsteds. Improve-
ments in. metals made possible the. use of torsion ba_r:;i, 
cutters which were highly resi~tant to abrasion, and very 
high~speed oper.ation of equipment.·· These factors .made it 
possible not merely to speed up exi.sting types of machinery, 
which would have itself been an innovation, -but to develop 
·important new basic types of machinery which drastically 
altered production methods. 
Another factor encouraging technological improvement 
and change in met~ods of production was the use of new 
fiber raw materials. ·synthetic fibers presented great pos-
sibilities for blending with wool. It was expected that 
blends could reduce. the cost of the Tabric and that ·desir-
able qualities might be built into the finished product. 
But becau·se of differing physic.al characteristics these 
fibers could not be processed satisfactorily on existing 
equipment. New machinery had to be developed to handle 
these new fibers. These new machines proved to be highly 
adaptable; not merely making it p·os.sible to utilize these 
new fibers, but also making it more efficient to process 
wool .fibers. 
Unlike wool which suffers from highly volatile 
prices, the prices of man..;m~de fibers are relatively · 
stable. This means that the average raw-material pr~ce 
fluctuation.for wool-synthetic blends is less than that~ 
for all-wool material. This great~r stability i~ the 
average cost of raw materi.al may have important effect-s-
upon the future ·rate of innovation and upon the replace-
ment of' inefficient machinery. Manufacturers will find 
it increasingly ne_cessary to rely on manufacturing,rather 
than spee-uls.t.i~e; .. · .- profits. 
World War II produced a climate favoring_research 
and development. These expenditures could be charged 
against high profits~ against which high tax rates applied. 
The prosp.ect of successful research and development w~igh:ed 
more favorably in the balance since~ in effect~ the govern-. 
ment was bearing a substantial part of the costs (by a re-
duction in the tax bill of the corporation). Nevertheless, 
research and development did not become popular among tex-
tile firms. Although research and development were not 
novel ideas, they were an innovation in the woolen and 
woPs.ted ·industry. These firms were content to let the 
machinery companies generate technolog~cal improvement. 
But two textile companies in particular, the Bachmann-
U.x:bridge Worsted firm,· and Pacific· Mills., be caine important 
innovators, using inventions produced by the organized 
.research departments of the respective concerns. 
They became interested in research for all of the · 
previously mentioned reasons and also because of the fear 
of post-war domestic and foreigil competition. These firms 
decided to concentrate on manufacturing profits~ relying 
on inventory controls to minimize speculative profits and 
losses. 
It is of interest that these successful resear.ch 
and development programs were not imitated in other woolen 
and worsted firms. But they resulted directly in t~e 
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introduction of a new textile-machinery company, the 
Warne~.and Swasey Company, and a great increase in research 
and development activity of existing ~-textile-machinery 
firms. If the present quantity of research and_development 
activity is an indication of the number of future inventions, 
~ 
then the bulk of inventions. will once again be concentrated 
in the machinery· companies. The emergenc·e of research a:d.d 
development activity in textile firms appears to be a 
special case, possibly a temporary case. 
Leading innovators· in the woolen and worsted industry 
pointed·out that a major reason for developing their own 
technological ideas was that textile-machinery manufacturers 
at that time were unwilling to do so. Whe~ undertaking 
their own research programs, however, they came upon resis-
tances which were eventually overcome. 
Bac~mann-Uxbridge_employees, for example, f:eared un-
employment and spread rumors of probable unemployment 
(which they thought would re'sult from research activity). 
Pacific Mills discovered that foremen and workmen in certain 
Northern plants did not take Jtindly to new techniques and 
refUs~d to make them function effectively. But these prob-
lems and others proved transient. 
· Financing research, d~velopment, and resulting 
inventions· by larger woblen and worsted firms was 
accomplished·internally, rather than by borrowing. Bank 
loans were not required. Neither were special issues of 
securities sold to meet such financial needs. Research and 
development was costly, yet it was only a mmall percentage 
of total sales receipts and easily manageable. All major 
inventions which resulted were made available to the woolen 
and worsted indus.try as a whole, and with few exceptions, 
costs of manufacture and distribution were borne by other 
firms. 
An interesting chapter in the history of the industry 
has been revealed, which is not likely to be repeated. Cer-
tain woolen .and worsted firms were dissatisfied with the 
. ' 
rate of progress and seized temporary technological leader-
ship from machinery manufacturers. Our economy provided 
this tempo:oary alternative means of technological achieve-
ment through large·ttTrustified Capitalist" woolen and wor-
sted firms. A new important textile-machinery firm was 
introduced. Existing machinery manufacturers increased 
research and development expenditures and were successful 
in inventing important new machinery. This wave of inno-
vation has not yet ended. The combined effect of all. these 
innovations has been to create a major technological revo ... 
lution in the long~conservative woolen and worsted industry. 
*** 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 
DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR MECHANICAL INVENTIONS 
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The purpose of this appendix is to provide the 
reader with additional information concerning· the physical 
and operating characteristics of the Pacific converter, 
the Sulzer weaving machine and the pin-drafter, the most 
important technological innovations studied in this work. 
The Pacific Converter-
The Warner and Swasey - Pacific Converter is 
pictured in Figure· 1. The machine is simple in appearance, 
and it'is iilust~ated here to show the general details of 
its construction. Compared to most of the older equipment 
seen in woolen and worsted mills, it is a fine-looking 
piece of equipment which is a tribute to its manufacturer, 
the Warner and Swasey Company. It is difficult to ·tell 
anything about the operation by simply looking at .a picture, 
however, so in Diagram 1 we have an iJ,.lustration of the 
operation of the machine. We will now explain these oper-
ations in greater detail, and the individual steps in the 
operation of the converter are illustrated diagramatically 
1 in Diagram 2. 
lThe author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of 
the Warner and Swasey Company in providing me with these 
illustrations as -well as various technical details about 
fhe machines discussed here. 
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Diagram l 
OPER.(I'ION OF 
THE WARNlil\ AND SWASEY - PACIFIC CONVERI'ER 
Socrcea Warner a.nd Swasey Compa.n;y, Textile l4achinery Division 
1\) 
\J"l 
\J1 
Diagram 2 
INDIVIDUAL STBIPS IN THE OPliRXl' ION OJ' THE CONVliRTB:R 
CUTTING 
POSITIVE NIP 
DIAGONAL ROLL 
(FORMS SLIVER) 
DE-BONDING 
SHUFFLING 
CRIMPING 
Sourcel Warner and Sw&ee;r Comp&n1, Textile Machinery Divi~on 
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One important feature of the new machine, as is 
true of other new developments in textile machinery in the 
post-war period, is that it is an independent unit with a 
built-in motor. The days of driving machines from an 
overhead shaft are a thing of the past, although many 
woolen and worsted mills in the Nort~ are. still cluttered 
up with the belts and shafts of such a system. The fact 
that the converter is a complete unit facilitates placing 
it in the proper place to ob-pain the b.est process flow in 
the mill. 
We will describe the operation of the convereter as 
it is fed the continuous syp.thetic ntowtt and carry through 
to the final stage where the tow is finally co'nverted into 
cut staple .ready for further processing. 
In step 1 of Diagram 2 we see the tow being fed into 
the machine. A driven, high-angle helix multiple-blade 
cutter, which rotates against a revolving anviL, cuts the 
continuous fiber into the desired l·ength. If fiber lengths 
at three inches are desired, for example, the machine is 
set so that all of the continuous fiber is cut into staple 
with each individual fiber three inches in length. On the 
· o.ther hand, there are occasions when .fibers of variable 
lengths are required, and the machine can ·be set to cut 
some fibers of three inches, some of four, and some of six, 
. for example. 
Step 2 is called "de-bonding. n Here. the cut sheet 
passes between two sets of fluted rolls in order to flex 
the fibers and separate the individual ends of fibers 
after cutting. 
There are three sets of 11nip rolls" separated by 
two shuffling sectors, as· can be seen from Diagram 1. The 
n.iP rolls and shuffling sectors in combination draft the 
fibers (i.e., attentuate them) and extend them lengthwise 
in order to form a thinner sheet. This is done, inciden-
tally, without strain on the fibers themselves; the action 
is a firm but gentle one. These two operations are illus-
trated in steps 3 and 4 of Diagram 2. Step 5 illustrates 
the way in which the staple, passing between fluted rolls 
and a leather apron, is subjected to a serpentine action. 
The upper fibers of the sheet are moved more rapidly than 
the lower fibers; this produces further fiber separation. 
The cut sheet as it emerges from the third nip (or draft) 
roll section is lifted from the apron and rolled diagonally 
(as illustrated in step 5, Diagram 2), and this forms a 
continuous sliver of staple fiber. Finally, as shown in 
step 6, the sliver is passed through crimping rolls at the 
delivery end of the apron. 'Ji!he purpose of. crimping is to 
impart further strength to the ~' and to facili~ate 
removal from the can for further processing. · It is also 
this quality which permits the cut synthetic staple to be 
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blended with wool which is ncrimped" or serrated by nature. 
The blending attachment (which is optional in the 
purchase of' the machine) may be one of' two types. The· 
f'irst, which is attached in the upper position (in Figure 
1 this is the box with.the roughly heart-shaped casing on 
one side), breaks the natural f'ibers to .the.maximu.m length 
desired -- within a range of' three to six incheas -:-- and 
f'eeds these f'ibers in on top of' the sheet w~thout cutting 
them. If' the blending attachment is in the lower position 
. 
(not illustrated here), it f'eeds the natural f'iber sheet . 
on top of' the continuous (syn~hetic) f'iber sheet, and both 
f'ibers are cut in the operation described above. 
It is easy to see how, with this arrangement, the 
natural wool fiber and the synthetic fiber· can be blended 
in just the proportions desired. Experimentation will tell 
the cloth designers what blend of synthetic and natural 
.fiber they want. The guesswork; as far as blending 
is concerned, is then e~iminated by the converter. It is 
easy to control the amounts of' the two kinds of' fibers 
entering the mac~ine so that o·f a given pound of the 
blended fibers there will be controlled amounts of the 
natural and tl;;is synthet·ic. This is especially important 
during the ~esent ·experimental. stage of blending various 
synthetic f'ibers with natural fibers, as well as ba.ending 
dif'ferent kinds of synthetics together, or even blending 
·' 
these blends with the natural fibers. If it were neces-
sary for the textile technicians to rely upon the hit-or-
miss methods characteristic. of the past, and still char-
acteristic of many of the older mills, it is doubtful 
that they could properly control their experiments to 
achieve the f'abrics de.sired. Using the converter they 
can do this, and futhermore, once the desired blend has 
been found it can be controlled in the future production 
of yarn for the fabric. 
The Sulzer Weaving Machine 
Before turning to a description and .discussion of. 
the revolutionary new Suizer weaving machine, we should 
describe the kind of machine primarily in use today for 
purposes of contrast. The most widely used loom is the 
Crompton and Knowles. In 1937 the Crompton and Knowles 
Loom Works supplied more than ninety percent of all looms 
used in the manufacture of woolens and worsteds in this 
. 1 
country. 
In support of the position taken earlier in this 
thesis that the woolen and worsted industry has failed to 
·mod·ernize its equipment in the past we may cite some 
figures taken from the bulletin publisped by the South 
1An Opportunity for the Woolen and Worsted 
Industry in South Carolina, So~th Carolina State 
Planning Board Bulletin Number 10., 1942, p. 25. 
. . 
Carolina State Planning Board; these f'igures are based 
upon estimates made by the Crompton and Knowles Company at 
the request of the planning board. In 1942, it was esti-
mated that forty-two percent of all Crompton and Knowles 
looms in place were ~ than thirty years old, while only 
twenty-nine percent were ·less than fif'teen years old. The 
remainder ranged in between. 1 Availabie evidence indicates 
increasi.ng superannuation during the World Wa~ II period. 
While the Crompton and Knowles loo.m is generally regarded 
as a good· one; and while there have been improvements in 
it over the years, the fUndamental design has remained un-
changed since it was first invented. 
In Figure 2 we have a picture of'.a Crompton and 
Knowles loom. This is the kind of loom one will see most 
of'ten even today when· touring a t'ypica.l Northern·.·woolen or 
. . 
worsted mill. It is an automa~ic loom, which means that 
the bobbic:s o"P filler yarn are placed dm a magazine 1 and· as 
one bobbin is exhausted, another is automatically placed 
in position in the shuttle and the empty bobbin is ejected. 
The loom operates as follows: The warp (length-
wise) yarn ·is wound on a large beam Which is placed at the 
t back of the loom. The warp ~breads are then passed over· 
·the 1oom and fastened to the receiving beam at the f'ront 
'It ,. 
Figure 2 
Crompton and Knowlea Loom 
w Looa 
Souroe: Crompton and Knowlea Leoa Worka 
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end. Alternate strands of the yarn are·then drawn through. 
nheddle wires" which alternately raise and lower_them so 
that the shuttle carrying the filler ya~n can pass back 
and forth to make the woven cloth. After each trip of 
the shuttle the .filler yarn·is battened-into place by a 
reed which resembles a pocket comb in appearance. The 
shuttle is driven back and forth by a hammer-like 
arrangement which send.s it on its .flight across the 
loom, trailing the filler yarn behind. Only one shuttle 
is used at a time, i.e., it is driven back and .forth 
across the loom until the yarn it contains is used up. 
As we have noted, the maximum number of trips the ·shuttle 
can make across the loom on the Crompton arid Knowles loom 
is 135 trips (picks) per minute. 
The principle of the Sulzer weaving machine is en-
tirely new. First, the shuttle used does not con.tain the 
.filler yarn. Rather, the yarn is placed on the loom on 
the spool o:r npackage" onto which it is wound on the spin-
ning .frame. The Sulze:t> .machine does not use one shuttle 
at a time; instead there is an entire battery of shuttles, 
and each is not driven across the loom (between the al-
ternately raised and lowered strands o.f warp ya_rn) but is 
uflippedn across by an automatic a:rm.. 
Before the shuttle is sent across the loom, however, 
it is raised from the shuttle conveyor with -its ngripping 
fingersu open. Before it is placed in .fir'ing position, 
the fingers close over the yarn which it is to carry 
across the loom. The shuttle is then ready to carry a 
length of filler yarn between the warp yarns. The package 
of filler yarn is controlled by a tension arm which re-
leases the package until the proper length of yarn is un-
rolled; then it stops the package from turning and the 
filler yarn is cut. At the end of its trip the shuttle 
releases the filler yarn, and it is then dropped into the 
shuttle conveyor and carried back across the loom under 
the warp threads. This motion, i.e., a one-directional 
trip for the shuttle, and the ttrevolvingtt of the empty 
shuttles back across the loom is what has led to the name 
of the nrotary loomn in some discussions of this inno-
vation. 
This is the basic difference between the Sulzer 
machine and the old conventional loom. The Sulzer uses 
a much smaller shuttle (s~nce it does not have to contain 
yarn) which can be snapped across the· loom at much faster 
speeds than the older-type shuttle. To highlight these 
differences we show a picture of the conventional and 
the Sulzer shutt"Ies in Figure 3· In Diagram 3, the prin-
ciples discussed above are illustrated. Diagram 3-a 
shows the ·pr·ocess we have described, and Diagram 3-b 
shows the difference between the conventional and the new 
methods of inserting filler yarn between the alternately 
Figure 3 
COMPARISON OF StJI...ZEF. AND CONVImtriONAL SHurTLES 
So'Jrcel Narner a.nd Swasey Com r:any, Textile Machinery Division 
Here is a dramatic comparison 
between the conventional and the 
new method of inserting filling. The 
wooden shuttle carrying little yam 
which must be replenished frequently 
weighs almost two pounds the 
new shuttle carries no yam, but 
draws from a continuous supply. 
f\) 
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Di agrc.m 3 
OPBl\AT ION OF THE SULZER SHtJI'TLlll 
StJLZ.JrR MBITHOD 
UMn, the new princiiJJe. the fillln« ia 
puDea directly from a larl'l stationary 
paeka~ F"aDin1 ia then eut. alld it1 
eod1 ntber tuek<ed into the edl'l or 
hound by · twiltiDI• to form the 
ICI.ap. 
CONVENTION AL ~HOD 
• 
A~ci~nt, b_ut sti l~ universal W<'aving 
prmc1ple m wh1ch each filling is 
mserted by a heavy bobbin-carryin 
shuttle that movf's hack and fortf 
across the machine. 
Sourcea We.rn.er and Swasey Company, Textile Uaehinery Division 
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raised and lowered strands of warp yarn. 
This revolutionary method of weaving cloth co~­
pletely eliminates four steps that were followed in the 
old me tho d. These ar·e: bobbin winding (instead_,· .the 
package ·ot: yarn is taken directly from the spinni.ng frame 
to the weaving machine); bobbin stripping, i·.e., cleaning 
the bobbins before their re-use; bobbin inspection; and 
bobbin storage. Since the filler yarn is .taken direc~ly 
from the spinning frame to the loom, all of these costly. 
operations are done away with on the Sulzer weaving ma-
chine. 
In addition, -the use of the Sulzer machine reduces 
the amount of intra-plant transportation, and it reduces 
the cost of holding a substantial amount of-yarn inven-
tory. The· correct.· combination of ·spinning frames and 
weaving machines will result in continuous operations wit~ 
out the need for a storeroom full of yarn to be wound on 
bobbins. Only a·relatively small amount of inventory is 
required. The amount of handling of the filler yarn is 
sharply reduced. Even.on the automatic Crompton and 
Knowles loom it is necessary t9 fill the bobb~n magazine 
by hand; each bobbin can.contain a relativ~ly small amount 
of yarn since the bobbin fits in~ide the shuttle, and the· 
size of_the latter is restricted by the fact that it must 
be small enough to be ;driven between the warp yarns as they 
are alternately raised and lowered. The speed of operation 
is also limited since it must not be so fast that· as an 
empty bobbin is ejected from the shuttle and a new (full) 
one is inserted it will foul the yarn. All this is a 
thing of the past when the Sulzer weaving machine is 
installed. As was pointed out in Chapter IV, the speed of 
weaving has been increased t6 2~0 picks per minute (ori the 
110n machine), and up to 24-0 picks per minute on the 80" 
machine. 
Another important feature of the new machine is 
that more than one width of cloth can be woven on it at a 
time. Intermediate selvage units (i.e., devices to pack 
in the end of the filler yarn so that it will not ravel) 
can be installed, and up to three widths of cloth can be 
woven at one time. On the. 110" machine, for example, it 
would be possible to weave a single fabric of this width, 
or three separate fabt>ics of 3511 each. 
In F'igure.4 the Sulzer loom is p'ictured in both a 
front and a· bt:lck" vi~w. . The front· view shows a single 
width of fabric being woven; the back view shows two widths 
of cloth being wo·ven. 
The major mechanical innovation on the Sulzer ma-
chine is the npicking lavern which hurls the shuttle across 
the loom. On the Crompton and Knowles, and other earlier 
models, the heavy shuttle was knocked through the warp 
• 
F1g1lt'• 4 
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( rront and baCk view a) 
Source• WoTU~r ""d &wOLseY CompanY, Toxtil.• llaehin•TY DivisiOn 
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threads in much the manner of a baseball being struck by 
.a bat. On the Sulzer machine the shuttles are propelled 
.by a very short picking lever, compared .to earlier models. 
Energy to propel the shuttle is built up in the lever by 
twisting a torsion rod through cam action and locking it 
in the loaded position. The picking leve~ is locked in. 
position up to four times a second, and the driving force 
released When the torsion ·rod is freed to snap the picking 
lever foJ?ward. 
The width a~d weight of the filler yarn will vary 
from fabric to fabric, and this means·that the driving 
force beh~nd the picking lever must be variable. The 
. 1 
variability of drive .is obtained by adjusting torsion. 
The torsion rod extends through the front of the machine 
where there is an ad jus table head. 'The amount of to·rsion 
varies from 0 to 35 degrees to provide the correct driving 
force for each of a wide variety of fabrics. 
Users of the Sulzer weaving machine have been uni-
formly enthusiastic. Among other things it operates 
quietly. An observer entering the weaving room of·a mill 
equipped with conventional lo.oms' is startled by ·the 
.
1By "torsionn we mean twisting, i.e., the act of 
turning or twisting the torsion rod by a lateral force 
about the longitudinal axis as another force operates to 
pull it in the other direction. 
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terrific noise c.~used by the picking levers striking the 
shuttles. Since the operation of· the Sulzer is entirely 
mechanical, this loud noise is missing. Although so far 
the machine can be used on relatively plain (not fancy) 
fabrics only, in the production of these its record has 
. been outstandingly gobd. Warner and Swasey, with their 
usual outstanding performance, have made this another 
precision textile machine. By careful machining they 
have enabled the setting of warp-yarn tension more uni-
formly, and this has reduced the incidence of l-oom· stops 
due to yarn breakage. Mending costs are reduced when 
yarri breakage declines, so that in this sense, too, the 
machine has been a cost-saver. Since there is no filling 
. . 
waste, as there always was with the old bobbin-shuttle 
combination, anot]+er item. of cost is eut; and finaliy,. 
weavers have tended many more Sulzer weaving machines . 
than they typically tended when they operated the con-
ventional looms •. Perhaps the· more widespread adoption 
of the Sulzer weaving machine will do much to solve the 
workload problem in many mills. 
· The principal limitation of the weaving mac.hine is 
the limited use of colors. For fabrics requiring several 
colors the traditional loom must be employed. The possi-
bilities of various colors on the weaving machine may be 
sunnnarized as follo.ws. Any number of colors may be 
employed in the warp ( lengthwise)yarns since the warps are 
made up in advance and are simply fed through the machine. 
The great limitation occurs in the filling (width) yarns. 
Normally only one color is used. It is possible, however, 
to use two colors of yarns in alternate picks. To illus-
trate, let us assume we are weaving black· and white yarns. 
We could alternately weave black and white yarns. But any 
other combination, let us say five blacks and two whites, 
is impossible. 
As a consequence of the above limitations the 
weaving machine is used principally for fabrics with a 
one-color filling. 
There is a strong possibility that ·this color limi-
tation may be overcome. Early in the summer of 1953 it was 
reported to me by a textile research man that he had ob-
served experimental developments in this matter in Switzer-
land. This statement was later confirmed in other inter-
views. Tt has also been donfirmed that much progress has 
been made on a Warner and Swasey weaving machine in devel~. 
opment in the United States, with a definite color selecbr 
which will alternate in any combination, four different 
. l 
colors in the filling. If this becomes commercially 
lwarner and Swasey Company, Uxbridge, Massachusetts, 
office. 
feasible then the color problem will be susstantially 
overcome, since this range of colors is adequate for 
practically all fabrics. Certain very fancy color com-
binations would still have to be manufactured on tradi-
tional looms which have double the color selection even 
of the experimental weaving machine. 
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The weaving machine is also limited to relatively 
plain weaveE~ For very fancy weaves the traditio~al loom 
is again at an advantage. The experimental weaving ma-
chine is capable of fancier combinations than the exist-
ing machine, since it can use yarns of different weights 
as well as different colors. It appears that the tradi-
tional loom will remain superior (at least for the 
present) in this respe~t. 
In conclusion we may say· that in spite of its. 
disadvantages this machine is easily the outstanding in-
novation of the post-World War II period.. The other in-. 
novations discussed in this thesis are not reduced in 
importance by this evaluation, but none of them has 
introduced so fundament~l a change as has the Sulzer ma-
chine, although it must be added that the pin-dr.after,to 
which we now turn, runs a very close second. 
The Pin-Drafter 
As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, the pin-
drafter is a completely new type of machine which replaces 
the conventional gill formerly used (and still used in, many 
mills) in processing yarn. It is essentially a ·modificatfun 
of the gill, alt~ough it is a more versatile and efficient 
machine than any of the earlier types of gills were. It is 
used in the wool-comoing industry, and it is also used in 
the worst.ed industry. 
The pin-drafter is designed for drafting operations 
before the roving operation on straight wool or biliends of 
wool and synthetics (i.e., synthetic cut staple), and it· 
also may be used with pure synthetic cut staple .ir desired. 
The machine can be .f:ed either a combed sliver or it can be 
fed ball top (both of these are· long-fiber wo?l which has 
. . 
been through the combing process; combed sliver is usually 
stored in cans, and ball. top is the sliver that has been 
wound into large, soft ballsl. In turn,.t~e pin-drafter 
discharges roving yarn either into coiler cans .or as balls~ 
The balls. (which actually do not resemble a spherical ball, 
. 
but rather a cylindrical roll) are tightly wound in packages 
weighing twenty-one pounds in wool and higher with synthetic 
ribera. 
The older conventional drafting assembly made use of 
two rollers and an apron. . The principle of drafting 
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(i.e., attenuating the sliver into a thinner sliver or 
roving yarn) is simple. If wool sliver of a certain 
thickness is passed between rollers that are revolving at 
different rates of speed, some of the fibers will be 
pulled ahead of the other, but the pressure of th.e rollers 
will maintain the body and strength of the sliver. The 
pin-drafter makes use of three rol~s consisting of an 
inner roll which is fluted (?/8" diameter), an outer 
fluted roll (2 5/8n. diameter), both of which contact the 
third roll (2 l/2.n diameter) called the pressure roll. 
The principle is illustrated graphically in Diagram .·4, 
and an actual picture of the n·coiler headn showing the 
sliver passing between the rollers is given in Figure 5. 
Figure 6 illustrates a dual-can delivery pin-drafter,to 
which the stock is also fed it'rom cans,. and Figure 7 il-
lustrates a ball-delivery pin-drafter to which the stock 
is also being fed from balls. Figur.e 8 shows the pin-
drafter with head raised, exposing the pins. 
This concludes our discussion of the technology of 
the major innovations. This· approach was decided upon in 
order to enable the author to give a full description of 
the machines discussed here without encumbering the dis-
cussion of the circumstances which led to their develop-
ment with an undue amount of technical detail. 
276 
Diagram 4 
THRllllil ROLLiR ll\AP'l'ING ON WARNilR SVASiiY PIN ll\.All'nlR 
PIN IRAJII'D\ COIIJI\ HIIAD 
Source a Warner and S.asey- Company-, Textile Uachinery Division 
) 
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Figure 6 
DUAL CAN PIN ffiAFI'ER 
Figure 7 
DUAL BALL. PIN DR AFTER 
Source& Warner a.nd Swasey Company, Textile Machinery Divisi on 
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Figure ij 
Warner and Swaaey Pin Drafter with Head Raiaed Expoaing Faller Beda 
Source: Office of Naval Reae•rch Contract Nonr 478(00). 
Hamburger, Williama •nd Backer, A Survmt to Improve the Utiliz•tion 
of Wool in N~vy Fabrica, R•le~aea Dec• er-10, 1952.--xli aecrecy 
riatr!Ct!Ona on the content• of this document h~ve been lifted. 
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RECENT INNOVATIONS IN THE WOOLEN MD WORSTED 
INDUSTRY QF: THE UNITED STATES 
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This is an essay about entrepreneurial behavior in 
the woolen and worsted industry, which is presently in an 
important period of transition. For many years prior to 
World War II the industry lay dormant, generating no major 
fundamental technological or other changes. A significant 
post-war cluster of innovations materialized, however, 
.which has fomented a revolution, a novel state or artairs 
for the traditionally conservative industry. In the study 
1 . 
of these innovations the approach of J.A. Schumpeter and 
W.R. Maclaurin2 has been employed. These men have empha-
sized the role of innovation in a dynamic economy. 
Descriptive material has been written, principally 
in technical publications, concerning mechanical, chemical, 
corporate, and locational changes. In areas of this study 
~J.A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Go., Inc.,.· 1.939). Also ~ Theory of . 
Economi~ Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1936). 
2w .Rupert Maclaurin, 11 The Process of Technological 
Innovation, The Launching of.a New Scientific Industry," 
The American Economic Review, Vol. XL, No.1, March 1950. 
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... , 
\ which are concerned with such description the author has 
\, id i t , drawn heavily from these sources, prov ing appropr a e 
\ 
\ documentation. These written sources have been supple-
' \ 
mented by the writer's personal observations of the subject 
matter. 
The most significant portion of the work concerns 
\behavio~ of entrepreneurs. Although some case studies 
have been made in other industries, it is the belief of 
the author that this type of research is unique in the 
woolen and worsted industry. Because of the lack of docu-
mentary material concerning entrepreneurial behavior, most 
of the information has been derived from personal inter-
views. In every case ·the principals and their close asso-
ciates were interviewed. All findings·were cross-checked 
in discussion with other personnel of the concern, few of 
whom have been given proper documentary credit. It is be-
lieved that the case histories present a fair and accurate 
picture and that the conclusions drawn from these are valid. 
Possible innovations of all types in the woolen and 
worsted industry_were investigated. The outstanding inno-
vations, however, have been technological, altering the pro-
duction process by developing new machinery and new pro-
cesses as well as new products. 
Maclaurin suggests that the following questions be 
asked where technological innovations are of major 
importance: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Are major changes occurring in the 
sciences underlying the industry? 
Is engineering art in close touch 
wi.th and contributing to these 
advances? 
Is the economic organization of the 
industry conducive to innovation? 
Is capital freely available for 
radical new developments? 
Do the entrepreneurs possess: the 
requisite skills for successful 
innovation?l . 
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These questions have been answered for the woolen 
and worsted industry. Our analysis has been centered on 
the period following World War II, when the above-mentioned 
important group of innovations made significant changes in 
production processes. 
The study has revealed no reasonable new hypothesis 
concerning the timing of innovation in the industry which 
is capable of simple application. Nor does it provide sup-
port for existing theories of innovation. The woolen and 
worsted industries must be viewed as a special case of 
2 
ttTrustified Capitalism, n where innovation is examined 
against the background of the existing scene. 
Inquiry is made into the reasons f'or the clustering 
lw.R. Maclaurin, ~· ~., p. 91. 
2. J.A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, op. cit., p. 96. 
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of innovations during post-World War II years. Such prob-
lems are considered as: why.particular firma innovated and 
others did not; who the innovators were within the firm and 
why they innovated; and the resistances encountered by 
these innovators. The economic environment for innovation 
has been examined, including business condi tiona, labor, 
taxes, competition, state of technology, and availability 
of financing. 
We have thus analyzed the far-reaching changes in 
the industry since World War II. There have been more 
important changes during this period than at any time since 
the invention of the automatic loom and {excluding this one 
invention) since the original development of the industry 
on a factory basis. 
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